On Oct 18, 10:24 pm, "ScottW" wrote:
"Shhhh! I'm Listening to Reason!" wrote in
You seem to imply that Johnson's escalation was a continuation of
Kennedy's policy. You'd be wrong, as usual.
Typical unsubstantiated claims on your part.
Here, 2pid, I'll even spend the time... again, knowing that it's very
likely a total waste of my time. It's OK, 2pid: I enjoy reading
military history. Most professional soldiers do if they are in a
leadership position.
Here you go, 2pid. In an effort to 'discuss' this, I am linking you to
the official US Army history of Vietnam. If you decide to read it, pay
attention to the year 1964 and later. Note the shift from performing
an advisory function to authorization for offensive operations. Note
the other signs of "mission creep" (a self-explanatory military term.)
initiated by Johnson, including large-scale deployments of US troops.
It was McNamara and Johnson, in addition to the JCOS and other
military personnel (Westmoreland comes to mind), who got the ball
rolling after Kennedy's death.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/...ry/chap_28.txt
For a look into the true beginnings our escalation, from the
perspectives of both the military and civilian leadership, you could
always read _Dereliction of Duty_. The author, H.R. McMaster, is a
full colonel currently serving on active duty, although he was only a
peon major when he wrote it. COL McMaster is one of the architects of
the manual on COIN and I believe also serves as an advisor to GEN
Petraeus.
Now that I've gone to this effort to factually advance our
'discussion' and now that I have substantiated the counter to your
erroneous position which you said did not exist, you can just say,
"Ooooops! I was wrong! My bad!" and we'll be done with it.
Or you can always keep defending an impossible 'point' and prove what
everybody already knows: that it's wasted effort in linking you to the
correct information, that clearly-laid-out information is beyond you,
and that you are not really interested in discussions at all. You much
prefer 'discussions' (propaganda) and 'insults' (brainless).
Now for the "Oh, BTW". The conclusion of the chapter on Vietnam in the
official US Army history:
"The rediscovery of the Vietnam War suggests that its most important
legacy may be the lesson that unique historical, political, cultural,
and social [i.e. I would presume that religion is rolled into
"culture" or "social" here, or else its omission is clearly glaring]
factors always impinge on the military. Strategic and tactical success
rests not only on military progress but on correctly analyzing the
nature of the particular conflict, understanding the enemy's strategy
[i.e. within the context of those non-military factors above], and
realistically assessing the strengths and weaknesses of allies. A new
humility and a new sophistication may form the best parts of the
complex heritage left the Army by the long, bitter war in Vietnam."
Perhaps now you begin to see, 2pid, why tactical military successes
are not very high on my radar regarding our overall potential for
success in Iraq. Looking only at the military at the tactical level is
one way to insure failure, as we have done up until now, and which
bushie is trying his ass off to perpetuate. GEN Petraeus' report was
the second most important report given to Congress that day. And
perhaps you'll also begin to see some pretty striking similarities
between Iraq and Vietnam.
Here's another interesting quote from this article:
"First under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency and then
under a military commander, the Special Forces organized the highland
tribes into the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and in time
sought to recruit other ethnic groups and sects in the South as well.
To this scheme, underwritten almost entirely by the United States,
Diem gave only tepid support. Indeed, the civilian irregulars drew
strength from groups traditionally hostile to Saigon. Treated with
disdain by the lowland Vietnamese, the Montagnards developed close,
trusting relations with their Army advisers. Special Forces detachment
commanders frequently were the real leaders of CIDG units. This strong
mutual bond of loyalty between adviser and highlander benefited
operations, but some tribal leaders sought to exploit the special
relationship to advance Montagnard political autonomy. On occasion,
Special Forces advisers found themselves in the awkward position of
mediating between militant Montagnards and South Vietnamese officials
who were suspicious and wary of the Americans' sympathy for the
highlanders."
Substitute "Sunni" and "Shia" and "Kurds" for "Montagnards" and
"Lowlanders" and substitute "Diem" for "Maliki" and see what you get.
This is why I'm not overly optimistic about basing "success" on our
new-found friends, the Sunnis.
And yet another striking similarity: "But potential benefits were
nullified by the absence of a clear doctrine and a coherent
operational strategy for the conduct of counterinsurgency, and by
chronic military and political shortcomings on the part of the South
Vietnamese." You can read about the rampant corruption in the
government of the RVN on your own.
History is a bitch, isn't it, 2pid? It's too bad people never seem to
learn anything from it. It's not too late for you, though, 2pid. I
promise.
Lol!