Clyde Slick wrote:

"Howard Ferstler" wrote in message
...

It would be best if, rather than the DBT protocol, they
debated:

2) Ethics.

I admire your willingness to learn something
completely new.

Regarding the subject of ethics, below is a transcription I
published back in 1975 dealing with someone who was an
expert. The footnotes are often as important as the main
text, by the way.

Man and World: An International Philosophical Review

Editors: JOHN M. ANDERSON, JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS,
and CALVIN 0. SCHRAG

"A Skeleton Key to Spinoza" by Howard Ferstler

November, 1975

Spinoza is one of four philosophers who could legitimately
be called "knowers" in the sense that the whole of reality
was studied by them and was , in a very real sense, revealed
to them. Aristotle and Plato are two others in this
category, and we could legitimately claim Hegel as a fourth
member of this group, although his style of writing has led
some to consider his profundity as merely another form of
obscurity.

Many who read his works see Spinoza's system as a linear,
geometrical progression from definitions of the universal to
a knowledge of particulars. Many are no doubt put off by the
"geometric" style.(1)

For those readers who cannot get past the endless
definitions and propositions (especially in Part I) the
system becomes a melange of tautological statements,
interconnected by some rather good psychological insights
and examples of cynicism. If one resorts to close and
thoughtful reading, however, it is obvious that Spinoza's
"system" is a closed one and not really linear at all.
Furthermore, it will be found to be a circular system, very
similar to that of Hegel as a dramatic voyage of discovery.

The definitions at the beginning and the treatment of God in
particular, are meant to be tools for those who do not have
the truth already.(2) For those who do have a vision of this
truth the tools become something quite different. In
essence, the tools at the beginning of the Ethics, which is
the actual. whole philosophy of Spinoza, and which are
continually revealed and developed throughout that work,
cannot really be understood until the reader has grasped the
totality underlying what he has been saying throughout the
work. Any particular point of view which an uninitiated
reader has when he begins the Ethics must be at least
temporarily abandoned in favor of a sympathetic desire
to understand Spinoza on his own terms.

Once begun, the work should be completed in order for its
true meaning to sink in. Part I, in particular, cannot be
clearly understood until all the remaining parts are
thoroughly digested.(3) It is unlikely that any secondary
source alone or any shortcut technique will succeed in
gaining access to the meaning of Spinoza's philosophy.
There is a definite "dramatic" or developmental foundation
to Spinoza's thought.(4)

Hegel felt that "to be a follower of Spinoza is the
essential commencement of all Philosophy,"(5 ) and he was
right. In Part I of the Ethics, Spinoza explains the entire
foundation of his metaphysics and gives us insights into the
metaphysical systems of those who came before him and of
those who followed as well. Any instructor of philosophy
worthy of the name knows, however, that to explain is not
really enough. Individuals who do not "know" reality will
write off Part I as circular argumentation or tricks with
words. Spinoza appears to be merely giving a new name to
natu God is nature or God is everything around you and
around everyone else as well. His argument, as found in the
proofs and note to Proposition XI of Part I, reminds one of
the Ontological Argument of St. Anselm:

"The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of
power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a
power, as is obvious. If then that which necessarily exists
is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more
powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is
obviously absurd; therefore, either nothing exists or else a
being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also."(6)

This manner of reasoning carries very little weight with
most modern, critical thinkers. They may not mind calling
nature "God" to humor the followers of Spinoza but they
probably will mind the idea that all of this is something
unique. Many who venture to read the Ethics first Part are
ready to write Spinoza off as a carry-over from the Middle
Ages. This would not be a completely inaccurate view of
Spinoza's basic outlook in Part I. It is essential, however,
that the reader understand that Part I is a multi-leveled
work, designed to appeal to one kind of reader in one way
and to an essentially different kind of reader in quite
another. He states himself that Part I is a general
statement and that it is not really very good as a means of
convincing a reader who has not been previously exposed to
the truth.

"I have thought it worth while here to call attention to
this in order to show by this example how the knowledge of
particular things, which I have called intuitive or of the
third kind (II. xl. note ii), is potent, and more powerful
than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge
of the second kind. For although in Part I I showed in
general terms that all things (and consequently, also, the
human mind) depend as to their essence and existence on God,
yet that demonstration, though legitimate and placed beyond
the chances of doubt does not affect our mind so much as
when the same conclusion is derived from the actual essence
of some particular thing, which we say depends on God."(7)

Part I is not really supposed to convince anyone. Part I is
the truth but the truth will not pull anyone up to its level
when it is merely stated. The reader must, in a sense, be
"shown" the truth. A gradual and dramatic revelation must
take place and to get on this pathway one must begin with
the attributes and analyze them to arrive at an adequate
knowledge of things.

Individual things are nothing but modifications of the
attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.(8) So, we find
ourselves starting at certain assumptions and truths
unproven and moving on to prove them.

The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea
of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
essence of things...(9) The same basic view is entertained
in another of Spinoza's works:

"Thus we can see that it is before all things necessary
for us to deduce all our ideas from physical things that is
from real entities, proceeding, as far as may be, according
to the series of causes, from one real entity to another
real entity, never passing to universals and abstractions,
either for sole purpose of deducing some real entity from
them, or deducing them from some real entity."(10)

Spinoza could certainly not be mistaken for a typical
mystic, nor could he be considered in the least
obscure-unless one is willing to admit that the basic
reality is obscure to careless observation. For Spinoza,
"intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
modifications of God, and nothing else."(11)

Part I exists on three levels. First 2 it can be seen in
much the same way as we view Aristotle's Categories. In that
work, Aristotle defines certain terms which he will employ
in his system. One term defined is substance it "is that
which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a
subject; for instance, the individual man or horse."(12)
Secondary substances are the species or genera which are
subsumed under primary substances. Primary substances are
the reference standard. Spinoza uses Aristotle's analysis in
a rather unusual way: a substance cannot be predicated on
anything else. A man is a man, for Aristotle, because he is
by nature a man. He is complete. For Spinoza, God is God
because he is God. He is also complete.

Needless to say, there is one great difference: there are a
lot of substances by Aristotle's definition. Any complete
thing is a substance when taken for what it is as a whole.
For Spinoza, on the other hand, there is one substance only
and everything is literally predicable of it. Aristotle
defines the universal as that which flows out of the
particular.

Universals are names which are ways of categorizing various
particulars. Particulars are real substances for Aristotle
and universals are our way of making them logical.(13) The
universal is substance for Spinoza and particulars are the
way the universal manifests itself to us.

Secondly, Part I can be seen as a form of logic similar to
what Hegel created in his system. For Hegel, logic was the
real manifestation of the concept in the world - as a
concept only. The thinker who knows reality will see that
logic is the content of it. Logic is the real - the mental
content in the mind of the perceptive thinker - devoid of
worldly form.(14) Nature is the form of logic as it is
manifested in space.(15) Part I paints a conceptual
structure which is real but which cannot be understood if
the reader does not already have a good grasp of reality as
it is manifested in the world of action.(16)

Finally, Part I can be taken as the culmination of the whole
body of Spinoza's philosophy. God is truth - the only truth
- and once this is grasped (and it can be grasped by coming
to understand Parts II, III, and IV) the reader is ready for
the drawing together done in Part V. We read in Part II:

"Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity
of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God and
are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
many things which we may adequately know, and we may form
that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note
to II. xi., and of the excellence and use of which we shall
have occasion to speak in Part V."(17)

Part V is usually taken as the culmination of the Ethics,
but it is more than that, for it summarizes the linear
process of the three preceding chapters and raises the whole
work to the level of a complete metaphysical system. In
doing this, it finishes the process of integrating Part I
into the work. Part I becomes and finally is the immanent
truth which is explained in the rest of the work.

Part II, then, begins that process which "proceeds from an
adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate
knowledge of the essence of things."(18) Note that we are
again quoting a critical passage from Part V. Again, in Part
V we find further explanation of what Part II is beginning.

To repeat a critical passage:

"I have thought it worth while here to call attention to
this, in order to show by this example how the knowledge of
particular things which I have called intuitive or of the
third kind (II. xi. note ii.) is potent and more powerful
than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge
of the second kind. For, although in Part I I showed in
general terms that all things (and consequently, also, the
human mind) depend as to their essence and existence on God,
yet that demonstration, though legitimate and placed beyond
the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind so much, as
when the same conclusion is derived from the actual essence
of some particular thing, which we say depends on God."(19)

The way to bring the reader to truth and make him see the
whole is to lead him there by dealing with things which can
be more easily grasped: attributes and modes which can be
visualized and understood. We thus have a process of
development beginning. Part II begins to give us the
information whereby we will be able fully to understand part
I for what it really is.

Probably the most important aspect of Part II is the
discussion of the kinds of knowing.(20) The lowest level of
knowledge is split into two parts in the Ethics for the
purpose of clarification but it still is one level of
knowing opinion and imagination. These flow from either
confused experiences or confused symbols, resulting from
inadequate reflection upon what one has seen or read.
Operating at this mental level is not really "knowing" at
all but merely a form of belief. Ironically, this kind of
"knowing" is probably what Oldenburg, one of Spinoza's
correspondents, engaged in all the time.(21)

The second level of knowing is the ideas we have of the
properties of things. This level is more important than its
being "second" would seem to indicate. It is important to
see that it can be viewed in several ways. First, it can be
seen as theoretical science; second, as another form of
logic; and third, as the generalized truth which Spinoza
himself admits is hard to grasp. This second kind of knowing
is, in a way, consciousness itself and is valid. It is the
truth. It is found in Part I and is Part I, when viewed
conceptually. It is, as I have stated earlier, a form of
logic - logic in the Hegelian tradition.

Spinoza, however, as pointed out above, indicated that
something like this which is in "general terms' is not as
effective at teaching us of reality ""as when the same
conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some
particular thing, which we say depends on God."(22) This is
very important. Part II, as well as Parts III and IV are the
third kind of knowledge in the process of development.

This third kind of knowing is categorized as "'intuition"
but could be more appropriately rendered as "insight." It is
also a process and is the real knowledge of concrete- real
things, as they are in the process of existing. As such, it
reminds one of the Naturphilosophie in Hegel's system.(23)
It is an intimate knowledge of real things in the real
world, but at a level which is fundamentally unstructured.
The structuring has been done in Part I. We have, therefore,
the attributes or modes of thought and extension which are
real particulars but these must be conceptualized to fit
into the schema of Part I.(24) They are the form of the
structured concept in Part I.

Although Part III may at first be thought of as an analysis
of emotion in the tradition of Hobbes and Nietzsche, it is
actually a good deal more than that. Spinoza is here
continuing his analysis of the particulars of the world
begun in Part II. Significantly, at this point we are
working both upward and downward in Spinoza's system. We are
moving downward into the real world to analyze man as he
exists in a passive state. Here, we find man at his
passionate worst. We begin to realize that Spinoza began his
system with the philosopher already outside of Plato's
mythical cave - but the cave, for Spinoza, is a part of
reality too (a very real part) and he is taking us back
inside to discover its meaning.

While this journey (a reverse from Plato) is certainly a
move "downward," we are, at the same time, working our way
upward because we are increasing our knowledge of the real
world which will, ultimately, allow us fully to understand
the world in terms of Part I. This manner of teaching is, of
course, a radical departure from the Platonic method and is
a precursor to the method of Hegel. Part I structured the
whole and Parts II, III, and IV are proving the thesis of
Part I by analyzing the only proofs available: the
manifestations of the whole (God) in the world of
perception; i.e., mind and emotion.

The basic difference between Part II and Part III is that
Part II dealt with the self-contained reality of mind
thinking of itself as an attribute of God. In Part II, mind
is conceived of as "the very idea or knowledge of the human
body, which is in God..."(25) Part III, however, deals with
the relation of the self to the outside world. When the self
does not allow mind to rule, the real world makes the self a
slave of that world. Part III is a brilliant psychological
analysis of. the workings of the mind of the unthinking
individual.

"Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I
name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he
is not his own master."(26) Thus begins Part IV, the lowest
level reached in Spinoza's analysis. It deals with two
themes; one practical, the other spiritual.

First, it deals with practical ethics. Indeed, it is, in a
way, the "ethics" of the Ethics and is concerned with "the
right way of life."(27) Its second theme is important for
those seeking the meaning of Part I, for it is an expansion
of the analysis of the emotions begun in Part III.

This expansion goes further into the analysis of the
passions by showing us the consequences of being a part of
God (both as a mode of thought and extension) without
understanding the relationship of "particular" thought to
"universal" thought. To make headway in our search we must
come to know that:

"The power and increase of every passion and its
persistence in existing are not defined by the power whereby
we ourselves endeavor to persist in existing, but by the
power of an external cause compared with our own."(28)

On this lowest level, we are seeing that a knowledge of
particulars and out response to those particulars is a form
of slavery which results from an ignorance of the structured
whole. Yet, we find that this part of the work (just as the
previous parts did) is gradually revealing this structure to
us; a structure formulated statically before, in Part I, and
which is now being made real for us by the technique
pictured in the discussion of knowledge.(29) Part IV is the
final stage in the analysis of the real world. It shows us
how "human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely
surpassed by the power of external causes..."(30) It is this
knowledge which allows us to understand Part I and to become
really free.

Spinoza is taking us on a mythic journey in the tradition of
Homer, Plato, Dante, and Hegel. Spinoza, however, starts in
heaven, leads us through hell, and, in doing this, leads us
full circle back to the real meaning of heaven.

The Ethics began at a high level which those who deal in
superficialities would not understand (much the same way
that superficial thinkers do not really understand Plato's
cave parable). From this high level, which is, remember, the
second kind of knowledge, we found ourselves moving through
a process which progressively revealed to us, by the third
kind of knowledge, the meaning of the second kind. We came
from a mere statement of universals to the revelation of the
universal in the multitude of particulars in life.

For those who truly do come to understand the particulars
and their relation to the universal, life will have a
meaning above that entertained by the great mass of men.
"The more we understand particular things, the more do we
understand God."(31) Right conduct, then, becomes a matter
of natural behavior(32) and such men have no conflict of
passions; for, "an emotion which is a passion ceases to be a
passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea
thereof."(33) If all men attained such a level of
understanding, we would not have to concern ourselves about
ethical conduct, for "in so far only as men live in
obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in
nature."(34) But all men do not.

"The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not
possess
a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of
right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to
memory, and to apply it forthwith to the particular
circumstances which now and again meet us in life..."(35)

Politically, then, we find that the Ethics is both elitist
and conservative. Most people will never understand
themselves, their world, and the relationship between that
world and themselves. That is why they are trapped by the
environmental slave master which is the whole of reality.
For such people as these, a set of well thought out,
rational laws are the best answer. Such laws should be so
designed "that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of
incurring a greater injury themselves."(36) The mass of men
must give up certain natural rights because they cannot cope
with them. Such laws, although based upon threat,(37) would,
it appears, be best passed during periods of rational
thought, so as to be most effective in curtailing irrational
actions. For those who do understand themselves and live by
reason, a whole new realm is opened.

"A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his
wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life."(38)

Part I, the second kind of knowledge, will, for some
individuals, trigger a desire to know the facts of reality.

"The endeavor or desire to know things by the third kind
of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but instead from
the second kind of knowledge."(39)

The statements of Part I should draw the true lover of
wisdom through the remaining parts in order to discover how
truth is revealed. He who does not care to finish the Ethics
after reading Part I is condemned to be a slave of his
passions. He who does finish and understands, will be
introduced to the realm of immortality. This is a realm that
can only be conceived by embracing God as "Existence" and
which puts the individual on a subjective level with God. On
this level, the individual understands his relation to God
as a part of God.(40)

Part V is not the culmination of the Ethics without a
reflective analysis of Part I. Part V outlines the result of
coming to understand the relation of the world of forms
(attributes and modes) to the world of concept (God as
totality or existence) and, therefore, introduces us to Part
I. The immortality referred to by Spinoza is not exactly in
the Judeo/Moslem/Christian religious tradition. "Its
existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained
through duration..(41) Most men "confuse eternity with
duration..."(42 )because they cannot do more than be
conscious of the particulars of the world as mere
particulars.(43) Relationships, on a larger scale, escape
them because the only valid relationship is that of the
particular to the totality.

"Duration is only applicable to the existence of modes;
eternity is applicable to the existence of substance..."(44)

The philosopher will live at a level that allows him to be
at one with the totality of existence. "The intellectual
love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge,
is eternal."(45) And what is eternity? "By eternity, I mean
existence itself..."(46)

Part I is no longer a mere tool which allows us to penetrate
into reality. Instead, the God of Part I has become the
revealed truth. God is substance or nature and that fact now
has meaning. Man is a mere part of God when he reacts to the
particulars of life only, but becomes God on an intellectual
level and is immortal because knowledge of God is eternal.
Most men have knowledge in God which makes them slaves. They
understand only their limited position in relation to other
particulars but not in relation to the totality. The God
envisioned by Spinoza is immanent Substance, which is Nature
as perceived - and which is, therefore, existence itself.
His God is Aristotle's God. For Aristotle, "there is
something which causes motion without being moved, and this
is eternal, a substance, and an actuality."(47) For
Aristotle, matter exists in principle but is actually "real"
by virtue of energy. Energy is what makes reality "real."
Energy is God for Aristotle in the same spirit as Substance
is God for Spinoza.

Both are another name for reality or the world of nature and
of man alive in nature. God becomes existence itself and the
love of God becomes the love of existence itself. Spinoza
affirms existence. Spinoza affirms life. Part V culminates
our search and shows us the result of our endeavor to know
and leads us back to the real meaning of God in Part I.
------------------

NOTES

All of the quotations from Spinoza were taken from his Chief
Works, Volume 2, translated by R.H.M. Elwes (Dover
Publications, 1951). These were compared with the Latin
edition of his Opera, vol. 1 (Nijhoff, 1914) and with the
Ethics, preceded by On the Improvement of the Understanding,
edited by James Gutman (Hafner, 1949) and found to be
accurate enough.

1. Heinrich Heine, in his Religion and Philosophy in
Germany, translated by John Snodgrass (Beacon Press, 1951)
p. 69, states that "the mathematical form gives to Spinoza's
writings a harsh exterior. But this like the hard shell of
the almond; the kernel is all the more agreeable."

2. Hegel, G.W.F.: in his Science of Logic, 2 vols.,
translated by W.H. Johnson and L.G. Struthers (George Allen
& Unwin, Ltd., 1951) vol. 1, p. 80, "But to ask for
clearness about cognition before the beginning of the
science, is to demand that it shall be discussed outside of
its precincts..."

3. Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Prop. XI, Note, in Works, vol.
2, p. 91. All further quotations from Spinoza will be from
vol. 2 of the Chief Works.

4. The "Proof" to Proposition XLI of the Ethics, 269, which
states that Part V is not fully necessary to the ethical
status of that work, appears to contradict my contention
that the whole work must be read to be understood as a
system. However, Spinoza is writing an "ethical" work and
states "that the qualities attributable to courage and
high-mindedness are of primary importance." The first four
parts can lead one to ethical acts of virtue, but only by
understanding the whole system can one feel joy in the
actions of virtue and know truth. Part V tells us the
author's goals regarding the higher rewards of knowledge.

5. Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3,
translated by E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson (Routledge and
Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1955) P. 257. On the same page, Hegel
points out that "absolute substance is the truth, but it is
not the whole truth." He feels that Spinoza has left out the
process leading up to the conclusions of Part I. One of his
basic objections is the lack of subjective development in
Spinoza's work. In the Science of Logic (vol. 1, p. 266),
Hegel states that Spinoza "begins by defining the infinite
as the absolute affirmation of the existence of any one
Nature, and the Finite on the contrary as determinateness,
or negation." Spinoza posits God as infinite and everything
else as derivative of God or as a part (attribute or mode)
of God. He continues: "But with Spinoza, Substance and its
absolute unity have the form of an inert, that is, of a not
self-mediating, unity, - or rigidity wherein the concept of
the negative unity of the self (Subjectivity) has not yet
found a place." Spinoza, from Hegel's point of view, seems
to begin "in medias res" and has not progressed toward God
from consciousness. Yet, we will show that Spinoza is
progressing toward God in the Ethics. Profound as his
observations were, Hegel did not fully grasp all the nuances
of Spinoza's thought. For example, he was simply wrong when
he came to consider the term "extension" as synonymous with
"Being" (Science of Logic, vol 2, pp. 168-169). For Spinoza,
"extension" was merely one manifestation of "Being."

6. Ethics, Part I, Prop. XI, Another Proof (p. 52).

7. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXXVI, Note (pp. 265-266).

8. Ethics, Part I, Prop. XXV, Corollary (p. 66).

9. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXV, Proof (p. 260).

10. Spinoza, On the Improvement of Human Understanding (P.
36).

11. Ethics, Part I, Prop. XXX (p. 69). Hegel, in the Science
of Logic (vol. 1, p. 126) has the best interpretation of
"modes" and "attributes" that I have seen: "He therefore
conceived of them as Attributes, that is, as such as, having
no separate persistence or Being-in-for-self, exist only),
as transcended, or as moments; or, rather, they are not even
moments, since Substance is that which in itself is quite
indeterminate, the Attributes (as also the Modes) being
distinctions made by an external Understanding."

12. Aristotle, "Categories" in The Basic works of Aristotle,
edited by Richard McKeon (Random House, 1968) p. 9.

13. In the preface to The Philosophy of Right, translated,
notes by T.M. Knox (Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 10, we
read "What is rational is actual and what is actual is
rational." What Hegel is saying is that the real world is,
without man to perceive it, neither rational nor Irrational,
but it is actual. When perceived and Understood by a
thinking man, it is made rational because a thinking
(rational) man understands it. An irrational man would not
understand it and it would be for him irrational because he
had failed to grasp its essence. Rationality and
irrationality are man-created terms, used to describe a
universe that has the capacity to be understood. The
particulars of it are made universal and rational by the
human intellect. See also the Phenomenology of Mind,
translated by J.B. Baillie (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.,
1966) p. 600: "For knowing, is itself the process and
movement of those abstract moments..." The unifying factor
is the thinking individual who grasps the particulars and
gives to them order - the order of his mind.

14. In the Science of Logic, vol. 1, P. 48) we read:
"...logical science, I say, will be the reconstruction of
those thought determinations which are thrown into relief by
reflection, and by reflection are fixed as subjective forms,
forms external to matter and content." Or again (p. 65)
"This is already evident from the fact that the Method is
no-ways different from its object and content; for it is the
content in itself, the Dialectic which it has in itself,
that moves it on." Or still again (p. 69) "The System of
Logic is the realm of shades, a world of simple
essentialities freed from all concretion of sense." In the
section of his Science of Logic, entitled "With What Must
the Science Begin?" (vol. 1, PP. 79-90) Hegel comes right
out and all but literally says that it must begin with
Phenomenology! The development of certainty out of
consciousness is his starting point. Spinoza, however,
begins with a kind of logic of content.

15. History would be its form in time (development) but
Spinoza does not do his developing out of history. Possibly
the single biggest difference between Hegel and Spinoza is
that the former adds another perceived Attribute to God:
history, or the development of the concept (the whole or
"content" of reality) in "time" as well as in space. The
mode called thought manifests itself in time as well as in
the simple thought of the "now." Mind remembers its past
activities and reads of other past activities. In spite of
its profundity, Spinoza might have placed this type of
knowledge on the lower levels of knowing.

16. Ethics, Part V, Preface (P. 244), has Spinoza's view of
logic which is in line with my contention that Part I is not
a teaching section at all. Logic points out "the method and
means whereby the understanding may be perfected," but that
is not a part of his design. But Spinoza's "logic" in Part I
is a conceptual or content-filled logic in the sense that
Hegel used it, and not a traditional logic.

17. Ethics, Part II, Prop. XLVII, Note (p. 18).

18. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXV, Proof (p. 260). Also referred
to in note number 9, above.

19. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXXVI, Note (pp. 765-266). Also
referred to in note number 7, above. This is a quotation to
keep in mind.

20. Ethics, Part II, Prop. XL, Note II (P. 113).

21. The "Correspondence" of Spinoza, in vol. 2 of the Works,
indicates a growing disillusionment on the part of Henry
Oldenburg as he reads more and more of Spinoza's material.
See letters XVII (LXI) and XX (LXXI) for examples.

22. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXXVI, Note (p. 266). This was
also referred to in length in notes 7 and 19 above. A
pivotal statement.

23. The Ethics is surprisingly similar to Hegel's
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in basic
approach. Part I is similar to the section on logic; Part II
through IV to the section on nature (concrete particulars);
and Part V to the section on mind. However, Hegel's "system"
has four parts: phenomenology, logic, nature, and mind. The
Encyclopedia, of course, was designed to be a student's
text, which would be supplemented by lectures. The
Phenomenology of Mind (possibly better translated as
Phenomenology of Spirit), Hegel's great symphony of circles,
was to be the first part of the system and no such
counterpart exists in Spinoza's works. See also note number
5 above for further discussion.

24. I refer the reader back to note number II. Hegel
conceptualizes thought and extension (nature) and also time,
into one, coherent whole.

25. Ethics, Part II, Prop. XIX, Proof (p. 260).

26. Ethics, Part IV, Preface (P. 187).

27. Ethics, Part IV, Appendix (P. 236).

28. Ethics, Part IV, Prop. V (P. 194).

29. Ethics, Part 11, Note II (P. 113).

30. Ethics, Part IV, Appendix XXXII (P. 242).

31. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXIV (p. 260).

32. Ethics, Part IV, Prop. LIX, Proof (P. 227).

33. Ethics, Part V, Prop. III (P. 248).

34. Ethics, Part IV, Prop. XXXV (p. 209).

35. Ethics, Part V, Prop. X, Note (PP. 252-253).

36. Ethics, Part IV, Prop. XXXVII, Note II (P. 214).

37. Ethics, Part IV, Prop. XXXVII, Note II (P. 214).

38. Ethics, Part IV, Prop. LXVII (p. 232).

39. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXVIII (p. 261).

40. This is somewhat different from Hegel, who has the
comprehending individual become God.

41. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXIII, Note (p. 260).

42. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXXIV, Note (P. 264).

43. In the Phenomenology of Mind (or Spirit), Hegel has an
interesting discussion of belief and pure insight
(Enlightenment). For Hegel, the religious mind grasps the
totality (universal) but fails to understand particulars. To
do so would undermine the foundation of belief. Particulars,
however, are normally dealt with by insight (which came into
full bloom in the Enlightenment) and those who master
particulars only, lack the ability to come to grips with the
totality or the "concept." It might be better to divide the
groups into mystics and true-believers. True-believers would
be obsessed with the half-truths inherent in particulars (or
in the mere observation of particulars) while mystics would
simply "intuit" a state of bliss (blissful ignorance).

44. "Correspondence", Letter XXIX (XII), P. 318. This is a
letter to Lewis Meyer, whom Spinoza appears to have taken
more seriously than either Henry Oldenburg or Simon de
Vries.

45. Ethics, Part V, Prop. XXXIII (p. 263).

46. Ethics, Part I, Definition VIII (P. 46).

47. Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated, with commentaries
and glossary by Hippocrates C. Apostle (Indiana University
Press, 1966) Book A, 7, 1072a 25, P. 204. Existence is
activity. Potentiality is a principle which is existent only
as activity. Activity is another name for energy.

--------------------

Below, are some additional thoughts, recently formulated, in
1998.

Both Spinoza and Hegel have been long misinterpreted.
Spinoza's non-anthropomorphic spirituality, and his
separation of ethical behavior from any biblical injunctions
for anything but practical results (relating to the need to
simply keep non-critically thinking people from causing
trouble, or from being made unhappy by the "real" facts of
reality, particularly as it relates to death), plus the
disavowal of the concept of a "temporal" afterlife in
relation to the function of his "God," disconcerted a lot of
people in the 17th and 18th centuries, and would clearly
still be able to disconcert a lot of currently very smug
people if they bothered to read him.

His god is merely the "isness" or energy force that makes
"reality" be what it is, and is completely unrelated to any
human endeavors, hopes, fears, or prayers. Spinoza's
"immortality" involves simply understanding the nature of
non-temporal "eternity" and thinking of that automatically
puts one beyond any concern about time. It is a kind of
stoicism, and his view of God parallels that of Anselm, who
has never struck me as a genuine Christian, his sainthood
notwithstanding. Hegel really admired Spinoza, and while
Hegel was certainly reacting to Kant in a lot of his
writings (who, at least in terms of metaphysics, he
considered a lightweight), he is much more of a Spinozist
than a Kantian. Closer to Aristotle than to Kant, too.

Spinoza's "personal" ethical views are born out of a
knowledge of reality, rather than any coercive dictates,
postulated by wise old men who want to set up puritanical
rules for people to follow. (While some of those who opposed
Spinoza and continue to oppose him, had and have a sincere
belief that he was "wrong" about the nature of God, many
others, including those who had and have attitudes like
Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor, were fearful of him, because
they knew he was "right" about God.) The rules and laws of
civilization are for non thinkers, and certainly have an
important function in any society. (Spinoza was a social
conservative, but very radical when it comes to free
thought.)

However, the real philosophers need no rules, because they
have a grip on things, and will behave properly as a matter
of personal policy. Obviously, this reminds us of Nietzsche,
who also admired Spinoza. He influenced scads of people,
from Einstein, through Maugham, to Whitehead.