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jak163
 
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On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 16:51:29 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
.. .
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 06:03:52 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

The question is why they were not counted and the reason is they voted
incorrectly.


No the question is were people who were eligible to vote unable to do
so. Remember, Michael, there is a right to vote in the Constitution.
You still do not seem to understand this.


Immediately following the contested 2000 presidential election, The U.S
Commission on Civil Rights (hereinafter 'the Commission') conducted a
six-month investigation into Florida's election. The result? The Commission
found absolutely no evidence of systematic disenfranchisement of black
voters. Furthermore, the investigation found no credible evidence that any
Floridians were INTENTIONALLY denied the right to vote in the 2000 election.

The Commission did find, however, that many Florida voters, irrespective of
race, spoiled their ballots by MISTAKE. But voter error is not the same
thing as "disenfranchisement" and it certainly isn't evidence of any
conspiracy or plot to steal or suppress black votes. The Commission also
found violations of the Voting Rights Act in three counties. The infractions
were that some poll workers had been hostile to Hispanic voters, bilingual
assistance hadn't been provided to two Haitian voters and some Hispanic
voters had been denied bilingual assistance. None of the offending counties
was controlled by Republicans!


Michael:

What is the source of this quotation? You certainly did not write it,
and it is moreover a distortion of the findings of the Civil Rights
Commission, which did indeed find widespread violation of the 1965
Civil Rights Act.
  #162   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
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"jak163" wrote in message
...
On 07 Oct 2004 15:59:47 GMT, (Bruce J. Richman)
wrote:


Florida's vote totals (at least those actually counted) indicated a
difference
between the 2 candidates of a little over 500 votes - a relatively small
number.


And the result would have been a Gore victory of all the votes had
been counted:

"Statewide, based upon county-level statistical estimates, black
voters were nearly 10 times more likely than nonblack voters to have
their ballots rejected.

Estimates indicate that approximately 14.4 percent of Florida's black
voters cast ballots that were rejected. This compares with
approximately 1.6 percent of nonblack Florida voters who did not have
their presidential votes counted.

Statistical analysis shows that the disparity in ballot spoilage
rates--i.e., ballots cast but not counted--between black and nonblack
voters is not the result of education or literacy differences. This
conclusion is supported by Governor Jeb Bush's Select Task Force on
Election Procedures, Standards and Technology, which found that error
rates stemming from uneducated, uninformed, or disinterested voters
account for less than 1 percent of the problems.

Approximately 11 percent of Florida voters were African American;
however, African Americans cast about 54 percent of the 180,000
spoiled ballots in Florida during the November 2000 election based on
estimates derived from county-level data. These statewide estimates
were corroborated by the results in several counties based on actual
precinct data."

From the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/exesum


Their findings tend to obscure the whole truth.

The Commission's report failed to note that elections in
Florida are the responsibility of 67 county supervisors of
election. And, in all but one of the 25 counties with the
highest ballot spoilage rates, the election was supervised
by
a Democrat-the one exception being an official with no
party
affiliation. In fact, most of the authority over elections
in
Florida resides with officials in the state's 67 counties,
and
all of those with the highest rates of voter error were
under
Democratic control.
Of the 25 Florida counties with the highest rate of vote
spoilage, in how many was the election supervised by a
Republican? The answer is zero. All but one of the 25 had
Democratic chief election officers, and the one exception
was
in the hands of an official with no party affiliation.
The majority report argues that much of the spoiled ballot
problem was due to voting technology. But elected
Democratic
Party officials decided on the type of machinery used,
including the optical scanning system in Gadsden County,
the
state's only majority-black county and the one with the
highest spoilage rate.
There were certainly jammed phone lines, confusion and
error,
but none of it added up to widespread discrimination. Many
of
the difficulties, like those associated with the
"butterfly
ballot," were the product of good intentions gone awry or
the
presence of many first-time voters. The most compelling
testimony came from disabled voters who faced a range of
problems, including insufficient parking and inadequate
provision for wheelchair access. This problem, of course,
had
no racial dimension at all.
Other notes of significance:
Florida's Attorney General testified that of the 2,600
complaints he received on the election, 2,300 were related
to
the confusing butterfly ballot, and only three complaints
concerned alleged discrimination on the basis of race
An expert on voting rights and election law, Professor
Darryl
Paulson, testified that the problems in Florida were due
to "a
system failure without systemic discrimination." He also
testified: "Across the United States, there were 2.5
million
votes that were not counted. And whenever you
have an election
system that requires 105 million people to vote
essentially in
a span of 12 hours, you have created a system guaranteed
to
have voting problems."
CONVICTED FELONS: Why are they Voting?
Another allegation made of voter disenfranchisement is
Florida's use of a 'convicted felons list' which has the
names
of all convicted felons, which under Florida law, are
banned
from voting. The compilation of the purge list was part of
an
anti-fraud measure enacted by the Florida legislature in
the
wake of a Miami mayoral election in which ineligible
voters
cast ballots The Commission's report asserts that the use
of a
convicted felons list "has a disparate impact on African
Americans." "African Americans in Florida were more likely
to
find their names on the list than persons of other races."
Other points not in the Commission's report:
Whites were twice as likely as blacks to be placed on the
list
erroneously, not the other way around.
According to the Palm Beach Post, more than 6,500
ineligible
felons voted, despite having their names on the 'convicted
felons list. The biggest problem then was that the list
ended
up allowing ineligible voters to cast a ballot--not that
it
prevented voters from casting a ballot.
The sole piece of supporting evidence it cites a table
with
data on Miami-Dade County. Blacks were racially targeted,
according to the report, because they account for almost
two
thirds of the names of the felon list but were less than
one-seventh of Florida's population. It is not only
meaningless but irrelevant. The vast majority of the
people on
the felons' list were properly listed. It was illegal for
them
to vote according to Florida law.
Research revealed that 239 for the 4,678 African Americans
on
the Miami-Dade felons' were eventually cleared to vote
which
represented 5.1 percent of the total number of blacks on
the
felons list. Of the 1,264 whites on the list, 125 proved
to be
there by mistake-which is 9.9 percent of the total. The
error
rate for whites was almost double that for blacks.
The Commission did not hear from a single witness who was
prevented from voting as a result of being erroneously
identified as a felon. One witness did testify that he was
erroneously removed from the voter list because he had
been
mistaken for another individual on the felon list whose
name
and birth date were practically identical to his. However,
he
was able to convince precinct officials that there had
been a
clerical error, and he was allowed to vote.
The Commission completely ignored the bigger story:
Approximately 5,600 felons voted illegally in Florida on
November 7, approximately 68 percent of whom were
registered
Democrats. The Miami Herald discovered that, "among the
felons
who cast presidential ballots, there were "62 robbers, 56
drug
dealers, 45 killers, 16 rapists, and 7 kidnappers. At
least
two who voted were pictured on the state's on-line
registry of
sexual offenders."
Furthermore, the Post found no more than 108 "law-abiding"
citizens of all races that "were purged from the voter
rolls
as suspected criminals, only to be cleared after the
election." In fact during all the various lawsuits against
Florida, only two people testified they weren't allowed to
vote because their names were mistakenly on the list.
Of the 19,398 voters removed from the rolls, more than
14,600
matched a felon by name, birth date, race and gender.
The BALLOTS--An Analysis
According to the Commission's report, some 180,000 Florida
voters in the 2000 election, 2.9 percent of the total,
turned
in ballots that did not indicate a valid choice for a
presidential candidate and thus could not be counted in
that
race.
59% of these ballots were "overvotes". The chief problem
in
Florida was voters who cast a ballot for more than one
candidate for the same office (59%), and the second most
common problem was voters who registered no choice at all.
(35%). Ballots were "rejected," in short, because it was
impossible to determine which candidate-if any-voters
meant to
choose for president.
No statistical significant evidence was presented of
political/race based ballot disqualification. 94% of
Florida
voters simply voted for too many presidential candidates
or
none at all.
Other examples:
* At least one police checkpoint was set up on election
day
near a polling station in a minority neighborhood,
prompting
voters to complain of police intimidation (Despite
claims of
rampant police intimidation and harassment, the only
evidence of law-enforcement "misconduct" consisted of
just
two witnesses who described their perceptions regarding
the
actions of the Florida Highway Patrol. One of these
witnesses testified that he thought it was "unusual" to
see
an empty patrol car parked outside a polling place.
There
was no evidence that sight of the vehicle somehow
intimidated the witness or any other voters from casting
ballots. The evidence, however, shows that the
checkpoint in
question was two miles from the polling place. Moreover,
it
was not even on the same road as the polling facility.
During the checkpoint's approximately ninety minutes of
operation, citations for faulty equipment were issued to
16
individuals, 12 of whom were white. There was no
evidence
that the!
erstwhile occupant of the vehicle harassed voters. There
was
no evidence that the empty vehicle was there for the
purpose
of somehow disenfranchising anyone assigned to vote at
that
location, pulled from National Review, March 09, 2004,
By
Peter Kirsanow ).
* College students and others submitted voter
registration
applications on a timely basis, but in many instances
these
applications were not processed in time for the
applicants
to receive voter registration cards;
* Many Jewish and elderly voters received defective and
complicated ballots that may have produced "overvotes"
and
"undervotes;"
* Some polling places were closed early and some polling
places were moved without notice (including one polling
place which had to be moved due to a fire the night
before);
* Many Haitian-American and Puerto Rican voters were not
provided language assistance when required and
requested;
* Persons with disabilities faced accessibility
difficulties
at certain polling places.
These problems don't rise to the level of invidious
discrimination. There was one case in which a black woman
alleged that she was turned away from a poll at closing
time
whereas a white man wasn't but this allegation could not
be
substantiated.
THE BOTTOM LINE: BUSH WINS RECOUNT after RECOUNT after
RECOUNT
Both the Miami Herald and Palm Beach Post "hardly bastions
of
Republicanism" as Harris has pointed out found that, if
anything, county officials were too permissive in whom
they
let vote, and this largely was to the benefit of Al Gore.

In November 2001, a ballot-by-ballot analysis by a
consortium
of newspapers (the media consortium included The Times,
The
Wall Street Journal, The Tribune Company, The Washington
Post,
The Associated Press, The St. Petersburg Times, The Palm
Beach
Post and CNN. The group hired the National Opinion
Research
Center at the University of Chicago in January to examine
the
ballots) shows that Bush would have won the election clean
if
he'd let Florida go ahead with the partial recount that
Gore
wanted. This proved to a be a political miscalculation.
Gore
only wanted a recount of only four counties -- Palm Beach,
Broward, Miami-Dade and Volusia -- where he expected to
pick
up votes had Gore insisted on recounts throughout the
entire
state, the analysis shows him winning both Florida and the
presidency. Gore's political calculation to put politics
over
principle (every vote should count) arguably cost him the
election. Gore, you will recall, in his daily mantra
sought to
have "every vote count." But in court he asked only for a
hand
recount of undervotes in four counties that favored
Democrats.
Had he sought and won a statewide recount of all votes -
assuming the canvassing boards agreed to the same
standards
used by the consortium of newspapers - he might have won
the
presidency by as many as 115 votes. Maybe.
If Gore had adopted a different legal strategy and if the
courts had agreed to a manual recount of all invalidated
ballots, perhaps he would have won. As The Los Angeles
Times
points out, his best chance lay in a manual recount of the
state's nearly 114,000 overvotes. Although most were
spoiled
by marks for which there was no way to determine voter
intent,
he potentially had valid votes in counties that used
optical
scanning equipment.
The findings show that even if the U.S. Supreme Court had
not
stopped the county-by-county recounts of undervotes
ordered by
the bitterly divided Florida Supreme Court, Bush would
have
won. The high court ruled the lack of a statewide standard
for
hand-counting votes violated the Equal Protection Clause
of
the U.S. Constitution.
Even the venerable New York Times was forced to agree that
Bush won. In its November 12, 2001 paper it Bush "would
have
won under the ground rules prescribed by the Democrats."









  #163   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
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"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
ink.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
k.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
link.net...


Gratuitous name calling noted.


It wasn't directed at you, and it wasn't gratuitous.

Right, referring to me as Duh-Mikey isn't gratutious? It isn't
referring to me?

oh, I remember that there was a much worse insult,
and it wasn't directed at you. I thought you were talking about that,
cause your comment appeared right beneath it, rather than
beneath 'Duh-Mikey'. If you had a little more on the ball,
maybe you could make yourself understood a little better.



Maybe if you had a little more on the ball you'd realize that your excuse
is feeble.


Since my previous post, I have found two other
examples fromm you that deserved "duh-Mikey"
distinction.

Let's just disregard the fact that when I disagree with you, I seem to be
able to do so without name calling.

You're starting to make Lionel look like a man of integrity.


  #164   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 16:51:29 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
. ..
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 06:03:52 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

The question is why they were not counted and the reason is they voted
incorrectly.

No the question is were people who were eligible to vote unable to do
so. Remember, Michael, there is a right to vote in the Constitution.
You still do not seem to understand this.


Immediately following the contested 2000 presidential election, The U.S
Commission on Civil Rights (hereinafter 'the Commission') conducted a
six-month investigation into Florida's election. The result? The
Commission
found absolutely no evidence of systematic disenfranchisement of black
voters. Furthermore, the investigation found no credible evidence that any
Floridians were INTENTIONALLY denied the right to vote in the 2000
election.

The Commission did find, however, that many Florida voters, irrespective
of
race, spoiled their ballots by MISTAKE. But voter error is not the same
thing as "disenfranchisement" and it certainly isn't evidence of any
conspiracy or plot to steal or suppress black votes. The Commission also
found violations of the Voting Rights Act in three counties. The
infractions
were that some poll workers had been hostile to Hispanic voters, bilingual
assistance hadn't been provided to two Haitian voters and some Hispanic
voters had been denied bilingual assistance. None of the offending
counties
was controlled by Republicans!


Michael:

What is the source of this quotation? You certainly did not write it,
and it is moreover a distortion of the findings of the Civil Rights
Commission, which did indeed find widespread violation of the 1965
Civil Rights Act.


I've read the relevant parts of the Commission findings and the above is a
fair assessment of their findings and of the truth.

Excerpt what you find where the violations. In no case did they find any
proof of what the Democrats were alleging.



  #165   Report Post  
jak163
 
Posts: n/a
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On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 18:57:18 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 16:51:29 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 06:03:52 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

The question is why they were not counted and the reason is they voted
incorrectly.

No the question is were people who were eligible to vote unable to do
so. Remember, Michael, there is a right to vote in the Constitution.
You still do not seem to understand this.

Immediately following the contested 2000 presidential election, The U.S
Commission on Civil Rights (hereinafter 'the Commission') conducted a
six-month investigation into Florida's election. The result? The
Commission
found absolutely no evidence of systematic disenfranchisement of black
voters. Furthermore, the investigation found no credible evidence that any
Floridians were INTENTIONALLY denied the right to vote in the 2000
election.

The Commission did find, however, that many Florida voters, irrespective
of
race, spoiled their ballots by MISTAKE. But voter error is not the same
thing as "disenfranchisement" and it certainly isn't evidence of any
conspiracy or plot to steal or suppress black votes. The Commission also
found violations of the Voting Rights Act in three counties. The
infractions
were that some poll workers had been hostile to Hispanic voters, bilingual
assistance hadn't been provided to two Haitian voters and some Hispanic
voters had been denied bilingual assistance. None of the offending
counties
was controlled by Republicans!


Michael:

What is the source of this quotation? You certainly did not write it,
and it is moreover a distortion of the findings of the Civil Rights
Commission, which did indeed find widespread violation of the 1965
Civil Rights Act.


I've read the relevant parts of the Commission findings and the above is a
fair assessment of their findings and of the truth.


What is the source? You must give a citation for direct quotations.

Excerpt what you find where the violations. In no case did they find any
proof of what the Democrats were alleging.


The commission was not evaluating the 2000 allegations of the Gore
campaign. It was asking to what degree disfranchisement in fact took
place. Whether Gore was right or wrong is a separate question from
whether the Civil Rights Act was violated. Gore would have done
himself a favor if he had focused on the civil rights at stake.

I have already quoted the executive summary extensively in responses
to your continuing denial of this occurrence. At this point my answer
to you is to suggest that you read the executive summary or the full
report yourself before you comment further on whether or not
disfranchisement took place. The web site is:
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/main.htm The exective summary is
at: http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/exesum.htm

The Commission also monitors other aspects of the Civil Rights Acts.
If you are really concerned about civil rights I would suggest you
browse the entire site: http://www.usccr.gov


  #166   Report Post  
Lionel
 
Posts: n/a
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Michael McKelvy wrote:


"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
ink.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
k.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
link.net...


Gratuitous name calling noted.


It wasn't directed at you, and it wasn't gratuitous.

Right, referring to me as Duh-Mikey isn't gratutious? It isn't
referring to me?

oh, I remember that there was a much worse insult,
and it wasn't directed at you. I thought you were talking about that,
cause your comment appeared right beneath it, rather than
beneath 'Duh-Mikey'. If you had a little more on the ball,
maybe you could make yourself understood a little better.



Maybe if you had a little more on the ball you'd realize that your
excuse is feeble.


Since my previous post, I have found two other
examples fromm you that deserved "duh-Mikey"
distinction.

Let's just disregard the fact that when I disagree with you, I seem to be
able to do so without name calling.

You're starting to make Lionel look like a man of integrity.


LOL ! It's never too late McKelvy. :-)

Art Sackborg is anxiously looking for his readmission to Middius' court.
....Sniffing Mididus' ass is his prefered role.
  #167   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 16:51:29 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
. ..
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 06:03:52 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

The question is why they were not counted and the reason is they voted
incorrectly.

No the question is were people who were eligible to vote unable to do
so. Remember, Michael, there is a right to vote in the Constitution.
You still do not seem to understand this.


Immediately following the contested 2000 presidential election, The U.S
Commission on Civil Rights (hereinafter 'the Commission') conducted a
six-month investigation into Florida's election. The result? The
Commission
found absolutely no evidence of systematic disenfranchisement of black
voters. Furthermore, the investigation found no credible evidence that any
Floridians were INTENTIONALLY denied the right to vote in the 2000
election.

The Commission did find, however, that many Florida voters, irrespective
of
race, spoiled their ballots by MISTAKE. But voter error is not the same
thing as "disenfranchisement" and it certainly isn't evidence of any
conspiracy or plot to steal or suppress black votes. The Commission also
found violations of the Voting Rights Act in three counties. The
infractions
were that some poll workers had been hostile to Hispanic voters, bilingual
assistance hadn't been provided to two Haitian voters and some Hispanic
voters had been denied bilingual assistance. None of the offending
counties
was controlled by Republicans!


Michael:

What is the source of this quotation? You certainly did not write it,
and it is moreover a distortion of the findings of the Civil Rights
Commission, which did indeed find widespread violation of the 1965
Civil Rights Act.


Chapter 9: Findings and Recommendations


Voting Irregularities in Florida During the 2000 Presidential Election



Chapter 9
Findings and Recommendations



The great majority of Americans . . . are uneasy with injustice but
unwilling yet to pay a significant price to eradicate it.[1]
OVERVIEW
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights conducted an extensive public
investigation
of allegations of voting irregularities during the 2000 presidential
election in
Florida. The investigation, utilizing the Commission’s subpoena power,
included
three days of hearings, more than 30 hours of testimony, 100 witnesses, and
a
systematic review of more than 118,000 pages of pertinent documents.[2]
Perhaps the most dramatic undercount in Florida’s election was the uncast
ballots of countless eligible voters who were turned away at the polls or
wrongfully purged from voter registration rolls.
While statistical data, reinforced by credible anecdotal evidence, point to
widespread disenfranchisement and denial of voting rights, it is impossible
to
determine the extent of the disenfranchisement or to provide an adequate
remedy
to the persons whose voices were silenced in this historic election by a
pattern
and practice of injustice, ineptitude, and inefficiency.
Despite the closeness of the election, it was widespread voter
disenfranchisement, not the dead-heat contest, that was the extraordinary
feature in the Florida election. The disenfranchisement was not isolated or
episodic. And state officials failed to fulfill their duties in a manner
that
would prevent this disenfranchisement.
The Commission does not adjudicate violations of the law, hold trials, or
determine civil or criminal liability. Therefore, the recommendations that
follow urge the U.S. Department of Justice and Florida officials to
institute
formal investigations based on the facts in this report to determine
liability
and to seek appropriate remedies.
The Commission is charged to “investigate allegations in writing under oath
or
affirmation relating to deprivations—(A) because of color, race, religion,
sex,
age, disability, or national origin; or (B) as a result of any pattern or
practice of fraud; of the right of citizens of the United States to vote and
have votes counted. . . .”[3] The Commission is also charged with reporting
its
findings to the President and Congress as appropriate.[4] The uncontroverted
evidence leads the Commission to the following findings and recommendations.
CHAPTER 1: VOTING SYSTEM CONTROLS AND FAILURES
Voter Disenfranchisement
Findings
During Florida’s 2000 presidential election, restrictive statutory
provisions,
wide-ranging errors, and inadequate resources in the Florida election
process
denied countless Floridians of their right to vote.
This disenfranchisement of Florida voters fell most harshly on the
shoulders
of African Americans. Statewide, based on county-level statistical
estimates,
African American voters were nearly 10 times more likely than white voters
to
have their ballots rejected in the November 2000 election.[5]
Poorer counties, particularly those with large minority populations, were
more
likely to use voting systems with higher spoilage rates than more affluent
counties with significant white populations. For example, in Gadsden
County,
the only county in the state with an African American majority,
approximately
one in eight voters was disenfranchised. In Leon County, on the other
hand,
which is home to the prosperous state capital and two state universities,
fewer than two votes in 1,000 were not counted. In Florida, of the 100
precincts with the highest numbers of disqualified ballots, 83 of them are
majority-black precincts.
Even in counties where the same voting technology was used, blacks were
far
more likely to have their votes rejected than whites.
The recently enacted election reform law mandates that a county must use
an
electronic or electromechanical precinct-count tabulation voting system
and
that as of September 2, 2002, a voting system that uses a device for the
punching of ballots by the voter may not be used in Florida.
While technology improvements and the adoption of state-of-the-art voting
systems statewide should reduce overall ballot spoilage rates and lessen
the
disparity between the rate that African Americans’ and white voters’
ballots
are rejected, these enhancements will not, standing alone, eliminate the
racial disparity in ballot rejection rates.
The allocation of adequate financial resources and enhanced, effective
training of poll workers, other election workers, educating voters, and
accountability standards for state and local officials, as well as
technological improvements in voting systems, should reduce the rate at
which
ballots are spoiled and should lessen the disparity in vote spoilage rates
between whites and blacks.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, prohibits intentional
discrimination and forbids practices or procedures that (when considering
the
“totality of the circumstances”) result in people of color being denied
equal
access to the political process.
Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, jurisdictions covered
under
section 5 of the act cannot make voting changes unless and until they
obtain
approval (preclearance) either from the federal district court in
Washington,
D.C., or from the U.S. attorney general. Five Florida counties are subject
to
section 5 requirements: Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough, and Monroe.
Recommendations
1.1 The U.S. Department of Justice should immediately initiate the
litigation
process against the governor, secretary of state, director of the Division
of
Elections, specific supervisors of elections, and other state and local
officials responsible for the execution of election laws, practices, and
procedures, regarding their contributions, if any, to the extraordinary
racial
disparity in the rate that votes were rejected, through their actions or
failure
to act before and during the 2000 presidential election, in violation of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended. Appropriate enforcement action should
be
initiated to ensure full compliance with the election laws.
1.2 The Civil Rights Division in the Office of the Florida Attorney
General
should initiate the litigation process against state election officials who
violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, and/or Title IX of the
Florida statutes through their actions or failure to act before, during, and
after the November 2000 election. Based on the results of the investigation,
appropriate enforcement action should be initiated to ensure full compliance
with the election laws.
1.3 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against all state election officials who through their actions or failure to
act
violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, by not obtaining
preclearance either from the federal district court of Washington, D.C., or
the
U.S. attorney general. Based on the results of the investigation,
appropriate
enforcement action should be initiated to ensure full compliance with the
election laws.
1.4 The state of Florida should institute effective monitoring systems to
ensure the uniform implementation of any voting system that allows for a
precinct count and an opportunity for the voter to correct his or her
ballot;
annually analyze the rejection rates of the voting systems used in the
previous
year; consider, based upon that analysis, decertifying any voting system
that
minimizes the rejection of spoiled ballots; and ensure that there is a
consistent ballot rejection rate throughout the state. The funding
authorized by
the state legislature, but not yet distributed to the counties, must be
sufficient to support this mandate. More specifically, the funding should
ensure
that all counties can obtain the required technology; and can provide
appropriate voter education and effective training for poll workers and
other
election workers and officials. Appropriate administrative rules should be
adopted that provide clear guidance and targeted oversight responsibilities
for
election officials at every level to ensure proper implementation of these
requirements.
1.5 The state of Florida should retain knowledgeable experts to undertake
a
formal study to ascertain the reasons for the disparity in the vote
rejection
rates between white voters and persons of color and then adopt and publicize
procedures to eliminate this disparity. The study should target “best
practices”
that ensure comprehensive poll worker training, enhanced education for
first-time voters, and the delivery of adequate resources in all counties to
resolve problems as they arise on Election Day.
1.6 The five counties subject to section 5—Collier, Hardee, Hendry,
Hillsborough, and Monroe—should take immediate steps to determine if certain
specifications, particularly the “voter responsibilities” provisions set
forth
in the recently enacted Florida election law changes, constitute tests or
devices that trigger preclearance action by the U.S. Department of Justice.
Moreover, the U.S. Department of Justice should review these concerns.
1.7 Adequate financial resources should be allocated to educate voters,
poll
workers, and state election officials on all appropriate policies and
procedures, including, but not limited to, general voting rights, a voter’s
rights while at the polling place, how the voter should use the technology
to
vote for his on her candidate of choice, and the proper procedures to
resolve
issues that arise at the polling place on Election Day.
The Impact of the Purge List on Persons of Color
Findings
The state of Florida’s statutorily mandated purge list, compiled by a
private
firm, was provided to county supervisors of elections with names that were
inexact matches. The data provided demonstrated that this list had at
least a
14.1 percent error rate.
African Americans had a significantly greater chance of being listed on
Florida’s mandated purge list. The probability of names of African
Americans
appearing on the list in error was significantly greater than the
likelihood
of the names of whites being erroneously included on the purge list.
The state of Florida’s use of this purge list, combined with the state law
that places the burden on voters to remove themselves from the list,
resulted
in denying countless African Americans the right to vote.
Recommendations
1.8 The U.S. Department of Justice should immediately initiate the
litigation
process against Florida state officials whose list maintenance activities
during
the 2000 presidential election discriminated against people of color in
violation of federal law or resulted in the denial of people of color to
have
equal access to the political process. The process should focus on at least
the
following factors: the rate African Americans appear on the purge list, the
rate
that African Americans appear on this list in error, the fact that state law
places the burden on the voter to prove his or her innocence to be permitted
to
vote, and the awareness of state officials that names would be placed on
these
lists in error. Appropriate enforcement action should be initiated to ensure
compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.
1.9 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials who implemented list maintenance activities
before, during, and after the November 2000 election that either
intentionally
discriminated against people of color or resulted in the denial of people of
color to have equal access to the political process. The litigation process
should include, but not be limited to, the methodology for the compilation
of
names for the exclusion lists, the burden upon the voter to prove his or her
eligibility status before he or she could remain on the voter rolls, the
forecast of inexact matches on the exclusion lists, the methodology for data
verification, and the criteria for removal of a voter’s name from the voter
rolls. Appropriate enforcement action should be initiated to ensure full
compliance with the election laws.
1.10 The state of Florida should swiftly and uniformly implement specific
provisions of its recently adopted electoral reform laws, to eliminate the
current practice that places the burden on eligible voters to prove they
have
not lost their civil rights to be permitted to vote. Sufficient funding
should
be provided to support this mandate. The appropriate administrative rules
should
be promulgated to ensure implementation of the legislation.
CHAPTER 2: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Voters Not on Rolls and Unable to Appeal
Findings
Many voters who attempted to register to vote were not notified of alleged
application errors until Election Day, or in some instances, after
Election
Day. These voters were also denied the opportunity to correct the
information
so that they could vote.
Other voters in Florida submitted their voter registration applications
well
before the deadline, but on Election Day were informed by poll workers
that
there was no evidence of their registrations.
Many Floridians who were registered and voted in past elections were
informed
for the first time on November 7, 2000, that their names had been removed
prior to Election Day. These individuals were given no opportunity to
appeal
this determination.
On November 7, 2000, countless voters in Florida were denied the
opportunity
to vote because their names did not appear on the lists of registered
voters.
Voters (whose names were removed without notice prior to the November 2000
election) were neither allowed to vote by affidavit nor appeal their
removal
from the voter rolls.
During the 2000 presidential election, poll workers in numerous Florida
counties confronted significant obstacles to communicating with
supervisors of
elections offices to verify the accuracy of voters’ registrations. Because
of
factors such as insufficient telephone systems in supervisors of elections
offices, incorrect use of laptop computers intended to access county voter
registration information, and the lack of a computer in each voting
precinct,
a significant number of eligible Florida residents were denied their right
to
vote.
The state of Florida enacted a new provision in the law that permits
provisional balloting under restricted circumstances. This law is too
restrictive to address the numerous instances caused by governmental
inefficiency or error in which eligible voters may be denied opportunities
to
vote in an election.
Recommendations
2.1 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act violated
relevant federal and/or state laws that required poll workers be able to
communicate with election officials or access data to resolve issues during
the
November 2000 election. The process should include, but not be limited to,
insufficient telephone systems in supervisors of elections offices,
incorrect
use of laptop computers intended to access county voter registration
information, and the lack of at least one computer in each voting precinct
to
access voter registration information. Appropriate enforcement action should
be
initiated to ensure full compliance with the election laws.
2.2 While the newly enacted Florida legislation provides for a
provisional
ballot to those whose eligibility cannot be determined at the precinct where
he
or she should be properly registered, the Florida legislature should enact
legislation and/or appropriate administrative rule promulgation to provide
for
access to a provisional ballot in every polling place and where the voter
executes an appropriate affidavit attesting that he or she is legally
entitled
to vote on Election Day, even if the voter mistakenly believes it is the
precinct where he or she should be properly registered. The state of Florida
should also provide an immediate right to appeal the discarding of a ballot
with
resolution prior to the canvassing of the election or counting of ballots.
Sufficient funding should be provided to support this mandate.
2.3 Any voter who is denied the opportunity to vote on Election Day
should
have an absolute right to appeal this determination, as well as a right to
receive resolution of the issue prior to the canvassing of the election or
the
counting of ballots. Thus, any voter wrongfully denied the right to vote
will
have an opportunity for his or her vote to count in the same election in
which
the denial initially occurred.
2.4 Resources should be allocated to create a system of voter reminder
cards.
These cards should be mailed to voters before every election and inform them
of
their registration status and the location of their polling place. In
addition,
an electronic or automated telephone system could be devised that would
allow
voters to access their registration status and polling place location via
the
Internet or by telephone.
2.5 Each supervisor of elections should devise systems to process voter
registration applications and notify voters of any errors or missing data
within
a reasonable time to maintain eligibility to vote in the next election.
2.6 The Division of Elections should mandate through legislation and/or
appropriate administrative rule promulgation proactive measures to verify
and
update the information received from the supervisors of elections on a
regular
basis to ensure that all properly registered voters are allowed to exercise
their right to vote.
2.7 Supervisors of elections should ensure there is a sufficient number
of
properly trained staff available at their central offices to answer calls
and
resolve problems throughout the day during every election. Moreover,
supervisors
of elections should routinely examine the capability of their respective
offices’ telephone systems to determine whether additional resources should
be
requested to supplement their communication procedures during elections
where a
high volume of voters is expected. Accordingly, during those times,
supervisors
of elections offices should have the capability of increasing the number of
available phone lines in order to meet the demand. Supervisors of elections
should be provided with sufficient funding to accomplish this mandate.
2.8 Poll workers should be adequately trained to use any available
measure
under Florida election law that would permit properly registered individuals
to
vote, including, but not limited to, voting by affidavit, provisional
ballot,
and all language and special needs assistance. Poll workers should continue
to
be given training on the use of laptop computers that are designated for
accessing current voter registration information. Further, all polling
places in
each county should have computers for this purpose. Supervisors of
elections’
staff who are thoroughly familiar with computerized methods of accessing
voter
registration data should be available at each polling site on Election Day
to
assist poll workers.
2.9 Counties should allocate sufficient resources for the effective
implementation of Florida election laws, including, but not limited to, laws
that mandate voter education, poll worker training, laptop computers for
each
precinct, additional phone lines on Election Day, automated registration
systems/software, and administrative costs of appeals.
2.10 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act, violated
relevant federal and/or state laws that ensure polling places are neither
closed
during official poll hours nor moved without the required notification to
affected voters. Appropriate enforcement action should be initiated to
ensure
full compliance with the election laws.
2.11 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act violated
relevant federal and/or state laws by denying voters who arrived at a
polling
place during official poll hours their right to vote. Appropriate
enforcement
action should be initiated to ensure full compliance with the election laws.
2.12 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act violated
relevant federal and/or state laws by neither uniformly informing drivers of
the
“motor voter” registration process nor ensuring that the voter registration
applications arrived at the appropriate supervisor of elections office and
were
processed in a timely fashion. The process should include, but not be
limited
to, the failure to include the names of drivers who satisfactorily completed
voter registration applications to appear on the voter rolls for the
November
2000 election, the failure to inform voter registration applicants that a
driver’s license change does not automatically update voter registration,
and
lack of a verification system to ensure that the appropriate supervisor of
elections received all voter registration applications in a timely manner.
Appropriate enforcement action should be initiated to ensure full compliance
with the election laws.
Polling Places Closed Early or Moved Without Notice
Findings
The official statewide poll hours on November 7, 2000, were 7 a.m. to 7
p.m.
Eastern Standard Time and Central Standard Time. During these times, polls
were to be open and anyone present in a precinct prior to 7 p.m.
maintained
his or her right to vote.
In several instances, voters who had been standing in line before 7 p.m.
were
not allowed to vote, because poll workers stopped the voting at 7 p.m.
In other instances, voters were prevented from entering a polling place
when
the gates automatically locked at 6:15 p.m.
Some polling places were moved without prior notice to the affected
voters.
Some voters who reported to their assigned polling places on Election Day
neither received notice of the move nor were given further instructions on
the
location of their new polling place.
The above voters were not allowed to vote by affidavit or provisional
ballot.
Recommendations
2.13 Once a supervisor of elections determines that a polling place
should
be moved, all affected voters should be promptly notified by mail and the
information should be posted on the county’s Web site and otherwise
publicized
in a manner most effective in reaching the voters of that precinct.
2.14 The former polling place should have clearly posted signs
throughout
the location at a reasonable time preceding the election and on Election
Day,
which not only identify the new polling place, but also provide clear
directions
to the polling place.
2.15 Poll workers should also be provided with a list of all polling
places,
including those that were recently moved and closed. Poll workers should be
able
to inform voters of the location of the new polling place.
2.16 Poll workers should be educated regarding proper poll closing
procedures to ensure that all voters who arrive at the polls before closing
time
are permitted to vote. Florida election law should be changed to permit
those
wrongfully denied an opportunity to vote an immediate right to appeal with
resolution of the issue prior to the canvassing of the election or counting
of
ballots. A listing of all polling places should be widely distributed and
featured prominently in the print media within one week of the election.
National Voter Registration Act: The Motor Voter Law
Findings
Many voters who completed voter registration applications at the
Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) when they updated their driver’s
license information discovered on Election Day that they were not
registered
or their names did not appear on the rolls.
DHSMV examiners did not inform voters that changing their address on their
driver’s license does not automatically register them to vote in the new
county of residence. In addition, DHSMV does not retain copies of voter
registration applications, which are subsequently transmitted to
supervisors
of elections.
Once DHSMV has transmitted voter registration applications to supervisors
of
elections offices, there is no verification system in place to ensure that
the
supervisors of elections received this information.
Once a driver changes his or her driver’s license address, the DHSMV is
not
required to forward voter registration applications to supervisors of
elections offices for the new resident county of the driver.
Recommendations
2.17 The DHSMV should be mandated through legislation and/or appropriate
administrative rule promulgation to forward completed voter registration
applications to the supervisor of elections office of the new county of
residence for the voter.
2.18 Driver’s license examiners should be trained to inform applicants
that
any change in their driver’s license files does not automatically update
their
voter registration information. Examiners should inform voters that
completion
of registration applications does not guarantee the appearance of their
names on
the voter rolls in their county of residence and that applicants should
contact
local supervisors of elections offices for information on their voter
registration status.
2.19 The DHSMV, through enacted legislation and/or appropriate
administrative rule promulgation, should be required to devise a uniform
statewide system of review to verify that supervisors of elections offices
received DHSMV voter registration applications in a timely manner. Copies of
transmitted voter registration applications should be kept in the DHSMV
database
or files for a reasonable time after transmission.
2.20 Resources should be allocated to the DHSMV for the additional staff
and
training required to provide the services recommended.
Police Presence at or Near Polling Sites
Findings
Florida Highway Patrol troopers conducted an unauthorized vehicle
checkpoint
within a few miles of a polling place in a predominately African American
neighborhood. Several Florida voters reported seeing Florida Highway
Patrol
troopers and other uniformed law enforcement officials in and around
polling
places on Election Day.
The Florida Highway Patrol did not anticipate that the existence of the
checkpoint would intimidate voters.
Recommendations
2.21 No law enforcement agency should conduct routine checkpoints or
other
traffic barriers around polling locations. Checkpoints and other traffic
barriers should only occur on Election Day in case of emergencies or exigent
circumstances.
2.22 As recommended in previous Commission reports, public forums
involving
both the community and Florida law enforcement agencies should take place at
regular intervals throughout the year. These forums would allow all in
attendance—including law enforcement officers and officials, elected
officials,
and community members—to learn about and develop a greater respect for the
racial, economic, and cultural diversity of Floridians. The dialogue and
idea
exchange at the public forum should allow concerns to be addressed before
they
become serious grievances, e.g., the perceived use of checkpoints
predominantly
in communities of color, the perceived use of checkpoints on Election Day to
prevent certain communities from participating in the electoral process, and
the
perceived intimidation in the use of checkpoints on Election Day.
CHAPTER 3: RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY?
Delegation of Responsibilities
Findings
Florida’s statutory scheme for elections provides responsibility without
accountability and contributed significantly to the disenfranchisement of
Florida voters.
The governor chose not to exercise his authority to appoint special
officers
to investigate alleged election law violations in response to the
allegations
of impropriety in the 2000 presidential election.
The secretary of state chose to exercise authority to ensure the vote
count
was discontinued and that the vote was canvassed after the election, but
did
little to ensure that Floridians would be able to get to the polls and be
permitted to vote. The secretary’s office did little to ensure that the
state
was prepared for the election, adequate resources were available to
address
problems arising on Election Day, Florida voters received adequate
education
on voting processes, election precincts were appropriately staffed, and
election workers received needed education and training.
The secretary of state delegated her statutory obligation before and
during
the 2000 presidential election, to “[o]btain and maintain uniformity in
the
application, operation and interpretation of the election laws” (as it
relates
to ensuring that legal voters would be permitted to vote) to the degree
that
her duty was exercised on such a discretionary basis as to be arbitrary.
Recommendations
3.1 The U.S. Department of Justice should initiate the litigation process
against the governor regarding his failure to appoint special officers to
investigate alleged election law violations that discriminated against
people of
color. Appropriate enforcement action should be initiated to ensure
compliance
with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.
3.2 The U.S. Department of Justice should initiate the litigation process
against the secretary of state regarding her disregard of statutory
obligations
(as they relate to ensuring legal voters were permitted to vote during
Florida’s
2000 presidential election), which either discriminated against people of
color
or resulted in their denial of equal access to the political process in
violation of federal law. Appropriate enforcement action should be initiated
to
ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.
3.3 The state of Florida should pass legislation requiring the secretary
of
state to ensure that the state is prepared for elections, adequate resources
are
available to address problems arising on Election Day, Florida voters
receive
adequate education on voting processes, election precincts are appropriately
staffed, and election workers receive needed education and training. These
changes should ensure that there is an effective process for challenging a
secretary if he or she does not fulfill these statutory mandates.
3.4 The governor of Florida should immediately appoint special officers
to
investigate alleged violations of election laws under the authority vested
in
him by section 102.091 of the Florida Election Code. If violations are
found,
then the governor should ensure that the violators are prosecuted as
provided
for under the law.
3.5 The Civil Rights Division in the Office of the Florida Attorney
General
should develop a cooperative relationship with the Florida Elections
Commission
and the Florida Division of Elections to ensure that all individuals
complaining
that they were denied the right to vote have their complaints processed by
the
appropriate agency in an expeditious manner.
CHAPTER 4: RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Voter Education
Findings
Although the state Division of Elections is mandated to provide voter
education assistance to the public, as well as voter education technical
support to supervisors of elections, Florida’s supervisors of elections
generally expect the state to provide limited support (e.g., legislative
updates and legal advice) and/or do not anticipate that they will receive
direct resources from the division (such as financial assistance for local
voter education initiatives).
The omission of this possible financial resource contributes to the
counties’
lack of success in providing extensive and consistent outreach to
first-time
voters and those residents with special needs. Currently, it is unclear
whether supervisors of elections would receive state financial support to
fund
local voter education initiatives if they seek the state’s assistance.
Recommendation
4.1 The Division of Elections should cooperate with the appropriate state
and
local authorities (e.g., Florida’s legislature and county boards of
commissioners) to devise a mechanism for supervisors of elections to request
and
receive supplemental state funding for essential voter education initiatives
that address the particular needs of the residents in their respective
counties.
Educating the Public on Voter Fraud and the Mechanics of Voting
Findings
The Division of Elections expended funds to provide public service
announcements and other advertising to fulfill its mandate of educating
the
public on voter fraud. In spite of these expenditures, it is unclear
whether
the public was informed of the essential elements of voter fraud, as
defined
by Florida law. As a result, state estimates of the incidence of voter
fraud
that are based on public reports of alleged fraudulent voting practices
may
not be accurate.
There is no evidence that the Division of Elections spent a comparable
amount
of funds for voter education and/or instructing Florida residents on how
to
cast their votes properly.
The Division of Elections failed to fulfill its obligation to educate
Florida
residents on the mechanics of voting.
Recommendations
4.2 Future public service announcements and advertisements should plainly
define voter fraud, provide succinct examples of when fraud occurs, and
suggest
measures that members of the public can take to prevent and/or report its
occurrence.
4.3 The Division of Elections should also provide an appropriate level of
funding for advertisements and public service announcements that educate
Florida
residents on the mechanics of voting, as well as the importance of voting.
4.4 The Division of Elections should maintain a routine and working
relationship with all supervisors of elections, to become familiar with
voter
education assistance needs of each county, as well as the types of voting
systems used in each jurisdiction.
4.5 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act violated
relevant federal and/or state laws through the manner by which funds were
distributed to polling places or precincts. Appropriate enforcement action
should be initiated to ensure full compliance with the election laws.
No Process for Challenging Reduced Supervisors of Elections’ Budgets
Finding
Florida’s supervisors of elections do not have a specific process to
challenge
the level of funding approved by their respective county boards of
commissioners to update voting equipment, provide relevant voter education
resources, and/or supplement poll worker training. Consequently, expected
voting needs in various counties remain unmet, since supervisors of
elections
have limited financing alternatives to augment reduced budget proposals.
Recommendations
4.6 The secretary of state’s office, the Florida legislature, county
boards
of commissioners, and supervisors of elections should jointly create a
process
for supervisors of elections to challenge local funding decisions. Possible
solutions include requiring an amendment to the Florida statutes in order to
permit supervisors of elections access to an appeals process (as
constitutional
officers); or providing state financing to fund proposed budgets of
supervisors
of elections offices, if specific prerequisites have been met (e.g., the
anticipated unavailability of county financing).
4.7 The state of Florida should enact a specific law to authorize use of
state emergency funds that are earmarked for elections preparation in order
to
supplement proposed budgets of supervisors of elections offices. This
funding
would be accessible to supervisors of elections when adequate county
financing
is not available. Sufficient funding should be provided to support this
mandate,
and appropriate administrative rules should be promulgated to ensure
meaningful
implementation of the law.
Inconsistent Poll Worker Training among Florida’s Counties
Findings
The quantity and quality of training provided to poll workers vary among
counties. As a result, poll workers throughout the state do not receive
consistent guidance on issues that affect an individual’s right to vote
(e.g.,
instructing residents on the mechanics of voting, appropriately assisting
voters with disabilities, offering substitute ballots when spoilage
occurs,
and verifying voters’ registration).
The secretary of state and the Division of Elections failed to provide
clear
and consistent guidance for the training of poll workers.
Recommendations
4.8 Each county board of commissioners should regularly review its
respective
county’s financial allocation for poll worker training. Input from the
secretary
of state’s office may be required to ensure uniform instruction materials
and
guidance on state voting regulations, as well as funding for supplemental
training. To determine the effectiveness of training curricula, supervisors
of
elections offices should routinely obtain responses from a representative
sample
of each county’s poll workers regarding any difficulties they encountered on
Election Day, how prepared they were to solve these problems, and
suggestions on
improving their training courses. Information derived from these responses
should be included in the design of future poll worker training curricula.
4.9 State and county officials should establish certification
requirements
for poll workers to assure the public that poll workers have recently been
instructed in the basics of election law and procedures.
CHAPTER 5: THE REALITY OF LIST MAINTENANCE
Who Are the Disenfranchised?
Findings
Approximately 3.9 million Americans are disenfranchised or separated from
their right to vote in public elections due to their status as former
offenders.
Over 36 percent of the total disenfranchised population of these offenders
consists of African American men.
Thirteen percent of African American men are disenfranchised.
Thirty-one percent of the Florida disenfranchised population consists of
African American men.
Florida’s recently enacted electoral reform law failed to change the
state’s
policy of permanently disenfranchising former felons, which produces a
stark
disparity in disenfranchisement rates of African American men compared
with
their white counterparts. The state also failed to reform the laborious
and
protracted executive clemency application procedures.
Recommendations
5.1 The state of Florida should authorize legal measures to ensure that
former felons receive automatic restoration of their civil rights upon
satisfaction of their sentences, including probation. Sufficient funding
should
be provided to support this mandate. Moreover, appropriate administrative
rules
should be promulgated to monitor the implementation of the law. The governor
should issue an executive order to streamline the executive clemency
application
procedures to provide the swift restoration of civil rights to persons who
are
so entitled.
5.2 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act violated
relevant federal and/or state laws by permanently disenfranchising voters on
the
basis of felony conviction. Appropriate enforcement action should be
initiated
to ensure full compliance with the election laws.
5.3 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act violated
relevant federal and/or state laws through the method by which private
entities
were involved with list maintenance activities. The process should include,
but
not be limited to, the failure to include persons adjudicated mentally
incompetent to vote in the compilation of the exclusion lists, the matching
logic prescribing for false positives or inexact matches, the inclusion of
criminal history information from states other than Florida, and the failure
to
prescribe uniform provisions for voters who erroneously appeared on the
exclusion lists. Appropriate enforcement action should be initiated to
ensure
full compliance with the election laws.
5.4 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act violated
relevant federal and/or state laws by failing to provide standard training
to
election employees. The process should include, but not be limited to,
whether
the Division of Elections provided technical assistance to the supervisors
of
elections on voter education and election personnel training services;
monitored
and approved training courses for continuing education for supervisors of
elections; and coordinated, on an annual basis, two statewide workshops for
the
supervisors of elections by reviewing and providing updates on the election
laws
to ensure uniformity statewide in the interpretation of the election laws.
The
process should also consider the standards by which names were removed from
the
voter rolls. Appropriate enforcement action should be initiated to ensure
full
compliance with the election laws.
5.5 The Civil Rights Division in the Office of the Florida Attorney
General
should initiate the litigation process against state election officials
whose
actions or failure to act violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended,
and/or Title IX of the Florida statutes through the failure to give full
faith
and credit to the automatic restoration of civil rights in other states; and
the
inconsistencies in the Executive Clemency Board’s policy statement (that
felons
who enter Florida with their civil rights need not apply for civil rights in
Florida) and its rules (requiring that the felons who enter Florida must
apply
for civil rights in that state). Appropriate enforcement action should be
initiated to ensure full compliance with the election laws.
Data Verification
Findings
The 1997 Miami mayoral election, with its high incidence of voter fraud,
gave
impetus to the drive for a statutory requirement for the state to award a
contract to a private entity to assist in purging the voter files.
The Division of Elections solicited bids from private entities through
requests for proposals. The first contract was rewarded to Professional
Analytical Systems & Services. DBT Online was ultimately awarded the
contract
through an invitation to negotiate.
The Division of Elections instructed DBT Online, through a Requirements
Document, to use last name, first name, and date of birth as matching
criteria
for the felon exclusion list.
Although persons adjudicated as mentally incompetent to vote, in
accordance
with Florida election laws are to be purged from the voter rolls, DBT
Online
was not required to include such data in its list. DBT Online provided a
list
of duplicate registrants, deceased persons, and felons whose civil rights
have
not been restored.
The purge list was compiled using certain state-provided databases. DBT
Online
provided databases in conjunction with the matching logic prescribed by
the
Division of Elections. The matching logic prescribed by the Division of
Elections for compiling the purge list resulted in inexact matches (“false
positives”). The Division of Elections contracted for the more inclusive
methodology of processing the data and did not require DBT Online to
produce a
list of exact matches.
There were no clear guidelines from the governor, the secretary of state,
or
the director of the Division of Elections to subordinates to employ list
maintenance strategies that would protect eligible voters, particularly
historically disenfranchised populations, from being wrongfully removed
from
the voter registration rolls.
An official of the Division of Elections dictated to representatives of
the
private firm to employ a strategy that resulted in a disproportionate
number
of eligible African American voters being removed from the voter
registration
rolls in error.
The Division of Elections failed to take the same cautionary steps before
the
2000 presidential election that were taken before the 1998 election to
alert
supervisors of elections to verify the exclusion lists with the greatest
of
care and to provide opportunities for persons to vote by affidavit ballot
in
those instances in which the voter makes a credible challenge to his or
her
removal from the voter registration rolls.
Weary state officials missed opportunities to provide necessary training
to
supervisors of elections on verification procedures, even when scheduled
or
requested.
Recommendation
5.6 The state of Florida should authorize legal measures to ensure that
no
registered voter is purged from voter rolls or files, unless he or she is an
exact match of someone who is deceased, also registered to vote in another
jurisdiction, a convicted felon without restoration of his or her civil
rights,
or someone adjudicated as mentally incompetent to vote. The state of Florida
should provide clear guidance to the Division of Elections on how to use
information provided from its own state agencies to determine the
eligibility of
registered voters. Sufficient funding should be provided to support this
mandate, and the appropriate administrative rules should be promulgated that
establish, with clear guidance, accountability standards and effective
monitoring mechanisms to protect voters and the integrity of the voter
registration rolls.
Executive Clemency in Florida
Findings
The Division of Elections required DBT Online to include felony conviction
and
clemency information from 11 other states. Five of the 11 states have
automatic restoration of civil rights for former felons. Thus, there was
no
clemency board database from which DBT Online could easily match the names
of
probable felons. Six of the 11 states do not have automatic restoration of
civil rights for former felons. DBT Online matched the names of felons
against
the clemency databases of each of those states.
The Division of Elections instructed DBT Online that those felons who were
convicted outside the state of Florida and restored their civil rights in
a
state other than Florida should apply for clemency in Florida.
Florida case law states that the full faith and credit clause of the
United
States Constitution requires the state of Florida to recognize the
restoration
of an individual’s civil rights from another state(s).
On February 16, 2001, the Commission questioned the policy of requiring
felons
whose civil rights were restored in another state to apply for clemency in
Florida. On February 23, 2001, the Office of Executive Clemency issued a
letter stating that former felons who enter the state of Florida with
restored
civil rights need not apply for civil rights in Florida.
Recommendations
5.7 The state of Florida should establish clear guidance and monitoring
systems to ensure that a practical appeal mechanism exists for those Florida
residents whose names appear on a purge list. Sufficient funding should be
provided to support this mandate, and the appropriate administrative rules
should be promulgated.
5.8 The state of Florida should authorize legal measures, as the Florida
legislature appears to have done in recently enacted legislation, to ensure
that
the policy statement issued by the Office of Executive Clemency on February
23,
2001, is codified through enacted legislation and/or appropriate
administrative
rule promulgation. Sufficient funding should be provided to support this
mandate.
5.9 The state of Florida should ensure through enacted legislation and/or
other appropriate action that modifications are made in the state’s statutes
and
constitution to comply with the policy statement issued by the Office of
Executive Clemency on February 23, 2001.
List Verification and Removal of Names
Findings
Supervisors of elections had no uniform method to verify the information
on
the exclusion lists.
Some supervisors of elections chose not to use the information on the
exclusion lists in any manner.
One supervisor of elections, who has never been convicted of a felony,
received a letter stating that she was identified as a convicted felon.
Former director of the Division of Elections, Ethel Baxter, instructed
supervisors of elections that if they had any doubts as to the accuracy of
the
felony information, they should allow the person to vote by affidavit.
There is no evidence that in preparation for the 2000 presidential
election,
the director of the Division of Elections took proper steps to ensure that
supervisors of elections were informed about the errors in the exclusion
lists.
The Florida Elections Commission has authority to investigate the wrongful
removal of a Floridian from the voter rolls with evidence of a willful
violation.
Recommendations
5.10 Although the recently enacted Florida legislation appears to
provide
some level of instruction on list verification, the Division of Elections
should
provide step-by-step instructions on how supervisors of elections verify the
accuracy of any information that may purge a voter from the central voter
file.
5.11 Supervisors of elections should verify the veracity of any
information
that may purge a voter from the central voter file, prior to the removal of
any
name from the voter rolls.
5.12 The Florida legislature should broaden the scope of the Florida
Elections Commission’s authority to investigate the wrongful removal of a
Floridian from the voter rolls, with not only evidence of a willful
violation,
but also negligent removal of a Floridian from the voter rolls.
5.13 The Florida Elections Commission should better advertise the scope
of
its investigative and enforcement authority to the public, by not only
posting
information on its Web site, but also by using other forms of media most
effective in reaching the voters of each community.
5.14 The Florida legislature should appropriate funding to support the
broader scope of investigative authority of the Florida Elections Commission
and
its additional advertising efforts.
CHAPTER 6: ACCESSIBILITY ISSUES
Special Needs
Findings
In the November 2000 election, countless Floridian voters with special
needs
were denied their right to vote due to inaccessible precincts and ballots.
Many precinct managers and poll workers were not properly trained to
handle
individuals with accessibility needs, including those with physical
disabilities and language barriers.
Access to Polling Places for People with Disabilities
Findings
It is estimated that voter participation for individuals with physical
disabilities is 15 percent to 20 percent below that of the general
population.

The inaccessibility of the nation’s voting systems means that many
individuals
with disabilities are unable to vote. In addition, many people with
disabilities find themselves forced to cope with inaccessible polling
places
that fail to provide accommodations.
In the November 2000 election, Florida voters with disabilities who rely
on
wheelchairs were forced to negotiate steps and unreachable polling booths
or
undergo humiliation by relying on others to lift them into the polling
places
to exercise their right to vote. Others who did not have these options
were
simply turned away, which denied them their right to vote.
Some voters with visual impairments found that the precincts did not have
proper equipment to assist them in reading their ballots and, therefore,
they
had to rely on others to cast their votes, which denied them a secret
ballot.
As one supervisor of elections conceded, many precincts are inaccessible.
Some
require ramps to comply with the accessibility requirements and others
should
be “replaced” as they cannot be made accessible.
Although a 1992 Federal Election Commission study of local jurisdiction
data
collected through self-reporting found that 86 percent of the polling
places
in the United States are physically accessible to individuals with
disabilities, a recent report using data based on independent surveys and
court documents suggests that potentially over 40 percent of polling
places
“continue to pose significant accessibility problems for voters with
disabilities.”
Despite the Voter Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, which
requires that all polling places be physically accessible to voters with
disabilities, numerous Florida precincts are not accessible to voters with
disabilities. Thus, many Floridians with disabilities were disenfranchised
in
the November 2000 election.
Access to Polling Places for People Needing Language Assistance
Findings
Despite the requirements that non-English-proficient voters be provided
with
some form of language assistance, many limited-English-speaking voters
were
denied this assistance at Florida’s polling places in the November 2000
election.
Many poll workers were not properly trained on the requirements of
language
assistance and thus failed to assist non-English-proficient voters. Even
bilingual members of the public were prevented from providing language
support. In some instances, bilingual poll workers were directed not to
provide language assistance. Thus, these non-English-speaking voters found
that their polling places offered ballots that were essentially
inaccessible
to them.
Haitian Americans and Spanish-speaking voters were disproportionately
affected.
In some central Florida counties, Spanish-speaking voters did not receive
bilingual assistance and some of these counties were subject to section
203 of
the Voting Rights Act. This failure to provide proper language support led
to
widespread voter disenfranchisement of possibly several thousand
Spanish-speaking voters in central Florida.
Numerous Haitian Americans did not receive proper language assistance.
Even in
precincts where a county ordinance required bilingual ballots, the
precincts
failed to do so; as a result, many Haitian American voters were denied the
opportunity to vote.
Under Florida law, voters are allowed five minutes to cast their ballots.
It
is difficult for some limited English proficient voters to cast ballots
within
this time period. These voters either did not have a complete opportunity
to
cast their votes or their votes were not counted. As a result, they were
denied meaningful participation in the November 2000 election.
Recommendations
6.1 State and county officials should allocate funding and resources to
train
precinct managers and poll workers on providing required assistance to
individuals with disabilities and non-English-speaking voters. This training
should not only focus on the mechanics of providing assistance, but it
should
also include sensitivity training to provide services to better assist and
accommodate individuals with special needs.
6.2 The Florida legislature should enact similar legislation to the Voter
Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act that directs the state
Elections Commission to study and collect data on accessibility of polling
places in Florida.
6.3 State and county officials should establish minimum standards for
polling
places, ensuring that they are fully accessible to individuals with
disabilities
and that individuals with special language needs receive proper language
assistance in order to exercise their right to vote.
6.4 To ensure the uniformity of the application of election laws in
Florida,
the secretary of state should require that each supervisor of elections
submit a
report to the secretary of state that certifies that each polling site in
the
county is accessible to persons with disabilities and individuals with
special
language needs. In response, the secretary of state should assess the
certification no later than 30 days prior to an election. All polling places
deemed inaccessible through the above assessment process should be made
accessible through a cooperative relationship between the secretary of
state,
supervisors of elections, and county commissioners.
6.5 The Florida legislature should enact legislation and/or appropriate
administrative rule promulgation ensuring that the state of Florida complies
with the requirements of the Voter Accessibility for the Elderly and
Handicapped
Act and other applicable federal laws.
6.6 All inaccessible precincts should be relocated to buildings that are
accessible or made accessible through the use of ramps. At a minimum,
curbside
voting should be provided to voters with disabilities.
6.7 All curbside voting should be conducted by poll workers or
plain-clothed
sheriffs when a county law requires that the sheriffs be used for this
process.
No uniformed law enforcement officers should be required to be present at or
near polling places, where this presence may cause intimidation of voters.
6.8 The Division of Elections and the supervisors of elections should
provide
accessible ballots for non-English-speaking voters. Florida voting machinery
should contain the ability to accommodate the language needs of the
multilingual
population of Florida. The new optical scan voting machines can be
programmed in
most, if not all, languages, eliminating language barriers that exist with
old
voting systems (e.g., punch cards).
6.9 The Florida legislature should pass legislation and/or appropriate
administrative rule promulgation that would allow the secretary of state to
mandate that each supervisor of elections submit a report detailing steps
and
procedures that each county has taken to comply with legal language
assistance
requirements.
6.10 Supervisors of elections should actively recruit bilingual poll
workers
to assist bilingual voters. Furthermore, there should be a language
assistance
mechanism that is readily available for voters who need such support on
Election
Day.
6.11 The U.S. Department of Justice should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials who implemented practices during the 2000
presidential election that either intentionally discriminated or resulted in
discrimination against persons with disabilities and language minorities,
including, but not limited to, the enforcement of a five-minute voting rule
and
the requirement to enter the voting booth alone. Appropriate enforcement
action
should be initiated to ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as
amended, as well as other applicable federal laws. The state of Florida
should
amend section 101.51 of the Florida statutes through enacted legislation
and/or
appropriate administrative rule promulgation to affirm (1) that persons with
disabilities and those requiring language assistance have “sufficient
reason” to
occupy a voting booth for more than five minutes, and (2) that persons
requiring
language assistance may enter the voting booth with someone to assist them
with
casting ballots for the candidates of their choice.
6.12 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act violated
the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, the Voter Accessibility for the
Elderly
and Handicapped Act, and other relevant federal and/or state laws by failing
to
provide reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities and voters
with
limited English proficiency. The process should include, but not be limited
to,
whether polling places, polling booths, and ballots were accessible to all
voters, including individuals with disabilities; and whether voters with
limited
English proficiency and individuals with disabilities were provided with
assistance to not only understand the ballot, but also to cast the ballot
for
the candidates of his or her choice. Appropriate enforcement action should
be
initiated to ensure full compliance with the election laws.
6.13 The state of Florida should require through legislation or
appropriate
administrative rule promulgation that supervisors of elections consult
people
with disabilities, people with limited English proficiency, and their
advocacy
and affected community groups to ensure that ballots are readily understood
by
voters. State officials should establish strategies to provide adequate
assistance for persons with disabilities and persons with limited English
proficiency.
CHAPTER 7: CASTING A BALLOT
Voting by Affidavit and Provisional Ballot
Findings
Florida election law grants supervisors of elections tremendous discretion
in
determining who will ultimately be permitted to vote.
The Florida Election Code authorizes voting by affidavit in numerous
situations, based on prior approval of the supervisor of elections. An
individual may seek to vote by affidavit if there is a change of address,
a
change of name, the voter requires assistance due to disability, his or
her
right to vote is challenged, or if the voter’s name does not appear in the
precinct registration book.
The Florida Office of the Secretary of State and its Division of Elections
failed to provide clear guidance and proper training to ensure supervisors
of
elections acted uniformly in providing equal opportunities in the use of
affidavits.
On November 7, 2000, some voters who were eligible to vote by affidavit
were
not informed of that right—or were led to believe they did not have such a
right—by poll workers who did not clearly understand the law or did not
convey
accurate information.
One of the key irregularities in Florida during the 2000 election was a
near-statewide inability of poll workers to reach supervisors of elections
to
verify voter eligibility or to obtain authorization to permit the
individual
to vote by affidavit. Thus, countless citizens were denied the right to
vote.
Provisional ballots protect the rights of eligible voters as well as the
integrity of the electoral process by counting the provisional ballot only
after election officials have verified the voter’s registration status and
eligibility. Eligible votes are then added during the final tally.
The Election Reform Act allows for voting by provisional ballot but
specifically holds that if the voter is registered in a different precinct
from the one in which the ballot is cast, then the provisional ballot will
not
be counted.
Recommendations
7.1 The state of Florida must effectively implement the provisions of its
recently enacted Election Reform Act and ensure (1) poll workers are no
longer
required to contact supervisors of elections for authorization to vote by
affidavit, and (2) alternative measures to verify voter eligibility are
created
that would minimize or eliminate the need to contact supervisors of
elections on
the day of an election.
7.2 Sufficient funding should be provided to support the mandates of the
Election Reform Act that relate to affidavit voting and provisional ballots,
and
the appropriate administrative rules should be promulgated to provide
effective
monitoring mechanisms that will ensure implementation of the legislation.
7.3 Poll workers should be trained on the use of affidavits and
provisional
ballots during elections. If a voter’s eligibility cannot be immediately
determined, poll workers should be instructed to inform the voter of the
affidavit procedure and know how to assist the voter in properly casting his
or
her vote.
7.4 When a person votes by affidavit, the ballot should be
distinguishable
from other ballots. If it is discovered that information in the affidavit is
false, a mechanism should be in place during the verification process that
would
capture and annul the fraudulent vote, as well as notify the voter of the
reason
for the rejection of the ballot.
7.5 While the recently enacted Election Reform Act provides for limited
use
of voting by provisional ballot, the state of Florida should provide an
absolute
right to a provisional ballot in every polling location where the voter
executes
an appropriate affidavit attesting that he or she is eligible to vote.
7.6 The state of Florida should provide voters with an immediate right to
appeal the discarding of any ballot or the refusal of any opportunity to
vote
prior to the final canvassing of the election.
7.7 The secretary of state should require each supervisor of elections to
submit a report to the Division of Elections providing detailed information
on
the specific steps that will be taken to ensure that voters are given
adequate
notice and other information about opportunities and requirements relating
to
voting by affidavit or provisional ballot. The report must also include
detailed
information about the training of poll workers and other election officials
to
implement these provisions. Based on these reports, the secretary of state
must
assess the voter education and training needs in each county and provide
adequate resources as needed.
7.8 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division in the
Office of the Florida Attorney General should initiate the litigation
process
against state election officials whose actions or failure to act violated
the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, and other relevant federal and/or
state
laws by failing to allow voters to cast ballots through the use of affidavit
procedures prescribed in the election code. Appropriate enforcement action
should be initiated to ensure full compliance with the election laws.
CHAPTER 8: THE MACHINERY OF ELECTIONS
Voting Systems and Spoiled Ballots
Findings
During Florida’s 2000 presidential election, different voting systems,
with
varying error rates, were used throughout the state. The evidence
indicates
that Florida voters in poorer communities, as well as voters in
communities
where the majority of residents are people of color, were more likely to
use
voting systems that cause higher spoilage rates. It is clear that every
voter
did not have an equal opportunity to have his or her vote counted.
Florida voters who cast their ballots and then had those ballots tabulated
at
a central location were more likely to lose their votes through spoiled
ballots than were voters who used precinct-based counting (PBC)
technology.
PBC voting systems can be programmed to “kick out” invalid ballots and
allow
voters to correct overvote errors occurring at the polling site. Florida
law
gives voters three opportunities to cast a correct ballot.
Even if machines incorporate PBC technology to identify and kick out
invalid
ballots so voters can try again, it does not guarantee the feature will be
used. During the November 2000 election, at least two Florida counties
turned
off that part of the machine to cut costs and save time. Disabling the
kick
out feature of this technology, which can easily be done, resulted in
thousands of spoiled ballots that otherwise might have been corrected.
In Florida, 22 of the 23 counties with the lowest spoilage rates used
precinct-based optical scan technology. On average, the spoilage rate for
counties using the precinct-based optical scan technology was 0.83
percent—far
lower than the average spoilage rates for either central-based optical
scan
technology (5.68 percent) or central-based punch card technology (3.93
percent).
Recommendation
8.1 The state of Florida should enact legislation requiring the use of an
electronic or electro-mechanical precinct-count tabulation voting system.
These
technologies will significantly increase the chances that a voter will have
his
or her vote count. The legislation should specifically prohibit the
dismantling
of the kick out feature of the machines since the main purpose of the
technology
is to identify and kick out invalid ballots, allowing voters to try again if
necessary. Sufficient funding should be provided for this mandate. The
appropriate administrative rules should be promulgated to ensure proper
monitoring of each stage of the implementation of the new law.
Ballot Confusion
Findings
There was substantial voter ballot confusion during Florida’s 2000
presidential election. In some jurisdictions this led to unprecedented
numbers
of invalidated ballots through overvoting. The majority of the complaints
were
registered in Palm Beach and Duval counties.
In Palm Beach County, there was massive voter confusion due to the design
of
the so-called butterfly ballot. The confusion played a role in more than
19,000 Palm Beach County voters punching two separate holes when voting
for
President, thereby invalidating their ballots with an overvote. The
confusion
also played a role in Reform Party candidate Patrick J. Buchanan receiving
approximately 3,400 votes in Palm Beach County—far more than anywhere else
in
the state—despite the fact there were only 337 Reform Party members in the
county.
The Commission concurs with the findings of a representative of the
National
Organization on Disability, who concluded that the butterfly ballot’s
design
was “absolutely irresponsible” for use by persons with visual impairments.
In Duval County, the ballot placed the names of presidential candidates
over
two pages, leading thousands of voters to invalidate their ballots by
voting
on both pages. This problem was compounded by the sample ballot’s
instructions, which explicitly guided voters to “vote all pages” of the
ballot.
Recommendation
8.2 The state of Florida should ensure through legislation or
administrative
rulemaking that ballot designs are as uniform and as easy to read and
understand
as possible for all Florida residents, including individuals with
disabilities
and those with language assistance needs. Because of their instrumental role
in
creating and/or approving ballot designs, this should include training for
supervisors of elections and their staffs—including training on how to
conduct
effective outreach efforts seeking advice and input from disability rights
and
other community groups. Sufficient funding should be provided for this
mandate,
and the appropriate administrative rules should be promulgated to monitor
the
implementation of the legislation.
CONCLUSION
While some of those denied the right to vote in the November 2000 election
no
doubt were legally denied that right, others who should have been legally
entitled to vote were also denied that right. Indeed as this report
demonstrates, Florida state law in some instances virtually guaranteed that
some
citizens who were legally entitled to vote would be denied that right. The
statute’s silence on other instances provided tacit approval for the denial
of
some to vote. Not all voices were heard on Election Day, and the law
provides no
meaningful way for their voices to now be heard. Picking winners and losers
is
rarely an easy task. Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Bush v.
Gore
opined, “Although we may never know with complete certainty the winner of
this
year’s presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear.
It
is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as the impartial guardian of the
rule of
law.”[6] There are, however, those like Cathy Jackson and Donnise DeSouza
who
lost the chance to speak through their ballots on Election Day but who now
speak
to the nation through this report about their Election Day experiences.
“Voting
is the language of our democracy and regrettably, when it mattered most,
real
people lost real opportunities to speak.”[7]
Florida officials have a formidable challenge and responsibility. First,
they
must hold themselves accountable for the significant array of voting
irregularities that occurred on their watch. Second, they must move swiftly
to
meaningfully implement reform measures signed into law by Governor Bush.
They
must establish monitoring and control systems to facilitate effective
communications among all levels of officials in the electoral system. There
must
be adequate funding, better training, more voter education resources,
increased
access for special needs populations, and greater responsiveness to the
voting
rights of all people.






[1] Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Where Do We Go From He Chaos
or
Community?” in A Testament of Hope: the Essential Writings and Speeches of
Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James Melvin Washington (Harper Collins
Publishers,
1991), p. 562.


[2] This report was subjected to required reviews to ensure its legal
integrity
and to give affected agencies an opportunity to review and provide comments.
The
governor, secretary of state, and the Florida attorney general, among
others,
were given an opportunity to review and respond to those portions of the
report
affecting their offices. These comments were then considered and where
appropriate are reflected in this final report.


[3] 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).


[4] 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(c)(2) (2000).


[5] These figures are based on a complex statistical analysis of statewide
estimates using county-level data. The analysis is more fully presented in a
report prepared by Dr. Allan Lichtman. See app. VII.


[6] Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. at 542.


[7] U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, “Status Report on Probe of Election
Practices in Florida During the 2000 Presidential Election,” Mar. 9, 2001,
p. 3.

Here's the dissenting statement.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE FLORIDA ELECTION REPORT: DISSENTING STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM AND COMMISSIONER RUSSELL G. REDENBAUGH

July 19, 2001


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The United States Commission on Civil Rights, charged with the statutory
duty to investigate voting rights violations in a fair and objective manner,
has produced a report that fails to serve the public interest. Voting
Irregularities Occurring in Florida During the 2000 Presidential Election is
prejudicial, divisive, and injurious to the cause of true democracy and
justice in our society. It discredits the Commission itself and
substantially diminishes its credibility as the nation's protector of our
civil rights.

The Commission's report has little basis in fact. Its conclusions are based
on a deeply flawed statistical analysis coupled with anecdotal evidence of
limited value, unverified by a proper factual investigation. This shaky
foundation is used to justify charges of the most serious nature-questioning
the legitimacy of the American electoral process and the validity of the
most recent presidential election. The report's central finding-that there
was "widespread disenfranchisement and denial of voting rights" in Florida's
2000 presidential election-does not withstand even a cursory legal or
scholarly scrutiny. Leveling such a serious charge without clear
justification is an unwarranted assault upon the public's confidence in
American democracy.

The statistical analysis in the report is superficial and incomplete. A more
sophisticated regression analysis by Dr. John Lott, an economist at Yale Law
School, challenges its main findings. Dr. Lott was unable to find a
consistent, statistical significant relationship between the share of voters
who were African Americans and the ballot spoilage rate.

Furthermore, Dr. Lott conducted additional analysis beyond the report's
parameters, looking at previous elections, demographic changes, and rates of
ballot spoilage. His analysis found little relationship between racial
population change and ballot spoilage, and the one correlation that is found
runs counter to the majority report's argument: An increase in the black
share of the voting population is linked to a slight decrease in spoilage
rates, although the difference is not statistically significant.

Nothing is more fundamental to American democracy than the right to vote and
to have valid votes properly counted. Allegations of disenfranchisement are
the fertile ground in which a dangerous distrust of American political
institutions thrives. By basing its conclusion on allegations that seem
driven by partisan interests and that lack factual basis, the majority on
the Commission has needlessly fostered public distrust, alienation and
manifest cynicism. The report implicitly labels the outcome of the 2000
election as illegitimate, thereby calling into question the most fundamental
basis of American democracy.

What appears to be partisan passions not only destroyed the credibility of
the report itself, but informed the entire process that led up to the final
draft. At the Florida hearings, Governor Jeb Bush was the only witness who
was not allowed to make an opening statement. The Chair, Mary Frances Berry,
was quoted in the Florida press as comparing the Governor and Secretary of
State to "Pontius Pilate... just washing their hands of the whole thing." On
March 9, six commissioners voted to issue a "preliminary assessment"-in
effect, a verdict-long before the staff had completed its review of the
evidence.

The report claims that "affected agencies were afforded an opportunity to
review applicable portions"; in fact, affected parties were never given a
look at the preliminary assessment, and had only ten days in which to review
and respond to the final report, in violation of established procedures and
previous promises.

Most recently, a request for basic data to which we-and indeed, any member
of the public-were entitled was denied to us. The Commission hired Professor
Allan Lichtman, an historian at American University, to examine the
relationship between spoiled ballots and the race of voters. We asked for a
copy of the machine-readable data that Professor Lichtman used to run his
correlations and regressions. That is, we wanted his computer runs, the data
that went into them, and the regression output that was produced. The
Commission told us that it did not exist-that the data as he organized it
for purposes of analysis was literally unavailable. Professor Lichtman, who
knows that as a matter of scholarly convention such data should be shared,
also declined to provide it.

Even now, five weeks after our first request, we still have not received the
multiple regressions and the machine-readable data that were used in them.
They are the foundation upon which the Commission's report largely rests.

At the June 13 monthly Commission meeting, members of the commission staff
and some commissioners argued that this document is not a proper "dissent"
but a "dissenting report," and that the commission cannot allow the
preparation of a dissenting report. In a July 10 memo, the staff director
stated that the Commission "does not envision any Commissioner "engag[ing]
in a complete reanalysis of the staff s work." But it is obviously
impossible to write a thorough dissent without reanalyzing the quantitative
and other evidence upon which important claims have been based.

Perhaps no previous member of the commission has felt the need to write
quite such a lengthy critique of a report endorsed by the majority. But the
explanation may be that the Commission has never written an important report
that so demanded elaborate critical scrutiny. In any event, it is curious
that an agency devoted to the protection of minority rights should show so
little respect for the freedom of expression of its own members who happen
to disagree with the majority on an issue.

Process matters. And that is why it is important to examine, with integrity,
possible violations of the electoral process in Florida and other states.
When the process is right, participants on another day can revisit the
outcome-use the procedures (fair and thus trusted) to debate policy or to
vote again. But when the process is corrupt, the conclusions themselves
(current and future) are deeply suspect. The Commission investigated
procedural irregularities in Florida; it should have gotten its own house in
order first.

Had the process been right, the substance might have been much better. The
Commission's staff would have received feedback from Florida officials,
commissioners, and other concerned parties, on the basis of which it might
have revised the report. It should be consulting with commissioners in the
course of drafting a report, including those who do not share the majority
view. As it is, at great expense, the Commission has written a dangerous and
divisive document. And thus it certainly provides no basis upon which to
reform the electoral process in Florida or anywhere else.

SUMMARY
I. The statistical analysis done for the Commission by Dr. Allan Lichtman
does not support the claim of disenfranchisement.

The most sensational "finding" in the majority report is the claim that
black voters in the Florida election in 2000 were nine times as likely as
other residents of the state to have cast ballots that did not count in the
presidential contest. Dr. Lichtman's work does not establish this dramatic
claim.

(a) Disenfranchisement is not the same thing as voter error. The report
talks about voters likely to have their ballots spoiled; in fact, the
problem was undervotes and overvotes, some of which were deliberate (the
undervotes, particularly). But the rest are due to voter error. Or machine
error, which is random, and thus cannot "disenfranchise" any population
group. It was certainly not due to any conspiracy on the part of supervisors
of elections; the vast majority of spoiled ballots were cast in counties
where the supervisor was a Democrat.

(b) The ecological fallacy: The majority report argues that race was the
dominant factor explaining whose votes counted and whose were rejected. But
the method used rests on the assumption that if the proportion of spoiled
ballots in a county or precinct is higher in places with a larger black
population, it must be African American ballots that were disqualified. That
conclusion does not necessarily follow, as statisticians have long
understood. This is the problem of what is termed the ecological fallacy.

We have no data on the race of the individual voters. And it is impossible
to develop accurate estimates about how groups of individuals vote (or
misvote) on the basis of county-level or precinct-level averages.

(c) The failure to consider relevant explanatory variables: The Commission's
report assumes race had to be the decisive factor determining which voters
spoiled their ballots. Indeed, its analysis suggests that the electoral
system somehow worked to cancel the votes of even highly educated,
politically experienced African Americans.

In fact, the size of the black population (by Dr. Lichtman's own numbers)
accounts for only one-quarter of the difference between counties in the rate
of spoiled ballots (the correlation is .5). And Dr. Lichtman knows that we
cannot make meaningful statements about the relationship between one social
factor and another without controlling for or holding constant other
variables that may affect the relationship we are assessing.

Although Dr. Lichtman claims to have carried out a "more refined statistical
analysis," neither the Commission's report nor his report to the Commission
display evidence that he has successfully isolated the effect of race per se
from that of other variables that are correlated with race: poverty, income,
literacy, and the like. A complex model applied to the Florida data by our
own expert, Dr. John Lott, enables us to explain 70 percent of the variance
(three times as much as Dr. Lichtman was able to account for) without using
the proportion of African Americans in each county as a variable.

In fact, using the variables provided in the report, Dr. Lott was unable to
find a consistent, statistically significant relationship between the share
of voters who were African American and the ballot spoilage rate. Further,
removing race from the equation, but leaving in all the other variables only
reduced ballot spoilage rate explained by his regression by a trivial
amount. In other words, the best indicator of whether or not a particular
county had a high or low rate of ballot spoilage is not its racial
composition. Other variables were more important.

(d) The obvious explanation for a high number of spoiled ballots among black
voters is their lower literacy rate. Dr. Lichtman offers only a perfunctory
and superficial discussion of the question, and fails to provide the
regression results that allegedly demonstrate that literacy was irrelevant.
This claim is impossible to reconcile with the Commission's own
recommendation that more "effective programs of education for voters" are
needed to solve the problem. Moreover, the data upon which he relies are too
crude to allow meaningful conclusions. They are not broken down by race, for
one thing.

(e) First time Voters: An important source of the high rate of ballot
spoilage in some Florida communities may have been that a sizable fraction
of those who turned out at the polls were there for the first time and were
unfamiliar with the rules of the electoral process. Impressionistic evidence
suggests that disproportionate numbers of black voters fell into this
category. The majority report's failure to explore-or even mention-this
factor is a serious flaw.

(f) The Time Dimension: Most social scientists understand that the
interpretation of social patterns on the basis of observations at just one
point in time is dangerously simplistic. But that is all the majority report
offers. It focuses entirely on the 2000 election returns.

Dr. Lott, by contrast, did two analyses that take the time dimension into
account. He looked at spoilage rates by county for the 1996 and 2000
presidential races, and compared them with demographic change. A rise in a
county's black population did not result in a similar rise in spoilage
rates, suggesting, again, that race was not the causal factor at work.

Dr. Lott also examined data from the 1992, 1996, and 2000 races, and found
that the "percent of voters in different race or ethnic categories is never
statistically related to ballot spoilage."

(g) County-level Data v. Precinct Data: The Commission's report, as earlier
noted, estimates that black ballots were nine times more likely to be
spoiled than white ballots. And it presents some precinct-level data,
providing estimates based on smaller units that are likely to be somewhat
closer to the truth than estimates based on inter-county variations. The
report ignores the fact that the county-level and precinct-level data
yielded quite different results. Ballot rejection rates dropped dramatically
when the precinct numbers were examined, even though comparing heavily black
and heavily nonblack precincts should have sharpened the difference between
white and black voters, rather than diminishing it. Dr. Lichtman obscures
this point by shifting from ratios to percentage point differences.

Dr. Lichtman's precinct analysis is just as vulnerable to criticism as his
county-level analysis. It employs the same methods, and again ignores
relevant variables that provide a better explanation of the variation in
ballot spoilage rates. No variables other than race and the type of voting
system were even considered in this analysis.

(h) Whose Fault Was It? The majority report lays the blame for the supposed
"disenfranchisement" of black voters at the feet of state
officials-particularly Governor Jeb Bush and Secretary of State Katherine
Harris. In fact, however, elections in Florida are the responsibility of 67
county supervisors of election. And, interestingly, in all but one of the 25
counties with the highest spoilage rates, the election was supervised by a
Democrat-the one exception being an official with no party affiliation.

The majority report argues that much of the spoiled ballot problem was due
to voting technology. But elected Democratic Party officials decided on the
type of machinery used, including the optical scanning system in Gadsden
County, the state's only majority-black county and the one with the highest
spoilage rate.

(i) The Exclusion of Florida's Hispanics: Hispanics are a protected group
under the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, the majority report speaks repeatedly
of the alleged disenfranchisement of "minorities" or "people of color." One
section is headed "Votes in Communities of Color Less Likely to be Counted."
And yet the crucial statistical analysis provided in Chapter 1 entirely
ignores Florida's largest minority group-people of Hispanic origin. The
analysis in the Commission's report thus excluded more Floridians of
minority background than it included.

The analysis conducted by Dr. Lichtman treats not only Hispanics, but Asians
and Native Americans as well as if they were, in effect, white. He
dichotomizes the Florida population into two groups, blacks and "nonblacks."

In the revised report, Dr. Lichtman did add one graph dealing with Hispanics
in the appendix, but this addition to his statistical analysis is clearly
only an afterthought. At the June 8 Commission meeting, Dr. Lichtman stated
he looked at this issue only at the last minute. This is a strange and
regrettable omission.

II. The Testimony of Witnesses Fails To Support the Claim of Systematic
Disenfranchisement

Based on witnesses' limited (and often, uncorroborated) accounts, the
Commission insists that there were "countless allegations" involving
"countless numbers" of Floridians who were denied the right to vote. This
anecdotal evidence is drawn from the testimony of 26 "fact witnesses,"
residing in only eight of the state's 67 counties.

In fact, however, many of those who appeared before the Commission testified
to the absence of "systemic disenfranchisement" in Florida. Thus, a
representative of the League of Women Voters testified that there had been
many administrative problems, but stated: "We don't have any evidence of
race-based problems... we actually I guess don't have any evidence of
partisan problems." And a witness from Miami-Dade County said she attributed
the problems she encountered not to race but rather to inefficient poll
workers: "I think [there are] a lot of people that are on jobs that really
don't fit them or they are not fit to be in."

Without question, some voters did encounter difficulties at the polls, but
the evidence fails to support the claim of systematic disenfranchisement.
Most of the complaints the Commission heard in direct testimony involved
individuals who arrived at the polls on election day only to find that their
names were not on the rolls of registered voters. The majority of these
cases were due to bureaucratic errors, inefficiencies within the system,
and/or error or confusion on the part of the voters themselves.

III. The Commission Failed to Distinguish Between Bureaucratic Problems and
Actual Discrimination

Other witnesses did offer testimony suggesting numerous problems on election
day. But the Commission, in discussing these problems, failed to distinguish
between mere inconvenience, difficulties caused by bureaucratic
inefficiencies, and incidents of possible discrimination. In its report, the
complaint from the voter whose shoes were muddied on the path to his polling
place is accorded the same degree of seriousness as the case of the
seeing-impaired voter who required help in reading the ballot, or the
African American voter who claimed she was turned away from the polls at
closing time while a white man was not.

There were certainly jammed phone lines, confusion and error, but none of it
added up to widespread discrimination. Many of the difficulties, like those
associated with the "butterfly ballot," were the product of good intentions
gone awry or the presence of many first-time voters. The most compelling
testimony came from disabled voters who faced a range of problems, including
insufficient parking and inadequate provision for wheelchair access. This
problem, of course, had no racial dimension at all.

IV. The Report's Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act Distorts the Law

The report essentially concludes that election procedures in Florida were in
violation of the Voting Rights Act, but the Commission found no evidence to
reach that conclusion, and has bent the 1965 statute totally out of shape.

The question of a Section 2 violation can only be settled in a federal
court. Plaintiffs who charge discrimination must prevail in a trial in which
the state has a full opportunity to challenge the evidence. To prevail,
plaintiffs must show that "racial politics dominate the electoral process,"
as the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee Report stated in explaining the newly
amended Section 2.

The majority's report implies that Section 2 aimed to correct all possible
inequalities in the electoral process. Had that been the goal, racially
disparate registration and turnout rates-found nearly everywhere in the
country-would constitute a Voting Rights Act violation. Less affluent, less
educated citizens tend to register and vote at lower rates, and, for the
same reasons, are likely to make more errors in casting ballots, especially
if they are first time voters. Neither the failure to register nor the
failure to cast a ballot properly-as regrettable as they are -are Section 2
violations.

Thus, despite the thousands of voting rights cases on the books, the
majority report cannot cite any case law that suggests punch card ballots,
for instance, are potentially discriminatory. Or that higher error rates
among black voters suggest disenfranchisement.

There is good reason why claims brought under Section 2 must be settled in a
federal court. The provision requires the adjudication of competing claims
about equal electoral opportunity-an inquiry into the complex issue of
racial fairness. The Commission is not a court and cannot arrive at verdicts
that belong exclusively to the judiciary. Yet, while the majority report
does admit that the Commission cannot determine if violations of the Voting
Rights Act have actually occurred, in fact it unequivocally claims to have
found "disenfranchisement," under the terms of the statute.

V. Misplaced Responsibility for Election Procedures

The report holds Florida's public officials, particularly the governor and
secretary of state responsible for the discrimination that it alleges.
"State officials failed to fulfill their duties in a manner that would
prevent this disenfranchisement," it asserts. In fact, most of the authority
over elections in Florida resides with officials in the state's 67 counties,
and all of those with the highest rates of voter error were under Democratic
control.

The report charges that the governor, the secretary of state and other state
officials should have acted differently in anticipation of the high turnout
of voters. What the Commission actually heard from "key officials" and
experts was that the increase in registration, on average, was no different
than in previous years; that since the development of "motor voter"
registration, voter registration is more of an ongoing process and does not
reach the intensity it once did just prior to an election; and that, in any
event, registration is not always a reliable predictor for turnout.

The majority report also faults Florida state officials with having failed
to provide the 67 supervisors of elections with "adequate guidance or
funding" for voter education and training of election officials. What the
report pointedly ignores is that the county supervisors are independent,
constitutional officers who make their budget requests to the boards of
county commissioners, not to the state.

VI. The Commission's Analysis of the Felon List is Misleading

The report asserts that the use of a convicted felons list "has a disparate
impact on African Americans." "African Americans in Florida were more likely
to find their names on the list than persons of other races." Of course,
because a higher proportion of blacks have been convicted of felonies in
Florida, as elsewhere in the nation. But there is no evidence that the state
targeted blacks in a discriminatory manner in constructing a purge list, or
that the state made less of an effort to notify listed African Americans and
to correct errors than it did with whites. The Commission did not hear from
a single witness who was actually prevented from voting as a result of being
erroneously identified as a felon. Furthermore, whites were twice as likely
as blacks to be placed on the list erroneously, not the other way around.

The compilation of the purge list was part of an anti-fraud measure enacted
by the Florida legislature in the wake of a Miami mayoral election in which
ineligible voters cast ballots. The list for the 2000 election was
over-inclusive, and some supervisors made no use of it. (The majority report
did not bother to ask how many counties relied upon it.) On the other hand,
according to the Palm Beach Post, more than 6,500 ineligible felons voted.

Based on extensive research, the Miami Herald concluded that the biggest
problem with the felon list was not that it wrongly prevented eligible
voters from casting ballots, but that it ended up allowing ineligible voters
to cast a ballot. The Commission should have looked into allegations of
voter fraud, not only with respect to ineligible felons, but allegations
involving fraudulent absentee ballots in nursing homes, unregistered voters,
and so forth. Across the country in a variety of jurisdictions, serious
questions about voter fraud have been raised.

VII. Unwarranted Criticism of Florida Law Enforcement

Despite clear and direct testimony during the hearings, as well as
additional information submitted by Florida officials after the hearings,
the report continues to charge the Florida Highway Patrol with behavior that
was "perceived" by "a number of voters" as "unusual" (and thus somehow
"intimidating") on election day. In fact, only two persons are identified in
the report as giving their reactions to activities of the Florida Highway
Patrol on election day. One testified regarding a police checkpoint, and the
other testified that he found it "unusual" to see an empty police car parked
outside of a polling facility. Neither of these witnesses' testimony
indicates how their or others' ability to vote was impaired by these events.

VIII. Procedural Irregularities at the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

Procedural irregularities have seriously marred the report. The Commission
ignored not only the rules of evidence, but the agency's own procedures for
gathering evidence. By arguing that "every voice must be heard," while in
fact stifling the voice of the political minority on the Commission itself,
it is guilty of gross hypocrisy.

Among the procedural problems in the drafting of the report:

a.. Republican-appointed commissioners were never asked for any input in
the composition of the witness list or in the drafting of the report itself.
In fact, at one point, we were denied access to the witness lists altogether
prior to the hearing. An outside expert with strong partisan affiliations
was hired to do a statistical analysis without consultation with
commissioners.

b.. At the hearings in Florida, the secretary of state and other
Republican witnesses were treated in a manner that fell far short of the
standard of fair, equal and courteous.

c.. The majority reached and released its verdict, in the form of a
"preliminary assessment," long before the report was ready for discussion.

d.. Florida authorities who might be defamed or degraded by the report
were not given the proper time to review the parts of the report sent to
them-to say nothing of their right to review the report in its entirety.

e.. Affected agencies were not given adequate time to review applicable
provisions, and a draft final report was made available to the press that
included no corrections or amendments on the basis of affected agency
comments.

f.. Commissioners were given only three days to read the report-one less
day than three major newspapers had-before its approval by the Commission at
the June 8 meeting. This and other aspects of the process were contrary to
the schedule, and made careful, detailed feedback at the time literally
impossible.

In its efforts to investigate procedural irregularities in Florida, the
Commission has clearly engaged in serious procedural irregularities of its
own. By consistently violating its own procedures for fair and objective
fact-finding, the Commission undermines its credibility and calls into
question the validity of its work.

Part I: The Statistical Analysis Done for the Commission by Dr. Allan
Lichtman Does Not Support the Claim of Disenfranchisement

The most sensational "finding" in the majority report is the claim that
black voters in Florida were nine times as likely as other residents of the
state to have cast ballots that did not count in the presidential contest.
Dr. Lichtman's work does not establish this dramatic claim.

The most sensational "finding" in the majority report, and the one that
received most attention in the press, is the claim that black voters in the
Florida election in 2000 were allegedly nine times as likely as other
residents of the state to have cast ballots that did not count in the
presidential contest, and that 52 percent of all disqualified ballots were
cast by black voters in a state whose population is only 15 percent black.
This charge made the headlines, but it is nothing more than a wild
guesstimate

Dr. Lichtman's statistical analysis is badly flawed, strongly slanted to
support preconceived conclusions that cannot withstand careful scrutiny. The
assertion that votes by African Americans were nine times as likely to be
rejected as those by whites, we will show in detail below, is completely
unsubstantiated. Dr. Lichtman's other estimates are not much more reliable,
and he fails to examine the impact of variables that were of great
importance in determining the outcome.

Below we provide a broader and more sophisticated regression analysis
prepared for us by an econometrician, an analysis which clashes with that
provided in the majority report on virtually every important point.

Disenfranchisement is not the same as voter error.

The report talks about voters likely to have their ballots spoiled; in fact,
the problem was undervotes and overvotes, some of which were deliberate (the
undervotes, particularly). The rest were due to voter error. Or machine
error, which is random, and thus cannot "disenfranchise" any population
group. It was certainly not due to any conspiracy on the part of supervisors
of elections; the vast majority of spoiled ballots were cast in counties
where the supervisor was a Democrat-a point to which we will return.

It is important to note at the outset that the majority report's account of
Dr. Lichtman's findings employs language that serves to obscure the true
nature of the phenomenon under investigation. These pages are filled with
references to the "disenfranchisement" of black voters, as if African
Americans in Florida last year were faced with obstacles comparable to poll
taxes, literacy tests, and other devices by which southern whites in the
years before the Voting Rights Act of 1965 managed to suppress the black
vote and keep political office safely in the hands of candidates committed
to the preservation of white supremacy.

Black votes, we are told again and again, were "rejected" in vastly
disproportionate numbers. "Countless Floridians," the report concludes, were
"denied... their right to vote," and this "disenfranchisement fell most
harshly on the shoulders of African Americans."[1] In a particularly
masterful bit of obfuscation, the majority report declares that, "persons
living in a county with a substantial African American or people of color
population are more likely to have their ballots spoiled or discounted than
persons living in the rest of Florida." This alleged fact, the reader is
told, "starts to prove the Florida election was not equally open to
participation by all."[2]

Let us be clear: According to Dr. Lichtman's data, some 180,000 Florida
voters in the 2000 election, 2.9 percent of the total, turned in ballots
that did not indicate a valid choice for a presidential candidate and thus
could not be counted in that race. Six out of ten of these rejected ballots
(59 percent) were "overvotes"-ballots that were disqualified because they
indicated more than one choice for president. Another 35 percent were
"undervotes," ballots lacking any clear indication of which presidential
candidate the voter preferred.[3] (The other 6 percent were invalid for some
other unspecified reason. Since they are ignored in the majority report,
they will be here as well.)

Hence the chief problem in Florida was voters who cast a ballot for more
than one candidate for the same office, and the second most common problem
was voters who registered no choice at all. Ballots were "rejected," in
short, because it was impossible to determine which candidate-if any-voters
meant to choose for president.

Some of these overvotes, and undervotes, it should be noted, may have been
the result of deliberate choices on the part of voters. In fact, Chair Mary
Frances Berry remarked at the hearing in Miami that she herself has
sometimes "over-voted deliberately."

Chair Berry cannot be the only voter in the United States to make such a
choice. According to the exhaustive investigation of the ballots conducted
by the Miami Herald, 10 percent of all the overvotes in the state showed
votes for both Bush and Gore.[4] Some of these voters, it is reasonable to
assume, were attempting to convey the message that either candidate would be
equally acceptable. Some voters in Citrus County put giant X's through the
names of all presidential candidates, perhaps to indicate "none of the
above."[5]

Similarly, some of the undervotes under discussion here must been recorded
by people who could not settle on a choice for president but who turned up
to register their preferences in other contests. We know from the Miami
Herald's inspection of the 61,111 undervoted ballots in the state that
almost half-46.2 percent-had no markings at all for president.[6] It seems
reasonable to assume that many of them did not intend to register a choice
among the presidential candidates, and had come to the polls to vote for
other offices. According to exit polls in Miami-Dade County, 1 percent of
the voters made choices for other offices, but not in the presidential
race.[7] If so, that would account for 56 percent of all the undervotes in
Miami-Dade.

If half of these unmarked ballots in Florida were produced by voters who
really did not want to make a choice for president, that would reduce the
number of so-called "spoiled ballots" in the state from 180,000 to less than
150,000. It would be interesting if we could make a similar statistical
estimate of the proportion of overvoters who did it deliberately;
unfortunately that is impossible.

What is clear is this: In these instances, overvoting and undervoting are
not "problems" that require "remedies." And they certainly are not evidence
that anyone is being "disenfranchised." They represent the actual
preferences of the voters in question, and it is misleading to label them
"spoiled" ballots at all.

The majority would have us believe that "countless" numbers of Floridians
who were legally entitled to vote had their ballots "spoiled." In fact, we
are not talking about "countless" ballots. We are talking about 180,000
invalid ballots, minus those that did not indicate a clear presidential
choice because the voter had not decided on a presidential preference. Thus
the 180,000 figure, 2.9 percent of the total, is an upper bound estimate of
the true figure, which is undoubtedly smaller by an unknown amount. The
county-by-county figures on so-called spoiled ballots are likewise
exaggerations, biased upward to an unknown amount.

Still, there are overvotes and undervotes that undoubtedly did not reflect
the will of the voters. What accounts for them? The opening paragraph of the
introduction to the majority report suggests that the issue is whether
"votes that were cast were properly tabulated."[8] What does this mean? Are
we to believe African Americans cast their ballots correctly on election
day, but that many of their ballots were incorrectly tabulated by the
machines, or the people who conducted manual recounts in some counties?
There is no evidence whatsoever to support that implication.

Some of the 180,000 rejected ballots may have the result of machine error,
of course-but very few. Machine error, according to experts who have studied
it, is rare, involving at most 1 in 250,000 votes cast.[9] And machine error
is obviously random, and thus cannot "disenfranchise" any population group.
No one has yet shown that a VotoMatic machine can be programmed to
distinguish black voters from others and to record votes by African
Americans in such a way as to facilitate their rejection.

There is only one other explanation of what the Commission tendentiously
describes as "disenfranchisement." The problem is voter error, a term that
astonishingly appears nowhere in the majority report. This is the central
fact the majority report attempts to obscure. Some voters simply did not
fill out their ballots according to the instructions. They failed to abide
by the very elementary rule that you must vote for one and only one
candidate for the office of president of the United States, and therefore
their attempt to register their choice failed. Their ballots were rejected,
and their votes did not count.

The Ecological Fallacy

The majority report argues that race was the dominant factor explaining
whose votes counted and whose were rejected. But the method used rests on
the assumption that if the proportion of spoiled ballots in a county or
precinct is higher in places with a larger black population, it must be
African American ballots that were disqualified. That conclusion does not
necessarily follow, as statisticians have long understood. This is the
problem that is termed the ecological fallacy.

We have no data on the race of the individual voters. And it is impossible
to develop accurate estimates about how groups of individuals vote (or
misvote) on the basis of county-level or precinct-level averages.

Did African American voters in the 2000 Florida election have more
difficulty completing their ballots correctly than did other citizens of the
state, and hence have a higher rate of ballot rejection? Quite possibly so,
but Dr. Lichtman's estimates upon which the Commission relied are open to
very serious doubt. At best, they are highly exaggerated, and strong
evidence (Dr. Lott's research, discussed below) suggests they are entirely
wrong.

How can we figure out whether there were major racial differences in the
rate of voter error or ballot spoilage in the 2000 election? We have no data
whatever on the race of those individuals who cast invalid ballots. We have
secret ballots in the United States, and accordingly cannot know how any
individuals actually voted. Thus we cannot know with any precision how
particular ethnic or racial groups voted, or at what rate their ballots were
actually counted.[10] Whatever conclusions we draw about the matter must be
based on estimates that will be susceptible to error. The question is
whether the analysis and interpretations offered in the majority report are
at least pretty good approximations of reality. There are many reasons to
doubt that they are.

The majority report attempts to draw conclusions about this important matter
by examining county-level, and to a limited extent, precinct-level data. It
argues that race was the dominant factor explaining whose votes counted and
whose votes were rejected. The method employed to reach that conclusion
rests on the assumption that if the proportion of spoiled ballots tends to
increase across counties or across precincts as the proportion of black
residents in those counties increases, it must be African American voters
whose ballots were disqualified. This simple methodology may seem
intuitively appealing-but it is well established that it is often wrong.

Statisticians have long understood the difficulty of making such inferences
due to a phenomenon that is known in the social science literature as the
"ecological fallacy." The classic discussion of this issue is in an article
that was published half a century ago in the American Sociological
Review.[11] In that paper, W. G. Robinson reported that he had examined the
correlation between the proportion of a state's population that was
foreign*-born and the states literacy rate. He found, surprisingly, a
positive correlation between the literacy rate and the proportion of
immigrants in the population. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the
larger the foreign-born population, the higher the overall literacy rate was
in a state. The correlation was .53, a bit higher than the one found by Dr.
Lichtman between race and ballot spoilage rates.

Did that really prove that Americans born abroad were more literate, on the
average, than those born within the United States? Robinson chose this case
because he had reliable data against which to check the ecological estimate;
census data were available for individuals. When Robinson analyzed it, he
found that country of birth was negatively correlated with literacy; the
actual figure was -.11. Immigrants were actually significantly less likely
than natives to be literate, despite the strong state-level correlation
suggesting just the opposite.

The state-by-state correlation gave a completely false picture, because it
happened that the states with highly literate populations were also more
developed economically and attracted more immigrants because jobs were
available there. New York, for example, was more literate than Arkansas. It
also had a higher fraction of immigrants in its population, but not enough
to pull the state average literacy rate down very much.

A more recent example derives from the work of an eminent mathematical
statistician at the University of California at Berkeley, David A.
Freedman.[12] Using data from the 1995 Current Population Survey, Freedman
found that the correlation between the proportion of immigrants in the
population of the 50 states and the proportion of families with incomes over
$50,000 in 1994 was .52. Foreign-born Americans, judging from this
ecological correlation, were considerably more affluent than their
native-born neighbors. But the evidence also allowed Freedman to look at
incomes on the individual level. When you do that, it turns out that in the
nation as a whole, 35 percent of native-born American families were in the
$50,000 and over income bracket-but only 28 percent of immigrant families
were. The true correlation between being foreign-born and having a high
family income was not the .52 estimated from state-level data; it was
instead a mildly negative correlation of -0.05.

In this instance, too, estimates based on ecological correlations were not
just a bit off, a little imprecise but still close enough to the truth for
most purposes. They were way off the mark, and indeed had falsely
transformed relationships that were actually negative into positive ones.

The problem of the ecological fallacy afflicts all of the statistical
analyses Dr. Lichtman did for the majority report. We must remember that
counties do not vote. Precincts do not vote. Only individuals vote. It is
impossible to develop accurate estimates about how groups of individuals
vote (or misvote) on the basis of county-level or precinct-level averages.

In his appearance before the June 8, 2001 meeting of the Commission on Civil
Rights, Dr. Lichtman sounded a note of caution about his findings. He
declared that a correlation does not "by itself prove" that there were
"disparate rates" at which ballots by African Americans and "non-African
Americans" were rejected.[13] That is certainly true. But he went on to
claim that the "more advanced statistical procedures" he employed could
reliably do so. Unfortunately, that is not true. The use of ecological
regression techniques does not solve the problem of the ecological fallacy,
because it depends upon exactly the same aggregated data as simple
correlational analysis, and makes the same, often incorrect, constancy
assumption." It assumes that there is no relationship between the
composition of geographical areas and the relationship in question, when in
fact there often is.

If the information utilized in an analysis is based on averages for
geographical units, whether they are counties or precincts, the results will
necessarily be imprecise and they may be just plain wrong, as in the example
of immigrant literacy levels given above. When David Freedman did an
ecological regression of state-level data to assess the relationship between
immigration and family income, he found that it estimated that fully 85
percent of foreign-born American families had 1994 family incomes above
$50,000. But the true figure, from individual-level data, was really only 28
percent.[14] Ecological regression, in this case, yielded results that were
wildly mistaken. In another paper, Freedman provided a similar critique of
ecological regression estimates of political behavior specifically, in
instances in which individual-level data happened to be available, and he
found ecological regression estimates to have been highly unreliable.[15]

In sum, inferences about individual behavior on the basis of the average
distribution of some characteristic across geographical units are sometimes
wildly inaccurate. They must be examined with great caution and skepticism.
The majority report does not display the necessary caution about what the
facts reveal. A more searching analysis, summarized below and spelled out in
Appendix 1, demonstrates how misleading Dr. Lichtman's findings are.

The Commission's Failure to Analyze Factors Other Than Race

The Commission's report assumes race had to be the decisive factor
determining which voters spoiled their ballots. Indeed, its analysis
suggests that the electoral system somehow worked to cancel the votes of
even highly educated, politically experienced African Americans.

In fact, the size of the black population (by Dr. Lichtman's own numbers)
accounts for only one-quarter of the difference between counties in the rate
of spoiled ballots (the correlation is .5). And Dr. Lichtman knows that we
cannot make meaningful statements about the relationship between one social
factor and another without controlling for or holding constant other
variables that may affect the relationship we are assessing.

Although Dr. Lichtman claims to have carried out a "more refined statistical
analysis," neither the Commission's report nor his report to the Commission
display evidence that he has successfully isolated the effect of race per se
from that of other variables that are correlated with race: poverty, income,
literacy, and the like. A complex model applied to the Florida data by our
own expert, Dr. John Lott, enables us to explain 70 percent of the variance
(three times as much as Dr. Lichtman was able to account for) without using
the proportion of African Americans in each county as a variable.

In fact, using the variables provided in the report, Dr. Lott was unable to
find a consistent, statistically significant relationship between the share
of voters who were African American and the ballot spoilage rate. Further,
removing race from the equation, but leaving in all the other variables only
reduced ballot spoilage rate explained by his regression by a trivial
amount. In other words, the best indicator of whether or not a particular
county had a high or low rate of ballot spoilage is not its racial
composition. Other variables were more important.

Was race itself a decisive factor in determining which voters spoiled their
ballots in the 2000 election in Florida, as the majority report contends?
Did the electoral system somehow work in such a way that even highly
educated, politically experienced African Americans, for example, cast
ballots that were somehow spoiled in some unspecified and mysterious way?
The majority report claims that the answer was yes, though it provides no
indication of how the process worked to produce that result. Dr. Lichtman's
statistical analysis, the report claims, demonstrates that such was the
case.

It does nothing of the sort, even if we set aside for the sake of argument
the serious doubts most statisticians have about the accuracy of any
estimate based on an ecological regression or correlation. The report begins
with the simple correlation between the percentage of African American
registered voters in Florida's counties and the percentage of spoiled
ballots. That correlation is .50.[16] Speaking in statistical shorthand,
that "explains" 25 percent of the total variance across the counties. (It
doesn't necessarily "explain" anything in ordinary language, we shall see
later).

In other words, if you want to know why some Florida counties have a high
and some a low rate of spoiled ballots, knowing their racial composition
only accounts for one quarter of the difference.

Social scientists know that a simple correlation of about .5 between two
variables has very little meaning. We cannot make meaningful statements
about the relationship between one social factor and another without
controlling for or holding constant other variables that may affect the
relationship we are assessing. Since no other variables are included in this
correlation, anyone who ever took Statistics 101 would realize that it is of
just about zero value.

The Commission's report acknowledges the need for "a more refined
statistical analysis" of this matter. It notes that "an obvious question"
was "presented" by the findings of the simple correlation. "Is there some
other factor that better explains this disparity of ballot rejection rates?"
That certainly is a crucial question. "The answer," the commission assures
us, it is no."

The first thing to note about this key passage is that it doesn't sound like
anything a sophisticated social scientist would write. To say that the issue
is whether "some other factor better explains" a disparity implies that the
analyst, like a voter casting a ballot for president, must pick one and only
one candidate. The question that a "refined statistical analysis" would ask
is not whether some of other single factor "better explains" something. It
would ask what combination of factors best explains the phenomenon, and what
causal weight may be attributed to each of these factors. Such a complex
determination is precisely the purpose of multivariate regression analysis.

Furthermore, the claim that there "no other factor ... better explains" the
disparity in ballot rejection rates implies that many possibly relevant
factors have been analyzed by Dr. Lichtman. The report states explicitly
that he did a regression that "controlled for the percentage of high school
graduates and the percentage of adults in the lowest literacy category." It
also claims that he did a similar regression analysis for counties that used
punch card or optical scanning technology recorded centrally. The discussion
clearly implies that various other factors were also considered, but were
found to be of no significance-not worth mentioning. Appendix 1 of Dr.
Lichtman's report gives county-level values for such variables as median
income and percent living in poverty, and the reader naturally assumes that
all of these were examined in his "more refined statistical analysis."
Perhaps they were, but since Dr. Lichtman does not provide the actual
results of the regression analyses, it is impossible to tell.

This failure to spell out necessary details is in striking contrast to a new
book about the Florida election by Judge Richard Posner. Although Breaking
the Deadlock is aimed at a general audience, unlike Dr. Lichtman's report,
Judge Posner nonetheless includes seven tables that provide the complete
details of the regression analyses that he performed to determine the
sources of the undervotes and overvotes in Florida.

The "refined statistical analysis" provided by Dr. Lichtman, we conclude
after careful study, consists of nothing more than adding two measures of
education (very inadequate measures, we shall argue below) and controlling
for voting technology. And we have to take Dr. Lichtman's word about even
those results, since he does not supply the details. Competent social
scientists can have long arguments about the interpretations of the results
of a regression analysis. It is regrettable that the Civil Rights Commission
expects us to take its claims on faith.

What about all the other variables that might have influenced rates of
ballot spoilage? Poverty levels would be one good example. Senator McConnell
asked Dr. Lichtman specifically about the possible role of poverty at the
June 27 hearing of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and
received a completely non-responsive answer that dealt not with poverty but
with education. This seemed puzzling to us. Dr. Lichtman, after all, is no
absent-minded professor who has never learned to listen to questions
carefully. He has served as an expert witness in federal court on more than
five dozen voting rights cases. We could be wrong, but we suspect that the
honest answer to the question was that Dr. Lichtman had no idea whether
poverty influenced ballot spoilage rates because he had failed to include it
as a variable in his regression analysis.

The supposed refinements in Dr. Lichtman's regression analysis did not
include using poverty rates as a variable, as far we can tell. Nor did they
include measures of median family income, population density, proportions of
first-time voters, or age structure, to name a few about which census data
is readily available. So when the report declares that the answer to the
question of whether other factors could have produced the ballot is "no," it
is deceptive. In fact, Dr. Lichtman has no idea what role "other factors"
like poverty may have played, because he did not take them into account in
his analysis.

Although the commission refused-and still refuses-to provide us the machine
readable data Dr. Lichtman used in his analysis, we were able to assemble
the necessary material for our own analysis. We were fortunate in being able
to enlist the help of a first-rate economist, Dr. John Lott of the Yale Law
School. Dr. Lott agreed to evaluate the work of the commission and of Dr.
Lichtman, and even to gather additional data of his own to further extend
the analysis. Dr. Lott's report, with accompanying figures and tables,
appears as an appendix to this statement.

Dr. Lott ran a series of regressions, varying the specifications in an
effort to replicate Dr. Lichtman's results. Using all the variables reported
in Appendix I in the majority report, he was unable to find a consistent,
statistically significant relationship between the share of voters who were
African American and the ballot spoilage rate. He found that the coefficient
on the percent of voters who were black was indeed positive, but it was
statistically insignificant. The chance that the relationship was real was
only 50.3 percent, just about the chance of getting tails to come up on any
one coin toss and far below the 95 percent significance level commonly
demanded in social science.

Furthermore, when Dr. Lott analyzed the data using a specification that
implied that the share of African American voters in a county was
significantly related to the level of ballot spoilage, he found that it
explained hardly any of the overall variance. Removing race from the
equation but leaving in all the other explanatory variables only reduced the
amount of ballot spoilage explained by his regression from 73.4 percent to
69.1 percent, a mere 4.3 percentage point reduction (see Lott's Table 3 in
the attachment).

Indeed, in none of the other specifications provided in Dr. Lott's Table 3
did taking racial information out of the analysis but leaving in other
variables reduce by more than 3 percent the amount of variance in the
spoiled ballot rate that is explained. Consequently, it simply is not true
that the best indicator of whether or not a particular county had a high or
low rate of ballot spoilage is its racial composition. Dr. Lichtman's claims
to the contrary appear to be based on a very narrow and incomplete analysis
that failed to control for hardly any variables but race.

Was Education the Problem?

The obvious explanation for a high number of spoiled ballots among black
voters is their lower literacy rate. Dr. Lichtman offers only a perfunctory
and superficial discussion of the question, and fails to provide the
regression results that allegedly demonstrate that literacy results were
irrelevant. This claim is impossible to reconcile with the Commission's own
recommendation that more "effective programs of education for voters" are
needed to solve the problem. Moreover, the data upon which he relies are too
crude to allow meaningful conclusions. They are not broken down by race, for
one thing.

Although it does not take a high level of literacy to follow the
instruction, "Vote for ONE of the following," or "Fill in the box next to
the name of the candidate you wish to vote for," it does take some reading
ability. We know that some Americans today, regrettably, find it extremely
difficult to understand even the simplest written instructions. And,
unfortunately, this group is disproportionately black. The U.S. Department
of Education's 1992 Adult Literacy Study found that 38 percent of African
Americans-but only 14 percent of whites-ranked in the lowest category of
"prose literacy," which was defined as being unable to "make low-level
inferences based on what they read and to compare or contrast information
that can easily be found in [a] text."[17]

Black Americans, the study found, were 2.7 times as likely as whites to have
the lowest level of literacy skills. Likewise, the 1998 National Assessment
of Educational Progress found that 43 percent of African American
12th-graders had reading skills that were "Below Basic," as compared to just
17 percent of whites.[18] Black students were 2.5 times as likely as whites
to lack elementary reading skills. Among adults employed full-time, blacks
are 4.1 times more likely than whites to be in the lowest prose literacy
category.[19]

National studies provide no data on Florida specifically. However, we know
from the National Assessment of Educational Progress that black 4th- and
8th-graders in Florida (no state-level data is available for 12th-graders)
are no better readers than their counterparts elsewhere. Indeed, their
scores are below the national average for African Americans.[20] No fewer
than 57 percent of Florida's black 8th-graders in 1998 were Below Basic in
reading, 10 points above the national average for African Americans, and 2.7
times as high as the white figure.

The majority report, though, denies that racial differences in literacy
levels could be the source of the problem. It devotes only a brief paragraph
to the matter, claiming that "a multiple regression analysis that controlled
for the percentage of high school graduates and the percentage of adults in
the lowest literacy category failed to diminish the relationship between
race and ballot rejection."[21]

But the regression results themselves are not provided for the critical
reader to assess. When one turns to Dr. Lichtman's actual report for greater
illumination, one finds nothing more than the exact language used in the
commission report. This is a cavalier way to treat an issue as serious as
this one. We have specifically and repeatedly asked the commission to
provide us with the details of this regression analysis performed by Dr.
Lichtman and the data on which it was based. But our requests have been
denied.

Anyone uncomfortable with being asked to take at face value Dr. Lichtman's
claim that literacy is irrelevant in explaining ballot spoilage should
examine the very different analysis of the question presented in Judge
Richard Posner's new study. Describing the results of his regression
analysis in full detail, Judge Posner reaches the conclusion that it was
"not because black people in Florida are racially distinct, but because they
are poorer and less literate on average, that they are likely to encounter
greater difficulty than whites in coping with user-unfriendly voting
systems."[22]

The claim that the incidence of ballot spoilage or voter error is unrelated
to education is counter-intuitive. It is also extremely puzzling, because
just a few pages later in the same chapter the report addresses possible
solutions to the problem. It urges the adoption of optical scanning systems
with immediate feedback, what the report terms a "kick out" feature to
advise the voter that the ballot is not complete-that it gave no vote or too
many votes for president, for example.[23] The point of a "kick out" system
is thus to reduce voter error, although the Commission Report studiously
avoids any mention of that term. Voters who are able read and follow the
simple directions on the voting machine do not need any "kick out" system to
advise them of their mistakes.

The report then goes on to say that even this reform would not completely
"eliminate the disparity between the rates at which ballots cast by African
Americans and whites are rejected." It estimates that it would only cut the
disparity by about half. What else could be done? The Commission' s answer
is "effective programs of education for voters, for election officials, and
for poll workers."[24]

The commission majority seems to be declaring both that:

1.. The lower average level of literacy among Florida's blacks has
nothing to do with the allegedly higher rate of voter error by blacks; and

2.. The solution to this problem is for the state of Florida to launch a
huge new program designed to educate black voters on how to vote
successfully, and to better instruct election officials and poll workers how
to assist them.

The logic eludes us.[25]

How Many of the Spoiled Ballots Were Cast by First-time Voters?

An important source of the high rate of ballot spoilage in some Florida
communities may have been that a sizable fraction of those who turned out at
the polls were there for the first time and were unfamiliar with the rules
of the electoral process. Impressionistic evidence suggests that
disproportionate numbers of black voters fell into this category. The
majority report's failure to explore-or even mention-this factor is a
serious flaw.

A closely related and complementary explanation of what the majority report
claims was a racial difference in rates of ballot spoilage is that an
unusually high proportion of the blacks who voted in Florida in 2000 were
first-time voters. According to estimates widely cited in the press, as many
as 40 percent of the African Americans who turned up at the polls in Florida
in November had never voted before.

It is not clear whether this was indeed true. Recently released figures from
Florida's Division of Elections indicate that 10 percent of the voters who
cast a ballot in November 2000 were African American, up only slightly from
the 9.5 percent in 1996.[26] Earlier estimates that blacks accounted for as
much as 15 percent of the electorate were based on exit polls conducted by
the Voter News Service, yet another indication of the fallibility of
estimates coming from that organization. This evidence suggests that if an
unusually large number of blacks voted for the first time in 2000, their
numbers must have been largely offset by a unusually large drop in the
numbers of more experienced black voters turning out, which seems unlikely.

Nevertheless, Dr. Lichtman did not know what the figures only released in
July of 2001 would show. He must have been aware of widespread reports in
the press that a flood of inexperienced black voters came to the polls in
Florida last year, and that many had problems figuring out how to cast their
ballots. It is thus startling and revealing that neither the majority report
nor Dr. Lichtman's report even mention this as a possible source of voter
error, much less choose to investigate it. Certainly, it was a variable of
possible relevance, and there were data available that could have been used
in a regression analysis.

The Missing Dimension: The Failure to Analyze Change Over Time

Most social scientists understand that the interpretation of social patterns
on the basis of observations at just one point in time is dangerously
simplistic. But that is all the majority report offers. It focuses entirely
on the 2000 election returns. Dr. Lott did two analyses that take the time
dimension into account.

He looked at spoilage rates by county for the 1996 and 2000 presidential
races, and compared them with demographic change. A rise in a county's black
population did not result in a similar rise in spoilage rates, suggesting,
again, that race was not the causal factor at work.

Dr. Lott also examined data from the 1992, 1996, and 2000 races, and found
that the "percent of voters in different race or ethnic categories is never
statistically related to ballot spoilage."

All of the statistical analysis developed by Dr. Lichtman concerns one
moment in time-election day, November 2000. It is purely "cross-sectional"
analysis. Most social scientists and historians recognize that the
interpretation of social patterns on the basis of observations at just one
point in time is fraught with peril. Relationships suggested by such
analyses often do not hold up when the dimension of change over time is
added. Earlier data concerning the same phenomenon should be examined. It is
curious that a professional historian like Dr. Lichtman did not choose to
place the 2000 election results in broader perspective by examining prior
Florida elections. Surely he did not think that there was never an undervote
or an overvote in Florida before Bush v. Gore.

Dr. Lott did two analyses that take the time dimension into account. First,
he looked at spoilage rates by county for the 1996 and 2000 presidential
races and asked how they might have been affected by changes in the racial
demographics of those counties. If the Commission! s report's simple link
between race and "disenfranchisement" were true, counties that had a sharp
rise in the proportion of African American residents would be expected to
also see a strong increase in rates of ballot spoilage, and those in which
the black population was shrinking proportionally would be expected to have
a declining rate of ballot spoilage.

But when you look at the scatter plots in Dr. Lott's report (Figures 1-4),
the picture looks quite different. There appears to be little relationship
at all between racial population change and ballot spoilage, and the one
correlation that he finds runs counter to the majority report's argument: An
increase in the black share of the voting population is linked to a slight
decrease in spoilage rates, although the difference is not statistically
significant.

For a second analysis, Dr. Lott compiled data on voting in the 1992 and 1996
as well as 2000 presidential elections. In the set of regressions he
provides in his Table 5, the "percent of voters in different race or ethnic
categories is never statistically related to ballot spoilage." In the
analysis supplied in his Table 6, which groups voters by age and sex and
well as race, he found a very complex picture, with a positive link between
the size of black population in five of ten age and sex categories, but just
the opposite with the other five. To explain this strange pattern would
require further research. Suffice it to say here that it is hard to imagine
how discrimination could work against African American females in the 30-39
age bracket but in favor of black males of the same age.

Are the Precinct-level Estimates Any More Reliable? And What Do They Reveal?

The Commission's report, as earlier noted, estimates that black ballots were
nine times more likely to be spoiled than white ballots. And it presents
some precinct-level data, providing estimates based on smaller units that
are likely to be somewhat closer to the truth than estimates based on
inter-county variations. The report ignores the fact that the county-level
and precinct-level data yielded quite different results. Ballot rejection
rates dropped dramatically when the precinct numbers were examined, even
though comparing heavily black and heavily nonblack precincts should have
sharpened the difference between white and black voters, rather than
diminishing it. Dr. Lichtman obscures this point by shifting from ratios to
percentage point differences.

Dr. Lichtman's precinct analysis is just as vulnerable to criticism as his
county-level analysis. It employs the same methods, and again ignores
relevant variables that provide a better explanation of the variation in
ballot spoilage rates. No variables other than race and the type of voting
system were even considered in this analysis.

Dr. Lichtman devotes considerable space to a discussion of precinct-level
variations of in rates of ballot spoilage for three of the Florida's largest
counties. His machine-readable data was not made available to us,
regrettably, despite our repeated requests for it, and neither were we
provided the details of his regression analysis. We suspect that if we had
been able to reanalyze Dr. Lichtman's treatment of precinct-level data, we
would have found it just as problematic as his work at the county level. But
even in its absence we can offer a number of critical observations.

First, the only variables considered in this analysis are race (crudely
dichotomized into the categories "black" and "nonblack") and voting
technology. Dr. Lichtman has no precinct-level data at all on poverty rates,
literacy levels, years of school completed, or other socioeconomic variable.
So what he is really doing is the equivalent of his county-level simple
correlations of race with rates of ballot spoilage, with no controls for any
of the many other variables that could have influenced the pattern observed.
The method is too simplistic to yield meaningful results with county-level
data, and the same objection applies when it is employed with precinct-level
data.

The precinct-level analysis presented in the majority report, we have
already noted, can yield mistaken and misleading results, because it also
depends upon averages calculated for geographic units and yields findings
tainted by the ecological fallacy. However, precincts are much smaller units
than counties and are usually more homogeneous, so the results are likely to
be somewhat closer to the truth than estimates based on intercounty
variations. The report claims that the precinct-level analyses Dr. Lichtman
conducted for Duval, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach counties simply confirm the
estimates derived from county-level data. A careful comparison of the
figures, however, yields a quite different conclusion.

If the results of the precinct-level regression analysis in three counties
are assumed to be accurate-and we repeat the caution that they too are open
to serious question-we note that they show something quite interesting. They
indicate that the racial disparity in rates of ballot rejection was
apparently much smaller than it appeared from the county-level analysis.

As the table below indicates, using county-level data produces the estimate
that black ballots were nine times as likely to be rejected as those cast by
non-blacks. This estimate was given much play in the report and in press
reports about it. But when you apply a more high-powered microscope to the
election returns, and examine the evidence as reported by precinct, it turns
out that this disparity was nowhere near nine to one. Instead, it ranged
from 2.7 to 4.3. Thus it was from 52 percent to 70 percent lower than the
statewide estimate about which so much was made in the report.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Racial Disparities in Ballot Rejection Rates: Percent Votes
Rejected by Race and Ratio of Black to Non-Black Rejection



County-level estimates


Black
Non-Black
Ratio

Florida
14.4
1.6
9.0






Precinct-level

Duval
23.6
5.5
4.3

Miami-Dade
9.8
3.2
3.1

Palm Beach
16.3
6.1
2.7






Extreme Case Precincts (90%+ black vs. 90%+ non-black precincts)

Duval
22.1
5.8
3.8

Miami-Dade
9.1
3.2
2.8

Palm Beach
16.1
6.2
2.6






[Derived from Tables 1-2 and 1-3 of Majority Report]


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Further, the racial disparity ratios are narrower still in the precincts Dr.
Lichtman examined as "extreme cases"- precincts that were 90 percent black
(or 90 percent "non-black"). This is noteworthy. First, extreme case
analysis should get us closer to the truth because it gets us closer to
measuring the variable of interest-in this case, race. If almost everyone in
these select precincts is black, the problem of the ecological fallacy
intrudes much less. That the relationship of ballot spoilage with race
weakens instead of growing stronger is very telling.

In addition, extreme case analysis tends to sharpen and exaggerate estimated
group differences. Blacks who live in all-black or virtually all-black
neighborhoods are likely to be poorer and less educated, for example, than
African Americans in precincts that have a broader racial mix, and are
thereby more likely to spoil their ballots. And nonblacks who live in areas
with few black neighbors may be above average in their income and
educational levels, and less likely to make a mistake voting for that
reason. If these factors were taken into account in the analysis, the racial
difference might well vanish altogether.

Remarkably, Dr. Lichtman managed to discuss the relationship between his
county-level and his precinct-level findings at the June 8, 2001 meeting of
the Commission without ever calling attention to these striking (and
inconvenient) facts. After mentioning the much publicized nine-to-one
estimate that was so prominently featured in the report, he declared before
turning to the precinct-level results that he didn't "like dealing with
ratios because they don't tell you about people."[27] This is a very curious
statement, since the report's best sound bite-that blacks were nine times as
likely as nonblacks to cast ballots that were rejected-is a statement about
a ration. Dr. Lichtman's report is filled estimates of the alleged
relationship between race and ballot rejection rates without reference to a
shred of evidence about the experience of any individual person.

Instead of considering the ratio of estimated ballot spoilage for black and
non-black voters, Dr. Lichtman chose to look at percentage point
differences. The estimated difference for the state as a whole was 12.8
points (14.4 - 1.6); for Duval it was 18.1; for Miami-Dade it was 6.6; for
Palm Beach it was 10.2. Dr. Lichtman apparently averaged these when declared
that the difference was "about 13 percent. It was a "double digit
difference," he declared.[28] However, Miami-Dade's 6.6 percentage points is
not a "double digit difference." More important, shifting the focus from
ratios (9 to 1) to percentage point differences served to obscure a crucial
fact: If precinct-level analysis yields better estimates than county-level
estimates, the actual racial disparity in rates of ballot spoilage in
Florida as a whole was far below nine to one. In fact it was about three to
one, and thus corresponded closely with the racial gap in literacy rates
that we called attention to earlier.

Whose Fault Was It?

The majority report lays the blame for the supposed "disenfranchisement" of
black voters at the feet of state officials-particularly Governor Jeb Bush
and Secretary of State Katherine Harris. In fact, however, elections in
Florida are the responsibility of 67 county supervisors of election. And,
interestingly, in all but one of the 25 counties with the highest spoilage
rates, the election was supervised by a Democrat-the one exception being an
official with no party affiliation.

The majority report argues that much of the spoiled ballot problem was due
to voting technology. But elected Democratic Party officials decided on the
type of machinery used, including the optical scanning system in Gadsden
County, the state's only majority-black county and the one with the highest
spoilage rate.

A reader of the majority report would be led to think that many tens of
thousands of Floridians tried to register their vote for president and
failed to have it count because Governor Jeb Bush and Secretary of State
Katherine Harris didn't want their votes to count and failed in their
responsibility to ensure that they did. "State officials," the report
declares, "failed to fulfill their duties in a manner that would prevent
this disenfranchisement." Chair Berry, introducing the report at the June 8
meeting of the Commission, charged that the Governor and Secretary Harris
had been "grossly derelict" in fulfilling their responsibilities.

But which officials were responsible for the conduct of elections in Florida's
constitutionally decentralized system of government? Power and
responsibility were lodged almost entirely in the hands of county officials,
the most important of them the 67 county supervisors of elections. If anyone
was intent on suppressing the black vote or to "disenfranchise" anyone else,
it would have required the cooperation of these local officials.

Thus, it seems natural to inquire about the political affiliations of
Florida's supervisors of elections. If the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
seeks to show that the presidential election was stolen by Republicans, led
by the governor and the secretary of state, it would be logical to expect
that they had the greatest success in those counties in which the electoral
machinery was in the hands of fellow Republicans. Conversely, it is very
difficult to see any political motive that would lead Democratic local
officials to try to keep the most faithful members of their party from the
polls and to somehow spoil the ballots of those who did make it into the
voting booth.

The report never asks this question, though it seems an interesting
hypothesis to explore. The data with which to explore it are readily
available. When we examined the connection between rates of ballot spoilage
across counties and the political affiliation of the supervisor of
elections, we found precisely the opposite of what might be expected. There
was indeed a relationship between having a Republican running the county's
election and the ballot spoilage rate. But it was a negative correlation
of -.0467.

Having a Democratic supervisor of elections was also correlated with the
spoilage rate-by + 0.424. Dr. Lott has found that the ballot spoilage rate
in counties with Democratic supervisors were three times as high as in those
with Republican supervisors (see Lott's Table 3). Should we conclude that
Republican local officials were far more interested than Democrats in making
sure that every vote counted?

Of the 25 Florida counties with the highest rate of vote spoilage, in how
many was the election supervised by a Republican? The answer is zero. All
but one of the 25 had Democratic chief election officers, and the one
exception was in the hands of an official with no party affiliation.

Dr. Lott provides a fuller examination of the possible impact of having a
Democratic supervisor of elections in his Table 3, and adds another related
variable-whether or not the supervisor was African American. Having
Democratic officials in charge increases the ballot spoilage rate
substantially, and the effect is stronger still when that official is
African American. (All African American supervisors of elections are
Democrats.) Lott estimates that a 1 percent increase in the black share of
voters in counties with Democratic election officials increases the number
of spoiled ballots by a striking 135 percent.

We do not cite this as evidence that Democratic officials, for some bizarre
reason, sought to disenfranchise blacks, and that black Democratic officials
were even more eager to do so. That is manifestly absurd. It is worth noting
for two reasons. First, it nicely illustrates the limitations of ecological
correlations. Would anyone want to draw the conclusion from this correlation
that the solution was to elect more Republican supervisors of elections?

Second, it has important bearing on the question of who is to blame for the
large numbers of spoiled ballots in minority areas. The majority report
argues that much of the problem was due to voting technology-the use of
punch card machines or optical scanning methods that did not provide
feedback to the voter produced a higher rate of ballot spoilage. But who
decided that the voters of Gadsden County (the state's only black-majority
county and the one with the highest rate of spoiled ballots) would use an
optical scanning system in which votes were centrally recorded? Who decided
that Palm Beach and Miami-Dade county voters would use punch card machines?
Certainly it was not Jeb Bush or Katherine Harris. Nor was it Lawton Chiles.
It was Democratic local officials in those heavily Democratic counties who
made those choices.

It is worth noting that after these findings were mentioned at the June 27,
2001 hearing of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, the Chair
of the Commission on Civil Rights professed to feeling no surprise. The
Commission's Report, she maintained, had noted that local as well as state
officials had responsibility for the conduct of the election. The report,
though, devotes far more attention to Governor Jeb Bush and Secretary of
State Katherine Harris than to county supervisors of elections who have
primary responsibility for election day procedures. Furthermore, there is no
hint in the report that the local officials in those counties that accounted
for a large majority of the spoiled ballots were Democrats who had no
conceivable interest in suppressing the black vote. It is true that the
party affiliation of Governor Bush and Secretary of State Harris are not
mentioned either. But that hardly matters because everyone knows what party
they belong to, while few are aware of the fact that Florida's electoral
machinery is largely in the hands of county officials who are Democrats.

It is easy, of course, to say with hindsight that Florida should have had a
uniform system of voting and a common technology for all elections. The
Commission recommends that. But if Governor Bush and Republican legislators
had proposed adopting such a system before the 2000 election, we can imagine
the outcry from their political opponents, who would have seen such a move
as an improper attempt by the governor to control election procedures.
Indeed, it might well have been argued that such a decision would have had a
disparate impact on minority voters, since centralizing the electoral system
would have diminished the power of the Democratic local officials they had
chosen to put in office. It could even have been argued that this transfer
of power from officials who had the support of most minority voters would be
a violation of the Voting Right Act, yet another attempt to deprive
minorities of their opportunity to exercise political power!

Furthermore, it is inappropriate to be playing the blame game when there is
no evidence that anyone understood that the use of certain voting
technologies might increase the rate of voter error for some groups. Those
who charge that African Americans were "disenfranchised" in Florida have
never asked why it is that no one raised this issue before the election. If
punch card balloting, for instance, has a racially discriminatory effect,
why had not the NAACP, the Urban League, or any other organization belonging
to the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights ever uttered a peep about it
before November 2000? If civil rights leaders had understood that different
voting systems are conducive to different rates of voter error, and that
some can serve to disadvantage groups with below average literacy skills,
why didn't they raise the issue publicly and demand electoral reforms? If
they did not grasp this fact, it is hard to see why we should assume that
public officials did.

The Exclusion of Hispanics

Hispanics are a protected group under the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, the
majority report speaks repeatedly of the alleged disenfranchisement of
"minorities" or "people of color." One section is headed "Votes in
Communities of Color Less Likely to be Counted." And yet the crucial
statistical analysis provided in Chapter 1 entirely ignores Florida's
largest minority group-people of Hispanic origin. The analysis in the
Commission's report thus excluded more Floridians of minority background
than it included.

The analysis conducted by Dr. Lichtman treats not only Hispanics, but Asians
and Native Americans as well as if they were, in effect, white. He
dichotomizes the Florida population into two groups, blacks and "nonblacks."

In the revised report, Dr. Lichtman did add one graph dealing with Hispanics
in the appendix but this addition to his statistical analysis is clearly
only an afterthought. At the June 8 Commission meeting, Dr. Lichtman stated
he looked at this issue only at the last minute. This is a strange and
regrettable omission.

The majority report speaks repeatedly of the alleged "exclusion" and
"disenfranchisement" of "minorities" or "people of color." One section is
headed "Votes in Communities of Color Less Likely to be Counted."[29] But
what information are we actually given about all those "communities of
color"? We were amazed and disturbed to find that the crucial statistical
analysis provided in Chapter 1 is narrowly focused on just one of the state's
"communities of color"-African Americans. The discussion completely ignores
Florida's largest minority group-people of Hispanic origin.

This is revealing of the Commission's constricted vision. The 2000 Census
counted 2.3 million African Americans in Florida, approximately 15 percent
of the total population. But the state had 2.7 million Latinos, almost 17
percent of its population.[30] Astonishingly, Hispanics hardly get a mention
in the majority report. How many Hispanics in Miami cast ballots that were
"rejected"? An obviously important question that the authors of the report
never asked. They include a few hasty references to correlations between the
total minority population of the counties and the rate of ballot spoilage.
But they provide no separate analysis at all of the state's largest minority
group, or of any other minority group except African Americans.

Indeed, the analysis conducted by Dr. Lichtman treats not only Hispanics but
Asians and Native Americans as well as if they were, in effect, part of the
majority. He dichotomizes the Florida population into two groups, blacks and
"nonblacks." The "nonblack" population includes, in addition to whites, the
2.7 million Hispanics, and almost half a million other residents who listed
their race as Asian American or American Indian.[31]

A federal agency devoted to the protection of minority rights and to the
inclusion of all thus seems to have an extraordinarily narrow and exclusive
conception of who belongs in the minority population. In this report, the
Commission majority in fact has excluded more Floridians of minority
background-quite a lot more-than it has included. Whenever the report speaks
broadly about "minorities," it must be remembered that the supporting
statistical analysis it provides ignores all minorities but blacks, and
indeed merges most Floridians of minority background into the "nonblack"
category along with the white majority. An examination of the role of race
in election procedures in the Florida 2000 election that completely ignores
the voting experience of Hispanics, Asian American and Native Americans
cannot be considered a valid investigation. From the perspective of the
majority report, anyone who is not African American is just an
undifferentiated part of the vast "nonblack" population, which comprises 85
percent of the total.

In presenting his findings at the June 8, 2001, meeting of the Commission,
Dr. Lichtman remarked that after he concluded his report he had made an
effort to examine the Hispanic vote. But, as of this date, the statistical
analysis in the majority report still ignores Hispanics completely and
retains its simplistic dichotomy between black and "nonblack" Floridians. It
includes in an appendix one new graph produced by Dr. Lichtman (Appendix
II-F), and yet makes no comment on it. Dr. Lichtman's revised report
includes only one new paragraph on the subject. In sum, any attention given
to Florida's Latinos was only as an afterthought.

Part II. The Testimony of Witnesses Fails To Support the Claim of Systematic
Disenfranchisement

Based on witnesses' limited (and often, uncorroborated) accounts, the
Commission insists that there were "countless allegations" involving
"countless numbers" of Floridians who were denied the right to vote. This
anecdotal evidence is drawn from the testimony of 26 "fact witnesses,"
residing in only eight of the state's 67 counties.

In fact, however, many of those who appeared before the Commission testified
to the absence of "systemic disenfranchisement" in Florida. Thus, a
representative of the League of Women Voters testified that there had been
many administrative problems, but stated: "We don't have any evidence of
race-based problems... we actually I guess don't have any evidence of
partisan problems." And a witness from Miami-Dade County said she attributed
the problems she encountered not to race but rather to inefficient poll
workers: "I think [there are] a lot of people that are on jobs that really
don't fit them or they are not fit to be in."

Without question, some voters did encounter difficulties at the polls, but
the evidence fails to support the claim of systematic disenfranchisement.
Most of the complaints the Commission heard in direct testimony involved
individuals who arrived at the polls on election day only to find that their
names were not on the rolls of registered voters. The majority of these
cases were due to bureaucratic errors, inefficiencies within the system,
and/or error or confusion on the part of the voters themselves.

The report includes anecdotal evidence based on the testimony of a handful
of individuals. It maintains that is has made a prima facie case that many
Floridians were denied the right to vote, particularly African Americans.

These claims are not supported by the testimony the Commission received in
Florida. The Commission heard from a total of 26 fact witnesses,
representing only 8 of Florida's 67 counties. During the post-hearing
review, local election officials provided information which discredited
significant portions of that testimony, but those corrections and
clarifications are not reflected in the final report.

Nonetheless, based on witnesses' limited (and mostly, uncorroborated)
accounts, the Commission majority insists that there were "countless"
allegations involving "countless numbers" of Floridians who were denied the
right to vote. Without verifiable and quantifiable evidence to support its
predetermined conclusion concerning charges of disenfranchisement, the
majority is forced to rely on vague assertions that, "it is impossible to
determine the total number of voters who were unable to vote on election
day." The report's conclusions, insisting that our very democracy is
threatened, are based not on solid evidence supported by verifiable facts,
but rather upon a thin tissue of assertions that are contravened by direct
testimony from other witnesses. There is no question that some voters did
encounter difficulties at the polls, but the evidence does not support the
conclusion that there was a systematic attempt to deprive voters,
particularly minorities, of their right to vote.

Most of the complaints the Commission heard in direct testimony at the two
hearings involved individuals who arrived at the polls on election day only
to find that their names were not on the rolls of registered voters. The
majority of these cases point to bureaucratic errors (a lack of proper
assistance from misinformed or understaffed poll workers); inefficiencies
within the system (insufficient phone lines to verify registration status);
and/or error or confusion on the part of the voters themselves. Some voters
did not know the location of their precinct before going to vote. Some did
not bring proper identification to the polling station. Others were confused
or uncertain about their right to request and receive assistance or to ask
for another ballot if they believed they had made a mistake.

According to the testimony of a majority of the witnesses at the hearings,
there was no "systematic disenfranchisement or widespread discrimination" in
Florida. Although the following excerpts are either buried in the text of
the report or omitted altogether, they are representative of the testimony
the Commission heard throughout the three days of hearings:

a.. Florida's Attorney General testified that of the 2,600 complaints he
received on the election, 2,300 were related to the confusing butterfly
ballot, and only three complaints concerned alleged discrimination on the
basis of race.

b.. An expert on voting rights and election law, Professor Darryl Paulson,
testified that the problems in Florida were due to "a system failure without
systemic discrimination." He also testified: "Across the United States,
there were 2.5 million votes that were not counted. And whenever you have an
election system that requires 105 million people to vote essentially in a
span of 12 hours, you have created a system guaranteed to have voting
problems."

c.. Professor Paulson later testified: "If the intent of state officials
was to discriminate against African-Americans, I would argue it was a dismal
failure. The 1990s have ... seen a tremendous explosion in the number of
black elected officials throughout the state. We now have a record number of
African-Americans in the state legislature [and on] city councils, school
boards, [and] county commissions. Florida now has a competitive two-party
structure that... in many ways makes it extremely difficult for a systematic
type of discrimination to Occur."

d.. A representative of the League of Women Voters testified that there
had been many administrative problems, but stated: "We don't have any
evidence of race-based problems, well actually I guess don't have any
evidence of partisan problems."

e.. Florida's Commissioner of Agriculture, a designee to the Elections
Canvassing Commission, testified regarding the relationship of voting
problems to race and ethnicity: "I don't think it's a party issue or a
racial issue. I think it's a breakdown in the system."

f.. A witness from Miami-Dade County, who said she attributed the
problems she encountered not to race but rather to inefficient poll workers,
stated: "I think [there are] a lot of people that are on jobs that really
don't fit them or they are not fit to be in."

g.. Another witness from Miami-Dade, who claimed she could not vote
because poll workers were unable to find her name on the voter list: "In
light of everything that's come out it's kind of hard for me to say whether
or not it was discriminatory or whether or not it was just an inadvertent
mistake."

h.. A witness from Broward County who claimed she was not allowed to vote
by affidavit because her name was not on the list of registered voters: "I
don't think it was a racial situation. (The poll workers) were mostly white
and they were still trying to help me. [The system] was just not equipped to
handle the job that we had over there a lot of people were misinformed and
were not being helped. It was like a big chaotic place over there. It was
not about a racial thing."

Part III. The Commission Failed to Distinguish Between Bureaucratic Problems
and Actual Discrimination

Other witnesses did offer testimony suggesting numerous problems on election
day. But the Commission, in discussing these problems, failed to distinguish
between mere inconvenience, difficulties caused by bureaucratic
inefficiencies, and incidents of potential discrimination. In its report,
the complaint from the voter whose shoes were muddied on the path to his
polling place is accorded the same degree of seriousness as the case of the
seeing-impaired voter who required help in reading the ballot, or the
African American voter who claimed she was turned away from the polls at
closing time while a white man was not.

There were certainly jammed phone lines, confusion and error, but none of it
added up to widespread discrimination Many of the difficulties, like those
associated with the "butterfly ballot," were the product of good intentions
gone awry or the presence of many first-time voters. The most compelling
testimony came from disabled voters who faced a range of problems, including
insufficient parking and inadequate provision for wheelchair access. This
problem, of course, had no racial dimension at all.

Other than the "quantitative evidence" of its statistical analysis, the
report claims that, "the only evidence that exists is the testimony of those
who have stated publicly that they were denied the right to vote and the
credibility of their testimony." However, while the first-hand accounts of
witnesses were helpful in describing election-day problems, they did not
point to what the majority report calls a "disturbing trend of
disenfranchisement."

The majority of those witnesses who experienced problems and who came before
the Commission testified that they were ultimately able to cast their vote,
despite the problems they described; a few were not. A chief flaw in the
majority report, however, is that it generally fails to distinguish between
problems of mere inconvenience, difficulties caused by bureaucratic
inefficiencies, and incidents of potential discrimination. In this way, the
complaint from the white male voter whose shoes were muddied on the path to
his polling place is accorded the same degree of seriousness as the case of
the seeing-impaired voter who required-but was denied-assistance in reading
the ballot, or the African American voter who claimed she was turned away
from the polls at closing time while a white man was not.

For the most part, those who testified before the Commission told of
problems in voting, not of being prevented from voting. The most frequent
problems mentioned included the following:

1. Inability of some poll workers to confirm eligibility status

The report argues that in the last election, "many people arrived at their
polling places expecting to cast their ballots for the candidates of their
choice, but many left frustrated after being denied this right." To support
this charge, the report points to "consistent, uncontroversial testimony
regarding the persistent and pervasive inability of election poll workers to
verify voter eligibility during the November 7 presidential election."

It is true that the Commission heard several complaints about jammed phone
lines that, in many cases, prevented poll workers from getting through to
headquarters to confirm the eligibility of voters whose names did not appear
on the rolls. Some voters found that their names had been left off the
voting lists because of bureaucratic error and through no fault of their
own. In other cases, however, many voters failed to verify the location of
their assigned precinct or polling place before going to vote on election
day. Others failed to notify their elections board of a change in address.
Some neglected to bring the necessary proof of eligibility to vote, and
still others did not correctly fill out their mail-in applications through
"motor voter" registration. The high turnout of voters, many of them
first-time voters, only exacerbated the difficulties that arose on election
day.

Neither voters nor poll workers testified that the problems they experienced
amounted to widespread disenfranchisement in Florida. In fact, according to
researchers at the Miami Herald, some poll workers who struggled with
insufficient phone lines admitted that they erred on the side of including,
rather than excluding voters. In other words, when they were unable to get
through to headquarters, they found it easier to go ahead and let people
vote, rather than challenge their credentials.

What we learned in Florida was that all of these factors can contribute to
an overloaded communications system on election day, and that there is no
substitute for greater voter awareness and better trained elections staff to
handle inquiries.

2. Polling places closed early or moved without notice

The Commission received no evidence that this was more than an insignificant
problem. There is absolutely no evidence upon which to conclude, or even
suggest, that there was a pattern of closings or movement designed to
disenfranchise voters. One county supervisor testified that in some cases
there are urgent reasons for moving a polling facility-i.e., there was one
facility that had burned down on the Saturday before election day-but that
the public is notified of the change. The Palm Beach County supervisor
testified that, "Nobody has come to me to give me specifics on which
precinct they were turned away from so that I could do the investigation to
see what exactly happened."

The Commission did hear testimony from one poll worker about a gated
community where the gates had shut automatically at 6:15 p.m. and had to be
reopened by police officers. The Palm Beach supervisor asserted that this
incident was "never reported" to her but that it did not seem likely, given
that the facility in question was located at a water works facility that
would have had a government staff person there to open the gates. As the
supervisor explained, "I've heard many people tell me things and then I
asked them whether they themselves experienced it and they said, no, they
heard it from somebody else. And I wonder if this person [the witness about
the gated community] actually experienced that themselves."

In a letter to the General Counsel during the affected agency review, David
Leahy, the Supervisor of Elections for Miami-Dade refutes the testimony of
several witnesses, including one (Felix Boyle) who insisted that his voting
place had been changed without prior notice. After investigating this
matter, Mr. Leahy affirms in his letter that: "Felix Boyle stated that the
polling place for Precinct #36 was in a different building than was used in
the 2000 primary election. The same building was used for both elections."'
Ignoring this rebuttal altogether, the report continues to include Mr. Boyle's
testimony as an example of "polling places moved without notice."

If the Commission had been truly interested in the important issue of
uniform polling-place hours, it might have made more than a single, passing
mention of one of the more widely-publicized problems that emerged during
the last election: the announcement by all five television networks at 7: 00
p.m. Eastern time that the polls in Florida had closed, when the polls in
the Panhandle counties were still open for another hour. There is no way of
knowing exactly how many voters were discouraged from going to the polls
because of this misinformation, but a close review of the turnout figures by
John Lott estimates that it likely cost George W. Bush at least 10,000
votes.[32] The majority's lack of interest in exploring this issue suggests
that its research was shaped by its preconceptions.

3. Accessibility issues

Some of the most compelling and direct testimony in Florida were those
accounts regarding the problems of accessibility for disabled voters.
Although the disabled voters who testified before the Commission claimed
that they themselves ultimately voted, they described a range of problems
facing the disabled on election day, including insufficient parking,
inadequate provision for wheelchair access, and other difficulties involving
ballots and voting technology. The barriers they described appear to
constitute a long*standing problem that was not just confined to Florida or
to this presidential election. It is unfortunate that the report does not
examine the ongoing efforts of Florida state officials Governor Bush's ADA
working group and a task force working under the Secretary of State to
address these concerns.

In the same chapter on "accessibility issues," the report addresses
allegations that an "overwhelming number" of Haitian-American voters, "many
Latino voters," and "many persons who were not literate" were "denied
adequate assistance" in casting their ballots. Here, the discussion of
accessibility problems is much less clear. Much of the testimony from
advocacy groups was speculative and based on second-hand, anecdotal
information.

For instance, the Commission heard from a representative of a
Haitian-American advocacy organization in Miami-Dade that, in addition to
the problems of long lines and understaffed polling facilities, there were
problems regarding a lack of bilingual ballots. However, few details were
presented to help gauge the extent of this problem, and no attempt was made
to properly investigate the seriousness of these alleged problems.

When the Miami-Dade County supervisor was questioned about the allegations
of the earlier witness, he referred to a county commission ordinance that
requires the supervisor to determine which precincts have a significant
Haitian American voter population and to provide bilingual ballots in those
precincts. He testified that, for purposes of the November 2000 election, he
determined there were 60 precincts with a significant Creole population. In
addition to providing bilingual ballots, Miami-Dade also did sample ballots
in English and Creole and publicized those in Haitian-American newspapers.
The Miami Dade supervisor maintained that the earlier witness might be in a
precinct that did not have a significant Haitian American population. The
report makes no attempt to clear up this confusion.

4. "Motor Voter" Problems

The report asserts that "[m]any Floridians alleged that they registered to
vote through the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and learned later that
they were not registered. Many of these disappointed citizens filed
complaints with the attorney general's office and/or the Democratic Party."
The allegation here appears to be that Republicans in Florida somehow
engineered a "motor voter" conspiracy. There is no evidence to support that
claim. The report itself points out that, according to the testimony of the
director of the Division of Driver Licenses, problems often arose because
voters failed to complete their motor/voter applications correctly and/or in
a timely manner. References to one such individual were stricken from the
report when the affected agency's responses determined that this individual
had submitted an incomplete registration form. The report does not mention
the concern that the "motor voter" system frequently tends to err on the
side of letting voters vote when in fact they are not be eligible.

5. Confusing Ballots

Although some witnesses testified about the confusion caused by the
"butterfly ballot" in Palm Beach County, no evidence was presented that the
butterfly ballot was targeted to particular groups, as the Commission
originally suggested in its "preliminary" report of March 9. During the
hearings, the Commission heard varying accounts regarding "defective"
ballots. A rabbi from Palm Beach County testified that when he spoke with a
group of 500 people within his congregation in Palm Beach County, about 20
percent complained that they had problems with the butterfly ballot ("their
arrows did not line up with the holes"); the rest of the group experienced
no such problems and "simply laughed."

The supervisor of elections for Palm Beach County supervisor later testified
that, in some cases, it appeared that voters using the butterfly ballot
failed to properly line up the ballot in the voting machine. The supervisor
also explained that certain community groups may have mistakenly instructed
voters to "punch the second hole" for Gore "when he was not the second hole;
he was the third hole." Others had been told to "vote for Lieberman," but
"if they followed the line where Lieberman's name was, it punched another
hole down because the President and Vice President are grouped together."

The supervisor also testified that, "In Palm Beach, sample ballots were sent
out to all registered voters," and she contested earlier charges regarding
defective ballots. She explained that she herself had never been alerted to
or received any complaints about the actual card not fitting into the
machine: "The ballot cards are all purchased from the same company and they're
all printed at the same time. They all come off the same press. They're all
printed on the exact same size paper. You've got the candidate's name, the
arrow pointing to the number and then the hole if you follow straight across
then you'll hit the hole."

In Palm Beach County, the major problem was a ballot designed to be printed
in large type for the benefit of older voters. In Duval County, a major
problem was faulty instructions to voters by Democratic party workers,
provided with the intention of maximizing Democratic votes lower down on the
ballot The biggest problem for all kinds of ballots was the fact that, as
the report explains, there were ten candidates on the ballot for President,
compared with only three or four in previous years.

Another significant issue, which the report virtually ignores, concerns the
problems of first-time voters, many of whom received faulty how-to
instructions from the very groups that urged them to vote in the first
place. As Isiah Rumlin, head of the NAACP in Duval County, recently stated:
"We didn't do any voter education. We didn't know we needed to. In
retrospect, we should have done a better job."

As a result of the election-day confusion in Florida and many other states,
there is a new emphasis on voter education initiatives and the role that can
be played by advocacy groups and community organizations. In Broward County,
for example, the new supervisor of elections, Miriam Oliphant, has launched
a program to involve local churches in the efforts to better educate voters,
recruit new ones, and prevent many of the difficulties that occurred during
the 2000 election. By stressing litigation rather than education, the
majority report is heading in the wrong direction.

Part IV. The Majority Report's Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act
Distorts the Law

The report essentially concludes that election procedures in Florida were in
violation of the Voting Rights Act, but the Commission found no evidence to
reach that conclusion, and has bent the 1965 statute totally out of shape.

The question of a Section 2 violation can only be settled in a federal
court. Plaintiffs who charge discrimination must prevail in a trial in which
the state has a full opportunity to challenge the evidence. To prevail,
plaintiffs must show that "racial politics dominate the electoral process,"
as the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee Report stated in explaining the newly
amended Section 2.

The majority's report implies that Section 2 aimed to correct all possible
inequalities in the electoral process. Had that been the goal, racially
disparate registration and turnout rates-found nearly everywhere in the
country-would constitute a Voting Rights Act violation. Less affluent, less
educated citizens tend to register and vote at lower rates, and, for the
same reasons, are likely to make more errors in casting ballots, especially
if they are first time voters. Neither the failure to register nor the
failure to cast a ballot properly-as regrettable as they are-are Section 2
violations.

Thus, despite the thousands of voting rights cases on the books, the
majority report cannot cite any case law that suggests punch card ballots,
for instance, are potentially discriminatory. Or that higher error rates
among black voters suggest disenfranchisement.

There is good reason why claims brought under section 2 must be settled in a
federal court. The provision requires the adjudication of competing claims
about equal electoral opportunity-an inquiry into the complex issue of
racial fairness. The Commission is not a court and cannot arrive at verdicts
that belong exclusively to the judiciary. Yet, while the majority report
does admit that the Commission cannot determine if violations of the Voting
Rights Act have actually occurred, in fact it unequivocally claims to have
found "disenfranchisement," under the terms of the statute.

The majority report argues that election procedures in Florida violated the
Voting Rights Act, but that conclusion depends upon bending the 1965 statute
totally out of shape.

It is absolutely correct, as the Commission report asserts, that violations
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act do not need to involve intentional
disenfranchisement. Section 2 of the act was amended in 1982 in an effort to
circumvent the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden v. City of Mobile, 1980.
Bolden, in insisting that plaintiffs in an equal protection suit demonstrate
discriminatory intent, had brought the statute in conformity with Fourteenth
Amendment standards in general. The amended provision allowed minority
voters nationwide to challenge methods of election on grounds of
discriminatory "result."

The concern at the time was that plaintiffs, in the wake of Bolden, would
have to find a smoking gun-unmistakable evidence that public officials
deliberately, knowingly set out to deprive minority voters of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment rights.

No witness, however, from the civil rights community argued that all voting
mechanisms or procedures with a disparate impact on black or Hispanic voters
would violate the law. Thus, the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, in
explaining the newly amended Section 2, defined a jurisdiction in violation
of the law as one in which "racial politics dominate[d] the electoral
process." At the 1982 Senate Hearings, a distinguished civil rights attorney
testified that claims of voter dilution would rest on "evidence that voters
of a racial minority are isolated within a political system...'shut out,'
i.e. denied access... [without] the opportunity to participate in the
electoral process."

If all voting procedures with a disparate impact on minority voters violated
the statute, then all registration processes, in jurisdictions with black
and Hispanic residents, would be legally questionable. As you know, less
affluent, less educated citizens tend to register and vote at lower rates,
and many of those educationally and economically disadvantaged citizens are
members of those minority groups.

Voter error is analogous to low registration rates; it is more likely to
occur among the less educated and the less affluent. And thus, despite the
thousands of voting rights cases on the books, the majority report cannot
cite any case law that suggests punch card ballots, for instance, are
potentially discriminatory. Or that higher error rates among black voters
suggest disenfranchisement.

The disparate impact test is actually very complicated, and always has been.
For instance, a multimember district in which whites are a majority may have
a disparate impact on minority voters. But as the Supreme Court has said
(Whitcomb v. Chavis, 1971), the candidates supported by black voters may
consistently lose, but that disparate impact upon black representation (and
officeholding) is not necessarily a violation of minority voting rights. In
Whitcomb, black voters were Democrats in a Republican County. It was not
exclusion, but the process of party competition and the principle of
majority rule that denied blacks the representation they sought. Political
party, not race, determined the electoral outcome.

This same logic still runs through the complicated process by which a
judicial determination is made in a section 2 Voting Rights Act case. Courts
must determine whether minority voters have had "less opportunity" to
participate in the electoral process, a finding that requires plaintiffs to
meet a multifaceted test. Plaintiffs must show, for instance, that there has
been "a significant lack of responsiveness of the part of elected officials
to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group"; that
"political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals; and that voting is "racially polarized." These are just a few items
off the list of so-called "factors" to which courts are instructed to refer
in judging the merits of a vote dilution suit; disparate impact alone never
settles the "equal opportunity" question.

There is another point. The question of a Section 2 violation can only be
settled in a federal court. Plaintiffs who charge discrimination must
prevail in a trial in which the state has a full opportunity to challenge
the evidence. There is a reason why, in contrast to Section 5 in the Act,
Section 2 requires a trial in a federal court. Section 5 claims can be
settled in the Justice Department itself, through the process of
administrative review. That is because they pose simpler questions-namely,
whether a new election procedure or practice is clearly intentionally
discriminatory, or whether its impact is such as to leave minority voters
worse off than they had been. A typical Section 5 question would thus be:
Are newly drawn redistricting lines likely to result in fewer black
officeholders than before?

Section 2, on the other hand, demands an inquiry into the complex issue of
racial fairness. Adjudicating competing claims about equal electoral
opportunity, as the Supreme Court has noted, requires an "intensely local
appraisal"-the specific, detailed knowledge that only a court can obtain.
And it demands the chance that only a trial can provide for the challenged
jurisdiction to answer the charges. As the Chair herself has conceded many
times the Commission is: "not a court" and cannot arrive at verdicts that
belong exclusively to the judiciary. Yet, while the majority report does
admit that the Commission cannot determine whether violations of the Voting
Rights Act have actually occurred, in fact it unequivocally claims to have
found "disenfranchisement," under the terms of the statute.

The Commission's findings are likely to inspire some people to call for
federally mandated election procedures of one sort or another. This would be
a grievous error. The architects of the Constitution left matters of
suffrage almost entirely in state hands, although subsequent Amendments
prohibited a poll tax and denial or abridgment of the right to vote on
account of race, gender, or age (after eighteen). It is true that in 1965
the Voting Rights Act broke with constitutional tradition, but that was a
uniquely draconian response necessitated by the persistent and egregious
infringements of basic Fifteenth Amendment rights that pervaded the Jim Crow
South.

None of the Commission's findings depict a national emergency in any way
resembling that in 1965. Florida itself (unlike the states of the Deep South
in the 1960s) has readily acknowledged the need for reforms to its voting
procedures, and has already acted to remedy problems evident in the November
election. State action is appropriate; federal intrusion is not.

More voter education is clearly needed-a job for the states themselves, for
political parties, and for other interested organizations. Donna Brazile, Al
Gore's campaign manager, recently lamented the inadequate voter education in
preparation for the last election. "I take full responsibility for the lack
of voter education resources that could have helped us," she said. While we
think Ms. Brazile blames herself excessively, we do look forward to a
greater effort to prepare voters to cast their ballots in the future. That
effort is not mandated by the Voting Rights Act, but is certainly much to be
desired.

The "Less Reliable Voting Machinery" Issue

The less-reliable machinery argument-which gained mythic proportions in the
press-has been widely disproven. It is simply not the case that poorer
counties with larger minority populations have substantially inferior voting
equipment that is significantly more prone to error. At most, this was a
minor factor in voter error rates.

In fact, as the Commission heard in Florida, the punch-card jurisdictions
did not have the highest "spoilage" rates. The "optical central" system had
the most problems-that is, the system using optical scanners with votes
counted at some central location rather than in the local precinct. (Thus,
the county with the highest spoilage rate, Gadsden County, used the optical
central tabulation system, not the infamous punch-card machines.) And the
"touchscreen" system has been found to have a spoilage rate as high as
punch-card systems.

The Commission heard a number of complaints about punch card voting
machines, but these were used in many different locations throughout the
state, in both poor and affluent districts, from Duvall County to Palm
Beach. Testimony from expert witnesses on voting technology did seem to
point to a correlation between minority populations and "drop off" rates
("drop off" being the difference between the numbers of people who went to
the polls and the numbers of ballots that recorded no vote for certain
offices), but not a clear or consistent correlation between technology and
minority populations.

A January 2001 study by Professor Stephen Knack of the University of
Maryland and Professor Martha Kropf of the University of Missouri (Kansas
City), like other recent, authoritative studies, also challenges the
"widespread perception that counties in Florida and elsewhere with a greater
percentage of minorities and poor people were more likely to employ
antiquated voting machinery that produces a disproportionate number of
undervotes and invalid ballots." The Knack & Kropf study found "little
support for the view that resource constraints cause poorer counties with
large minority populations to retain antiquated or inferior voting
equipment."

Part V: Misplaced Responsibility for Election Procedures

The report holds Florida's public officials, including the governor and
secretary of state responsible for the discrimination that it alleges.
"State officials failed to fulfill their duties in a manner that would
prevent this disenfranchisement," is asserts. In fact, most of the authority
over elections in Florida resides with officials in the state's 67 counties,
and many of those with the highest rates of voter error were under
Democratic control.

The report charges that the governor, the secretary of state and other state
officials should have acted differently in anticipation of the high turnout
of voters. What the Commission actually heard from "key officials" and
experts was that the increase in registration, on average, was no different
than in previous years; that since the development of "motor voter"
registration, voter registration is more of an ongoing process and does not
reach the intensity it used to just prior to an election; and that, in any
event, registration is not always a reliable predictor for turnout.

The majority report also faults Florida state officials with having failed
to provide the 67 supervisors of elections with "adequate guidance or
funding" for voter education and training of election officials. But the
county supervisors are independent, constitutional officers who make their
budget requests to the Boards of county commissioners, not to the state.

The Commission's report makes a highly politicized attack against Florida
state officials. As previously noted, the report asserts that "State
officials failed to fulfill their duties in a manner that would prevent this
disenfranchisement," and calls on the U.S. Department of Justice to
"institute formal investigations... to determine liability and to seek
appropriate remedies."

The charges the majority has directed against the Governor and the Secretary
of State and other officials in Florida are particularly disturbing. The
Commission's interrogation in Tallahassee (during which the Governor was the
only witness during the entire set of hearings to be denied the opportunity
to make an opening statement) suggested a Catch-22: The governor and other
state officials would have been faulted if they had been too involved in the
running of the presidential election; now they are judged to be derelict for
their deference to proper local authorities.

The majority report admits grudgingly that it found no "conclusive evidence"
of a state-sponsored conspiracy to keep minorities from voting. But as
several independent observers have pointed out, this is malicious and
misleading phrasing, since there was in fact no evidence whatsoever of a
conspiracy at all, conclusive or otherwise.

Contrary to what the majority has asserted, state and local officials have
refuted in detail the serious allegations the Commission has made against
them.

The testimony in Florida clearly explained and delineated the delegation of
authority and decentralized responsibility for elections, under Florida's
constitution. Testimony from all the public witnesses with jurisdiction over
these matters provided no evidence of criminal misconduct in connection with
the Florida 2000 elections. Testimony also revealed the seriousness accorded
to the work of the Governor's bipartisan task force on election reform.
Ignoring all of this available evidence the Commission insists that Florida
state officials are guilty of "gross neglect" in fulfilling their
responsibilities regarding election matters. By so doing, the majority again
violates fundamental concepts of due process. Not only are its conclusions
not based upon evidence contained in the record of the hearings. They are in
direct conflict with the testimony of the witnesses who were most
knowledgeable about such matters.

The report refuses to accept a key point that emerged in testimony during
the hearings-that the elections supervisors are "independent, constitutional
officers." That is why, as a recent piece in The Economist ("Unfair, Again,"
June 9, 2001) points out, "laying so much blame on the governor and
secretary of state is unrealistic." The article goes on to explain that,
"Most of the key decisions were made in Florida's 67 counties rather than in
Tallahassee," and, "Many of the counties with the highest number of voter
errors were under Democratic control."

The majority report criticizes Governor Bush for having "apparently
delegated the responsibility" for the conduct of the election. It fails to
grasp that this is precisely what Florida law provides. The Secretary of
State is criticized for having taken a "limited" role in election oversight
that is in sharp contrast to the position she took before the Supreme Court"
in Bush v. Gore. The majority report fails to explain, however, that Bush v.
Gore (which addressed the issue of "recounts" and the certification of the
results of the election) had nothing to do with the authority of county
officials as to how the elections are run on the local level in Florida. The
report glosses over the inconvenient fact that, under Florida law, Governor
Bush has virtually no authority over the voting process, and the Secretary
of State's role is mainly to provide non-binding advice to local officials.

The report's central theme-that the governor and other officials are to be
blamed (and investigated) for not having taken full responsibility for all
of the problems that occurred during the Florida election-is contravened by
the arbitrary way in which these same officials were treated by the
Commission's own general counsel.

On June 8, when questioned as to why state officials were given only
portions of the report to review, the general counsel explained that, "we
selected the portions that are relevant... based on activities and
responsibilities." The general counsel went on to say that, "we just thought
it would be a bad idea [to send the full report] because there are
responsibilities and activities that don't pertain to the governor's office
In light of the fact that the general counsel sent the governor only about
30 pages of a 200-page report, he himself must have considered the governor's
activities and responsibilities to be quite limited indeed.

It is also ironic that the Chair chose to berate Secretary Harris during the
Tallahassee hearing for not having assumed more responsibility for the
problems that occurred on election day. At the hearing, the Chair explained
that, even though this Commission delegates to the staff director the
authority to run the day-to-day operations of the Commission, she herself-as
Chair-must assume ultimate responsibility for everything that happens at the
Commission. That explanation stands in stark contrast to the statements
issued by the Chair in the wake of the unauthorized leak of this report,
when the Chair asserted that she was "only one vote" on the Commission.

The report charges that the governor, the secretary of state and other state
officials should have acted differently in anticipation of the high turnout
of voters. What the Commission actually heard from "key officials" and
experts was that the increase in registration, on average, was no different
than in previous years; that since the development of "motor voter"
registration, voter registration is more of an ongoing process and does not
reach the intensity it used to just prior to an election; and that, in any
event, registration is not always a reliable predictor for turnout.

One expert who has studied voter turnout and participation for 25 years
testified that, "The Florida turnout was not particularly high"-only 2.2
percent over 1996. Several supervisors of elections testified that the
highest turnout occurred in 1992 (which had an 80 percent turnout compared
to the 64 percent turnout in 2000).

The majority report also faults Florida state officials with having failed
to provide the 67 supervisors of elections with "adequate guidance or
funding" for voter education and training of election officials. It fails to
mention the Commission also learned that, under Florida's Constitution,
requesting and allocating resources is a local responsibility, one which
belongs to the supervisors of elections. The county supervisors are
independent, constitutional officers who make their budget requests to the
Boards of county commissioners. It is up to the county commissioners to
approve or reject those requests, and there is currently no process for
appealing to the Florida cabinet. The majority of the supervisors of
elections who came before the Commission testified that they themselves did
not request additional resources prior to the election but, that even if
they had, such a request would have properly been directed to their county
commissioners, not to the governor or to the Division of Elections.

Part VI. The Commission Provides a Misleading Analysis of the Felon List
Question

The report asserts that the use of a convicted felons list "has a disparate
impact on African Americans." "African Americans in Florida were more likely
to find their names on the list than persons of other races." Of course,
because a higher proportion of blacks have been convicted of felonies in
Florida, as elsewhere in the nation. But there is no evidence that the state
targeted blacks in a discriminatory manner in constructing a purge list, or
that the state made less of an effort to notify listed African Americans and
to correct errors than it did with whites. The Commission did not hear from
a single witness who was actually prevented from voting as a result of being
erroneously identified as a felon. Furthermore, whites were twice as likely
as blacks to be placed on the list erroneously, not the other way around.

The compilation of the purge list was part of an anti-fraud measure enacted
by the Florida legislature in the wake of a Miami mayoral election in which
ineligible voters cast ballots. The list for the 2000 election was
over-inclusive, and some supervisors made no use of it. (The majority report
did not bother to ask how many counties relied upon it.) On the other hand
according to the Palm Beach Post, more than 6,500 ineligible felons voted.

Based on extensive research the Miami Herald concluded that the biggest
problem with the felon list was not that it wrongly prevented eligible
voters from casting ballots, but that it ended up allowing ineligible voters
to cast a ballot. The Commission should have looked into allegations of
voter fraud, not only with respect to ineligible felons, but allegations
involving fraudulent absentee ballots in nursing homes, unregistered voters,
and so forth. Across the country in a variety of jurisdictions, serious
questions about voter fraud have been raised.

The Majority Report suggests that one important instrument of black
"disenfranchisement" was the so-called "purge list," a list of persons who
should be removed from the voting rolls because they had a felony
conviction. Regrettably, the list supplied to state officials by the firm
hired to do the work mistakenly included the names of some persons who had
no felony convictions.

The Majority Report implies that this was no innocent mistake, but another
effort to suppress the black vote. The sole piece of supporting evidence it
cites a table with data on Miami-Dade County. Blacks were racially targeted,
according to the report, because they account for almost two thirds of the
names of the felon list but were less than one-seventh of Florida's
population.

This might seem a striking disparity. But it ignores the sad fact that
African Americans are greatly over-represented in the population of persons
committing felonies-in Florida and in the United States as a whole. The
Majority Report never bothers to ask what the proportion is. Without
demonstrating that less than two-thirds of the previously convicted felons
living in Miami-Dade County were African American, the racial disproportion
on the felon list is completely meaningless.

It is not only meaningless but irrelevant. The vast majority of the people
on the felons' list were properly listed. It was illegal for them to vote
according to Florida law. The Commission may not like that law, but it is
not its business to opine on the matter.

The only possible civil rights violation here is the allegation that
disproportionately large numbers of African Americans were put on the felon
list falsely. Had the Commission bothered to examine its own data supplied
in the report, it would have found that the truth was just the opposite of
what it claims.

The table reveals that 239 for the 4,678 African Americans on the Miami-Dade
felons' list objected when they were notified that they were ineligible to
vote and were cleared to participate. They represented 5.1 percent of the
total number of blacks on the felons list. Of the 1,264 whites on the list,
125 proved to be there by mistake-which is 9.9 percent of the total. Thus,
the error rate for whites was almost double that for blacks.

If the errors on the felons list were targeted so as to reduce the voting
strength of some group it was whites, not blacks, who were targeted. The
error rate for Hispanics was almost as high as that for whites-8.7 percent.
Since the data are from Miami-Dade, with its huge Hispanic population, one
might conclude that someone hoped to suppress both the both the non-Hispanic
white vote and the Hispanic vote.

At the hearing in Miami, the Commission received testimony from
DBT/Choicepoint, Inc., the data-base company which provided the state with a
over-inclusive list of individuals who might be convicted felons, registered
in more than one county or even deceased. The compilation of the list was
part of an anti-fraud measure enacted by the Florida legislature in the wake
of Miami's 1997 mayoral election, in which at least one dead voter and a
number of felons cast ballots.

The Commission heard from DBT that approximately 3,000 to 4,000 non-felons
(out of approximately 174,000 names) were mistakenly listed on this
so-called "purge" list provided to the state. The list identified 74,900
potentially dead voters, 57,770 potential felons, and 40,472 potential
duplicate registrations. Under Florida law, the supervisors of elections
were required to verify the ineligible-voter list by contacting the
supposedly ineligible voters. Some supervisors who were concerned about the
unreliability of the list did not use it to remove a single voter. It is
regrettable that the authors of the majority report made no effort to
determine how many of the 67 supervisors of elections did or did use the
list. According to recent studies, the total number of wrongly-purged
alleged felons was 1, 104, including 996 convicted of crimes in other states
and 108 who were not felons. This number contradicts the Commission's claim
that "countless" voters were wrongly disenfranchised because of inaccuracies
in the list.

Most notably, the Commission did not hear from a single witness who was
prevented from voting as a result of being erroneously identified as a
felon. One witness did testify that he was erroneously removed from the
voter list because he had been mistaken for another individual on the felon
list whose name and birth date were practically identical to his. However,
he was able to convince precinct officials that there had been a clerical
error, and he was allowed to vote.

In pursuing its attack on the purge list, the Commission completely ignored
the bigger story: Approximately 5,600 felons voted illegally in Florida on
November 7, approximately 68 percent of whom were registered Democrats. On
June 8, General Counsel Hailes was asked why the report failed to address
the issue of ineligible voters who cast ballots on election day. His
response was: "That's not part of the scope of our report."

Based on extensive research, the Miami Herald discovered that, "among the
felons who cast presidential ballots, there were "62 robbers, 56 drug
dealers, 45 killers, 16 rapists, and 7 kidnappers. At least two who voted
were pictured on the state's on-line registry of sexual offenders."
According to the Herald, the biggest problem with the felon list was not
that it wrongly prevented eligible voters from voting, but rather that it
ended up allowing ineligible voters to cast a ballot:

Some... claim that many legitimate voters "of all ethnic and racial
groups, but particularly blacks" were illegally swept from the rolls through
the state's efforts to ban felons from voting. There is no evidence of that.
Instead, the evidence points to just the opposite, that election officials
were mostly permissive, not obstructionist, when unregistered voters
presented themselves. (Miami Herald Report, p. 105)

The Palm Beach Post conducted its own extensive research into the problems
with the flawed exceptions list. The Post's findings, which corroborate the
major conclusions of the Herald's investigation, include the following:

a.. Most of the people the state prevented from voting probably were
felons.

b.. Of the 19,398 voters removed from the rolls, more than 14,600 matched
a felon by name, birth date, race and gender.

c.. More than 6,500 were convicted in counties other than where they
voted, suggesting they would not have been found by local officials without
the DBT list.

d.. Many of these felons were convicted years ago, and they had no idea
that they did not have their civil rights [to vote].

e.. Many had been voting and unwittingly breaking the law for years.

(Palm Beach Post, "Felon Purge Sacrificed Innocent Voters," May 27, 2001)

The report's message is that nobody in authority did enough in terms of data
verification. But the Commission itself failed to verify key arguments made
in its report. The letter (submitted per the affected agency review) from
Michael R. Ramage, General Counsel for the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, provides a lengthy clarification of the FDLE's role in
verifying the felon status of voters whose names had been forwarded by the
local supervisor. (Note that, according to Mr. Ramage's letter to Mr.
Hailes, the FDLE was allowed to review only three pages of the 200-page
report, despite the prominence the report gives to this controversial
issue.) In his letter to General Counsel Hailes, dated June 6, 2001, Mr.
Ramage maintains that the Commission's findings are "wrong and based on
erroneous assumptions," and places undue emphasis on "anecdotal examples of
problems." His letter later goes on to detail FDLE's efforts regarding
verification of the "exceptions" list:

[i]t is important to note that during the pertinent time frame, FDLE
responded effectively to nearly 5,000 voters whose names matched those of
convicted felon's in Florida's criminal history records. (It is not unusual
for criminals when arrested to use a name, date of birth, address, social
security number, etc., other than their own.).... A number of those who
believed they had been wrongfully identified as not being able to vote were
ultimately found to be incorrect. They were, in fact, not eligible to vote.
Likewise, a number of those who raised a concern were ultimately found to be
eligible to vote. The process worked to resolve issues. Of those voters who
contacted FDLE to appeal the notice from a local supervisor of elections
that they were ineligible to vote, approximately 50 percent were confirmed
to be Florida convicted felons, and 50 percent were determined not to have a
conviction in Florida for a felony.

While the General Counsel on June 8 indicated that some revisions would be
made to acknowledge the "extraordinary efforts" by the FDLE, no revision has
been made in the conclusions, which are still wrong and based on erroneous
assumptions. Certainly, no eligible voter should be wrongly prevented from
doing so, but at the same time, election officials have a compelling
interest in preventing voter fraud by convicted felons. The Commission
majority has failed to look at all the facts regarding the felon list and,
instead of focusing on what it calls "the reality" of list maintenance, uses
anecdotes to call for an extensive and unwarranted investigation by the U.S.
Department of Justice.

There is also the additional question of voter fraud. On June 8, the Chair
explained that the report did not look at the issue of voter fraud, since
"fraud does not appear to be a major factor in the Florida election," and
that, in any event, this was "beyond the scope" of the Commission's
investigation. Thus, the report single-mindedly pursues only one kind of
vote dilution (allegations that eligible voters were denied the right to
vote) while completely ignoring the other (allegations that ineligible
voters were allowed to vote).

Only in the report's introduction is there a brief mention of Complaints of
Voter Fraud, "listed along with the Western Florida Time Zone Controversy
and Absentee Military Ballots as "other factors" that "could have
contributed to voter disenfranchisement in Florida." (In other words, the
main concern is with voting irregularities that could be interpreted as
having a disparate impact on Democratic voters. Factors that one could
surmise might have had a disparate impact on Republican voters are simply
shoved aside.) The report then goes on to explain that, "while recognizing
that the above factors do raise concerns of voting irregularities, the
Commission did not receive many complaints or evidence during its
Tallahassee and Miami hearings pertaining to how these issues created
possible voter disenfranchisement in Florida."

This explanation is disingenuous and incorrect. First of all, at the
Commission's meeting of December 8, 2000, when the Commission reached its
decision to conduct an investigation of the Florida election, there was
lengthy discussion of the Commission's statutory responsibility to
investigate "any patterns or practice of fraud." Chair Berry herself
explained that "if there are people who engaged in fraud or violated the
laws, we would hand them over for prosecution." The Chair assured
Commissioners that, "[e]very single allegation should be systematically
pursued."

Second, if the Commission "did not receive" evidence regarding fraud, it is
because, contrary to the Chair's assurances in December, it chose not to
seek any testimony on the widely-publicized allegations of fraud. Given the
report's emphasis on the so-called purge list, this is an egregious
omission. In Florida, there were various reports regarding thousands of
ballots cast by ineligible felons and unregistered voters, fraudulent
absentee ballots in nursing homes, and precincts where more ballots were
cast than the number of people who voted. It is unconscionable that the
Commission made no effort to look at these problems.

Part VII: Unwarranted Criticism of Florida Law Enforcement

Despite clear and direct testimony during the hearings, as well as
additional information submitted by Florida officials after the hearings,
the majority report continues to charge the Florida Highway Patrol with
behavior that was "perceived" by a number of voters as unusual (and thus
somehow "intimidating") on election day. In fact, only two persons are
identified in the majority report regarding their perception of activities
of the Florida Highway Patrol on election day. One testified about a police
checkpoint, and the other testified that he found it "unusual" to see an
empty police car parked outside of a polling facility. Neither of these
witnesses' testimony indicates how their or others' ability to vote was
impaired by these events.

As the chief of the Florida Highway Patrol, Colonel Charles C. Hall,
testified in Tallahassee, there was one motor vehicle checkpoint, in Leon
County, on election day. That checkpoint was not adequately authorized and
resulted in one complaint. The equipment checkpoint operation lasted about
90 minutes (between 10:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m.) and occurred more than two
miles away and on a different roadway from the nearest polling facility. Of
the approximately 150 cars stopped at the checkpoint, a total of 18
citations or notices of faulty equipment were issued to 16 different
individuals, 12 of whom were white. The citizen who lodged the complaint
testified that she had contacted the NAACP after she returned from voting,
yet refused to meet with the FHP to assist their investigation. Despite this
one, highly publicized incident, there has been no evidence whatsoever of
police intimidation of voters.

Writing in response to the affected agency review, the general counsel for
the State of Florida's Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,
Enoch J. Whitney, stands by the evidence presented by Colonel Hall at the
hearing:

Colonel Hall's testimony conclusively demonstrates that there was no
intent by members of the Florida Highway Patrol to delay or prohibit any
citizen from voting on Election Day. All pertinent evidence shows that in
fact no one was delayed or prohibited from voting by virtue of the equipment
checkpoint operation.

The Commission majority's willingness to perpetuate a gross misperception of
this issue is a disservice to the public's confidence in America's electoral
and law enforcement systems, and an insult to the dedicated officers of
Florida's law enforcement community.

Part VIII: Procedural Irregularities at the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

Procedural irregularities have seriously marred the majority report. In
writing the report, the Commission ignored not only the rules of evidence,
but the agency's own procedures for gathering evidence. By arguing that
"every voice must be heard," while in fact stifling the voice of the
political minority on the Commission itself, it is guilty of hypocrisy.

In writing this report, the Commission majority has ignored not only the
rules of evidence, but the agency's own procedures for gathering evidence.
The procedural issues are important to the extent they relate to the policy
and politics driving this report. By pretending to investigate procedural
irregularities while engaging in procedural irregularities of its own, the
Commission majority undermines its credibility and diminishes the value of
its work. By arguing that "every voice must be heard" while in fact stifling
the voice of others, the Commission is guilty of hypocrisy.

Republican and Independent Commissioners were never asked if they would like
to call witnesses. Hearings were completely controlled by the Chair and the
General Counsel, and commissioners did not even know who the witnesses were
to be at one Miami hearing; thus they could not properly prepare questions.

When the hearings failed to provide any evidence of widespread voter
disenfranchisement, the Chair unilaterally approved a last-minute
procurement of the services of an outside "statistician," Professor Allan
Lichtman. Commissioners were never asked to approve this arrangement, nor
were they contacted regarding any suggestions they might have for additional
or alternate experts.

At its June 8, 2001 meeting the Commission voted that Dr. Lichtman would be
asked to prepare a rejoinder to any dissent that was filed, and that the
dissent was not to be made available on the commission's web site until it
could be accompanied by Dr. Lichtman's response. It is astonishing and
unprecedented that the commission would take the position that the views of
its minority members could not be circulated to the public until a rebuttal
of them was prepared. Is the dissent a document that is too dangerous for
the public to read unless accompanied by an immediate rebuttal? Furthermore,
to date, Dr. Lichtman's rejoinder has not materialized, and it was stated at
the July 13, 2001 meeting of the commission that it was not clear whether he
would be writing any response to this dissenting opinion, with unclear
consequences for the fate of the dissent.

At the July 13 monthly Commission meeting, members of the commission staff
and some commissioners argued that this document is not a proper "dissent,"
and that the commission should not allow its publication. One commissioner
asserted that a "two or three or five page statement" would be an acceptable
dissent, but something more than that would be out of bounds. In a July 10
memo, the staff director stated that the Commission "does not envision any
Commissioner "engag[ing] in a complete reanalysis of the staff s work." But
it is obviously impossible to write a thorough dissent without reanalyzing
the quantitative and other evidence upon which important claims have been
based.

As a result of such objections, at its July 13, 2000 meeting the Commission
majority refused to authorize the publication of our work pending further
negotiation. Whether it will actually appear under the Commission's
imprimatur remains an open question at this time. Astonishingly, many of the
commissioners seem to believe that it is appropriate for them to dictate the
form any disagreement with their views should take.

We feel fortunate to be living in a time in which technological progress
renders futile the attempts of those in power to silence the expression of
minority views. Any interested member of the public can already find our a
full draft on our dissenting opinion on the Web, on both the Manhattan
Institute and the National Review web sites. And of course it will be
available in print in the published hearings of the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration. But it is nonetheless deeply troubling that a body
whose mission is to explore unpopular truths would keep from public scrutiny
a dissenting opinion written by two of its duly-appointed members.

1. Failure to follow statutory requirements for fair and objective
proceedings.

Under the Commission's regulations, all proceedings are to be conducted in a
fair and objective manner. During its hearings in Florida, however, the
Commission failed to ensure fair, equal and courteous treatment of
witnesses. The secretary of state was treated in an insulting manner, and
the governor was the only witness during the proceedings who was denied the
opportunity to deliver an opening statement.

2. Conclusions issued before all of the evidence was received.

The Commission reached its verdict long before it had even completed its
review of the evidence. On March 9, the Chair introduced a "preliminary
assessment" that was not shared with Commissioners beforehand and that did
not provide Florida officials with an opportunity to respond to the charges
against them. These procedures are sadly reminiscent of Alison in Wonderland's
court of the Red Queen: "Verdict first, trial later!"

3. Denial of "defame and degrade" review.

Section 702.18 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires the Commission to
give parties that might be defamed or degraded by its reports a chance to
respond. The majority report states that "the Commission followed its
procedures by conducting a defame and degrade review." It fails to state
that the Commission's general counsel denied the governor's request to be
given the requisite 30 days, under defame and degrade, to review the report
in its entirety (instead of select portions) and the requisite 20 days to
submit a "timely, verified response." The general counsel's explanation on
June 8 was that there was "no statement [in the report] that would
constitute defame and degrade." In light of the Chair's statement on June 8
that the governor, the secretary of state, and other state officials were
"grossly derelict in fulfilling their responsibilities," the general counsel's
decision appears to indicate that the Commission has been "grossly derelict"
in its treatment of those who assist its investigations.

4. Inadequate affected agency review and consideration of affected agency
comments

The report also claims that "affected agencies were afforded an opportunity
to review applicable portions." The Commission's project management system
normally requires at least 30 days for affected agency review, yet the
governor and other officials were given only 10 days to review the report,
and the report was given to the press before affected parties could respond.
In an interview with the New York Times, the general counsel claimed that
anyone wishing to respond to the Florida report would have 20 days to do so.
Few of the affected agency comments have actually been factored into the
final report.

To compound the seriousness of these procedural improprieties, the
Commission handed out copies of the draft report at the June 8 meeting and
posted the draft on its web site, thereby widely disseminating a version of
the report that included none of the affected agency comments or any of the
corrections and amendments discussed at the June 8 meeting.

Affected agency review is an essential procedure to ensure fairness and
accuracy of Commission reports. Contrary to the Chair's statement on June 8,
it is not a mere "courtesy" that is granted or denied at the whim of the
Chair or the staff. In this case, the procedure was mooted by the leak to
the press and the public dissemination of a preliminary, uncorrected draft.

5. No management controls for this agency in disarray:

A 1997 investigation by the GAO found the Commission to be an "agency in
disarray" and cited, in particular, the lack of communication and effective
management controls regarding the Commission's projects. Pursuant to the GAO
investigation, the Commission implemented its management information system
to specify timelines for completion of the Commission's work product. In the
case of the Florida report, however, no clear or consistent timeline has
been maintained for this project and Commissioners' inquiries to both the
Chair and the staff director have been routinely ignored.

For example, at the March 9 meeting, instead of taking up a status report on
the project (as the agenda announced), Commissioners were asked to approve,
without any advance notice at all, the Chair's own personal statement of
preliminary findings. At the same meeting, the Chair advised Commissioners
that, "in April we expect to have the draft of the voting rights in Florida,
the actual draft, in front of us." In April, however, Commissioners were
given only an "Outline of the Final Document" and were advised that the
draft report would be considered at the June 8 meeting. At no time were
Commissioners advised they would be given only three days to read the report
prior to the June 8 vote. The Chair dismissed any criticism in this regard,
asserting that Commissioners should have known "that we would receive it
when we did receive it."

Instead of taking responsibility for the question of agency leaks, the Chair
now proposes to legitimize the premature disclosure of Commission reports,
by suggesting a change in policy for Commission reports. Specifically, the
Chair proposes, for future reports, "that we release the draft of the report
publicly as soon as it's available without waiting [until] even when we give
it to the Commissioners." While releasing drafts of a report as they are
written makes much sense, since it would allow commissioners to discuss the
findings with the staff before the document is finished, if s not clear why
the Chair would give the press, but not the commissioners themselves, copies
of such a draft.

6. Selection of Allan Lichtman as the Commission's Sole Statistical
Analyst for the Florida Report

As we have argued, we believe that a rigorous statistical analysis of the
available data clearly and convincingly contradicts Dr. Lichtman's alleged
findings. Dr. Lichtman's conclusions are so unsupportable, in fact, that it
is first worth pausing to discuss the Commission's selection of him as its
sole statistical analyst to carry out such crucial work.

The choice of Dr. Lichtman to carry out this work is problematic. When he
appeared at the June 8, 2001, meeting of the commission to present his
findings, he took pains to present himself as a scholar above party, who had
"worked for Democratic interests... and for Republican interests."[33] At
the time, the American University web site identified him as a "consultant
to Vice-President Albert Gore, Jr."[34] His partisan commitment was evident
in his media appearances throughout the campaign and the period of
post-election uncertainty.

Moreover, although Dr. Lichtman claimed (at the June 8 Commission meeting)
that he began his study of possible racial bias in the Florida election with
an open-even "skeptical"-mind, in fact, evidence suggests the contrary. As
early as January 11, at the very beginning of his investigation and prior to
conducting any detailed statistical analysis of his own, Dr. Lichtman stated
publicly that he was already convinced, on the basis of what he had read in
the New York Times, that in Florida "minorities perhaps can go to the polls
unimpeded, but their votes are less likely to count because of the disparate
technology than are the votes of whites." He concluded: "In my view, that is
a classic violation of the Voting Rights Act."[35] Long before he examined
any of the statistics, Dr. Lichtman had already concluded that Florida had
disenfranchised minority voters and violated the Voting Rights Act.

A social scientist with strong partisan leanings might conceivably still
conduct an even-handed, impartial analysis of a body of data. Unfortunately,
that is not the case in the present instance.

Conclusion
America's journey on the road to racial and ethnic equality is far from
over. We have traveled far, and still have far to go. But the Commission's
majority report positively sets us back. By crying "disenfranchisement"
where there was confusion, bureaucratic mistakes, and voter error, the
report encourages public indifference. Real civil rights problems stir the
moral conscience of Americans; inflated rhetoric depicting crimes for which
there is no evidence undermines public confidence in civil rights advocates
and the causes to which they devote themselves.

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was once the moral conscience of the
nation. Under the direction of the Chair, Mary Frances Berry, it has become
an agency dedicated to furthering a partisan agenda. After six months of
desperately searching for widespread disenfranchisement in Florida, the
Commission produced a 200-page report based on faulty analysis and echoing
vague and unsubstantiated claims.

The shoddy quality of the work, its stolen-election message, and its picture
of black citizens as helpless victims in the American political process is
neither in the public interest nor in the interest of black and other
minority citizens. Do we really want black Americans to believe there is no
reason to get to the polls; elections are always stolen; they remain
disenfranchised? There is important work the Commission can do. But not if
its scholarly and procedural standards are as low as those in this Florida
report.







--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Report, 154.



[2] Report, 18.



[3] Report, 21. Note that later in the report, on page 148, the majority
asserts that it was highly anomalous that 63 percent of spoiled ballots in
Palm Beach County were overvotes, and blames the alleged anomaly on the
infamous butterfly ballot. The pattern, according to the report, was "just
the opposite of what we normally observe, which is five percent or less of
the spoiled ballots." How could the author of this passage possibly think
that 5 percent or less was the norm for overvotes in Florida when the
Lichtman figures cited earlier in the report reveals that fully 59 percent
of all the spoiled ballots in the state were overvotes?



[4] Martin Merzer, The Miami Herald Report: Democracy Held Hostage (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 194



[5] Ibid., 195.



[6] Ibid., 230-231



[7] Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election. the
Constitution, and the Courts (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press,
2001), 61.



[8] Report, 1



[9] According to the Caltech/NUT Voting Project, "state and federal voting
machine certifications tolerate very low machine failure rates: no more than
1 in 250,000 ballots for federal certification and no more than 1 in
1,000,000 in some states." The problem, according to these investigators,
has to do with "how people relate to the technologies." See the Caltech/MIT
Voting Project, "A Preliminary Assessment of the Reliability of Existing
Voting Equipment," February 1, 2001, 13.



[10] Exit polls are commonly used to estimate how particular groups voted,
and even they are far from perfect. One flaw is that absentee voters are not
represented at all. In any event, we can't tell from an exit poll whether
someone failed to complete a valid ballot; if they thought they had erred,
presumably they would have had it invalidated and have received another.



[11] W.G. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of
Individuals," American Sociological Review, vol. 15 (June, 1950), 351-357.



[12] D.A. Freedman, "Ecological Inference and the Ecological Fallacy,"
University of California at Berkeley Department of Statistics Technical
Report No. 549, Oct. 15, 1999, This paper will appear as a chapter in the
forthcoming International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.



[13] Transcript of June 8, 2001 meeting, 42.



[14] The explanation is that immigrants tend to be attracted to the richer
states - California. and New York rather than Tennessee and Mississippi.
Thus their presence is associated with high average incomes at the state
level, but that does not mean that their average incomes are especially
high.



[15] D. A. Freedman, S. P. Klein, M. Ostland, and M. Robert, "On 'Solutions'
to the Ecological Inference Problem," Journal of the American Statistical
Association, vol. 93 (December 1998), 1518-1523.



[16] Report, 21.



[17] National Center for Education Statistics, Adult Literacy in America: A
First Look at the Results of the National Adult Literacy Survey, National
Center for Education Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1993), 18, 113.



[18] National Center for Education Statistics, NAEP 1998 Reading Report Card
for the Nation and the States, NCES 1999-500 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Education, 1999), 70.



[19] National Center for Education Statistics, Literacy in the Labor Force:
Results from the National Adult Literacy Survey NCES 1999-470 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1999), 57.



[20] NAEP 1998 Reading Report Card 260, and data from the NAEP website.



[21] Report, 22; Lichtman Report, 6.



[22] Posner, Breaking the Deadlock, 81.



[23] Report, 37.



[24] Report, 34.



[25] It should be noted that the data that are available on literacy as so
crude that it is hard to draw any solid conclusions by looking at variations
across counties. The data are "synthetic estimates of adult literacy
proficiency" derived from the U.S. Department of Education's 1992 National
Adult Literacy Survey, available in National Institute for Literacy, The
State of Literacy in America: Estimates at the Local, State, and National
Levels (Washington, D.C.: 1998), and on a number of web sites. The best
electronic source for them is http://www.casas.org where they maybe found
by doing a search for adult literacy. The estimates for Florida counties are
"synthetic," because the 1992 NALS did not include enough sample members
living in Florida to allow for any conclusions. about the state, much less
about individual counties. They have wide confidence intervals - an average
of 6 percent. More important, the literacy data are DA broken down by race.
So they cannot tell us anything about whether the small fraction of a county's
voters who failed to cast a ballot successfully were people who had
difficulty reading and what the racial composition of that group might be.
Remember that the highest rate of ballot spoilage in any county was 12.4
percent, and that it was below 5 percent in nearly two-thirds of the
counties. So we are talking about a very small group, and one whose presence
is not likely to show in county-wide averages. Palm Beach County, for
example, led the state in the number of spoiled ballots-nearly 30,0000. Some
6.4 percent of all the ballots cast there were invalid. The proportion of
Palm Beach residents who ranked in the bottom literacy category was 22
percent, a little below the state average of 25 percent. And the proportion
who had attended college was 48 percent, again above the state average. But
this does not allow us to conclude that the 6.4 percent of Palm Beach voters
who failed to complete their ballots successfully were not primarily people
who had difficulty in reading, comprehending, and following ballot
instructions. The only reliable way of assessing the impact of literacy on
ballot spoilage would be to administer the 45-minute NALS test to a
representative sample of voters in each geographic unit used in the
analysis.



[26] Frank J. Murray, "Florida's Black Voter Turnout Grossly Overstated,"
Washington Times, July 11, 2001.



[27] Transcript of June 8, 2001 Meeting, 44.



[28] Ibid, 44.



[29] Report, 141



[30] U.S. Census Bureau, Profiles of General Population Characteristics.
2000 Census of Population and Housing: Florida. May 2001, Table DP-1. We
state that the black population was approximately 15 percent of the total
because its exact size depends upon the definition you use. Some 14.6
percent of Floridians reported that their sole race was black. If you add in
people who considered themselves both black and something else, the figure
increases to 15.5 percent, still substantially smaller than the Hispanic
population.



[31] Ibid. In addition to the 2.7 million Hispanics and the 450,000 Asians
or American Indians, another 697,000 Floridians reported that they were of
"other race," meaning other than white, black, American Indian, Asian, or
Pacific Islander. Most of these "other race" respondents were, in all
likelihood, Latinos, and thus cannot be fairly added to the total excluded
from attention because it would entail double counting. All Hispanics were
excluded from the Commission's analysis unless they identified as African
Americans on the census race question, which hardly any did.



[32] John R, Lott, Jr., "Documenting Unusual Declines in Republican Voting
Rates in Florida's Western Panhandle Counties in 2000," unpublished paper,
May 2001.



[33] Transcript of United States Commission on Civil Rights meeting,
Washington, D.C., June 8, 2001, 46.



[34 ] http://www.american.edu/cas/faculty.shtml#IHSTORY. WMA



[35] Transcript of U.S. Commission on Civil Rights hearing, Tallahassee,
Florida, January 11, 2001, PAGE TK



The facts support this version much more than than the majority version
which was so glaringly partisan, they should be ashamed. Being Democrats of
course, they have none.


  #168   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
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"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 18:57:18 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 16:51:29 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
m...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 06:03:52 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

The question is why they were not counted and the reason is they voted
incorrectly.

No the question is were people who were eligible to vote unable to do
so. Remember, Michael, there is a right to vote in the Constitution.
You still do not seem to understand this.

Immediately following the contested 2000 presidential election, The U.S
Commission on Civil Rights (hereinafter 'the Commission') conducted a
six-month investigation into Florida's election. The result? The
Commission
found absolutely no evidence of systematic disenfranchisement of black
voters. Furthermore, the investigation found no credible evidence that
any
Floridians were INTENTIONALLY denied the right to vote in the 2000
election.

The Commission did find, however, that many Florida voters, irrespective
of
race, spoiled their ballots by MISTAKE. But voter error is not the same
thing as "disenfranchisement" and it certainly isn't evidence of any
conspiracy or plot to steal or suppress black votes. The Commission also
found violations of the Voting Rights Act in three counties. The
infractions
were that some poll workers had been hostile to Hispanic voters,
bilingual
assistance hadn't been provided to two Haitian voters and some Hispanic
voters had been denied bilingual assistance. None of the offending
counties
was controlled by Republicans!

Michael:

What is the source of this quotation? You certainly did not write it,
and it is moreover a distortion of the findings of the Civil Rights
Commission, which did indeed find widespread violation of the 1965
Civil Rights Act.


I've read the relevant parts of the Commission findings and the above is a
fair assessment of their findings and of the truth.


What is the source? You must give a citation for direct quotations.

Excerpt what you find where the violations. In no case did they find any
proof of what the Democrats were alleging.


The commission was not evaluating the 2000 allegations of the Gore
campaign. It was asking to what degree disfranchisement in fact took
place. Whether Gore was right or wrong is a separate question from
whether the Civil Rights Act was violated. Gore would have done
himself a favor if he had focused on the civil rights at stake.

I have already quoted the executive summary extensively in responses
to your continuing denial of this occurrence. At this point my answer
to you is to suggest that you read the executive summary or the full
report yourself before you comment further on whether or not
disfranchisement took place. The web site is:
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/main.htm The exective summary is
at: http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/exesum.htm

The Commission also monitors other aspects of the Civil Rights Acts.
If you are really concerned about civil rights I would suggest you
browse the entire site: http://www.usccr.gov


There's Civil Rights and then there's the Democrat version, which is to
empower anybody and anything that ****s the GOP.

You also did not cite the minority opinion, which is much more reasoned and
objective.

Did you even read it?


  #169   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
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"Lionel" wrote in message
...
Michael McKelvy wrote:


"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
ink.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
k.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
link.net...


Gratuitous name calling noted.


It wasn't directed at you, and it wasn't gratuitous.

Right, referring to me as Duh-Mikey isn't gratutious? It isn't
referring to me?

oh, I remember that there was a much worse insult,
and it wasn't directed at you. I thought you were talking about that,
cause your comment appeared right beneath it, rather than
beneath 'Duh-Mikey'. If you had a little more on the ball,
maybe you could make yourself understood a little better.



Maybe if you had a little more on the ball you'd realize that your
excuse is feeble.


Since my previous post, I have found two other
examples fromm you that deserved "duh-Mikey"
distinction.

Let's just disregard the fact that when I disagree with you, I seem to be
able to do so without name calling.

You're starting to make Lionel look like a man of integrity.


LOL ! It's never too late McKelvy. :-)

Art Sackborg is anxiously looking for his readmission to Middius' court.
...Sniffing Mididus' ass is his prefered role.


Don't confuse my comment with anything resembling a compliment to you.
You're still a radical left wing nutcase.


  #170   Report Post  
Lionel
 
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Michael McKelvy wrote:


"Lionel" wrote in message
...
Michael McKelvy wrote:


"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
ink.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
k.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
link.net...


Gratuitous name calling noted.


It wasn't directed at you, and it wasn't gratuitous.

Right, referring to me as Duh-Mikey isn't gratutious? It isn't
referring to me?

oh, I remember that there was a much worse insult,
and it wasn't directed at you. I thought you were talking about that,
cause your comment appeared right beneath it, rather than
beneath 'Duh-Mikey'. If you had a little more on the ball,
maybe you could make yourself understood a little better.



Maybe if you had a little more on the ball you'd realize that your
excuse is feeble.


Since my previous post, I have found two other
examples fromm you that deserved "duh-Mikey"
distinction.
Let's just disregard the fact that when I disagree with you, I seem to
be able to do so without name calling.

You're starting to make Lionel look like a man of integrity.


LOL ! It's never too late McKelvy. :-)

Art Sackborg is anxiously looking for his readmission to Middius' court.
...Sniffing Mididus' ass is his prefered role.


Don't confuse my comment with anything resembling a compliment to you.
You're still a radical left wing nutcase.


God ! I am reassured.


  #171   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
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"The Devil" wrote in message
news:ne2rm0ttig6oeae2tqf852d0ucjsm4riq5@rdmzrnewst xt.nz...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 19:23:40 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

Sorry--I would have replied earlier, but I spent all day trimming your
text. 4647 lines. Christ. Move over, Howie.

--
td


I didn't want to be accused of snipping something important.


  #172   Report Post  
Sander deWaal
 
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The Devil said:

Sorry--I would have replied earlier, but I spent all day trimming your
text. 4647 lines. Christ. Move over, Howie.


At least Howie writes about audio, although he manages to make that
subject just as boring as politics, note.

--
Sander deWaal
"SOA of a KT88? Sufficient."
  #173   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
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Default


"The Devil" wrote in message
news:ub4rm0dk8k2o3cu8crq3dpkq59b1g9n3tc@rdmzrnewst xt.nz...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 20:22:04 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

I didn't want to be accused of snipping something important.



No--terrible to be accused of *that*. I do however accuse you of being
so dumb you couldn't organise a **** in a brothel, but there you go
...

Dad?


  #174   Report Post  
Clyde Slick
 
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"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 00:20:35 -0400, "Clyde Slick"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
. ..
On Tue, 12 Oct 2004 21:18:44 -0400, "Clyde Slick"
wrote:

How many of these didn't get to vote, and how many
of them voted with infcorrectly punched ballots?
I already told you, the ones that cast ballots got their votes
examined and rejected. And, as I told you, they were unoficially
recounted several times by news organizations, and
it DID NOT change the outcome.

You are thinking of the news reports about the punchcard ballots.
Read the executive summary of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
report. The disfranchisement was much broader than that. It doesn't
matter why it happened, the point is that many people who were
entitled to vote were unable to do so. That's a violation of the
Civil Rights Act and of the right to vote. The fact that
disfranchisement took place is not in dispute.


Tell me who and where and how 90,000 eligible
people who wanted to vote were denied access to the polls.
Show me 90,000 denied registrations of eleigible voters.
I suppose you are talking about convicted felons, incarcerated, or not.
BTW, the elected officials and election boards in the
areas of black concentrations are Dems, mostly
pretty liberal. They are Democrats ****ing their own people, as is usual.


There were 180,000 spoiled ballots, 54 percent of which were cast by
African-Americans. That is not including people mistakenly purged as
felons or turned away from the polls. Read the summary of the
commission if you are really interested in this. They have done the
research and make the case much better than I can.


Ok, you are talking about the ones who went to the polls
and cast ballots. They actually got into the voting booths
and cast ballots, but the ballots were incorrectly filled out and rejected.
But before you said, "the point is that many people who were
entitled to vote were unable to do so." But now you have cahnged your
tune and are saying that they actually did vote.


  #175   Report Post  
Clyde Slick
 
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Default


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 06:06:54 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
. ..
On Tue, 12 Oct 2004 21:18:44 -0400, "Clyde Slick"
wrote:

How many of these didn't get to vote, and how many
of them voted with infcorrectly punched ballots?
I already told you, the ones that cast ballots got their votes
examined and rejected. And, as I told you, they were unoficially
recounted several times by news organizations, and
it DID NOT change the outcome.

You are thinking of the news reports about the punchcard ballots.
Read the executive summary of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
report. The disfranchisement was much broader than that. It doesn't
matter why it happened, the point is that many people who were
entitled to vote were unable to do so. That's a violation of the
Civil Rights Act and of the right to vote. The fact that
disfranchisement took place is not in dispute.


It matters why and how. Nobody went out and stopped anybody from casting
a
legal ballot. The votes not counted were invalid. Florida had problems
with their laws regarding counting ballots and have remedied that problem.
Unfortunately the new touch screen machines are vulnerable to tampering
and
that opens up a whole new batch of problems.


There doesn't have to be an intent or conspiracy to disfranchise in
order for there to have been disfranchisement. The fact that it
occurred is not in dispute.


They voted, so they were not disenfranchised. They voted, but
they incorrectly filled out the ballots.


Keep in mind that Jim Crow did not function by explicit restrictions
against African Americans. It used a myriad of means to disfranchise
not only Blacks but also poor whites. Poll taxes and literacy tests
are the most well known, but even simple registration, the Australian
ballot, and confusing ballots were highly effective means of cutting
down the vote and preserving Democratic control. All of these were
violations of the 15th Amendment, but because of Plessy v Fergeson
they were not eradicated until the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s,
culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1965. The mere fact of the
Civil Rights Act on the books does not mean people can exercise the
substantive right to vote. Jim Crow made a reappearance in 2000, and
it will come back again if we don't keep due diligence.


Thanks for admitting that liberal Democratic local election
officials in South Florida practice Jim Crow. Another reason
black people should 'at least' give serious consideration to voting
for Republican candidates.




  #176   Report Post  
Clyde Slick
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 06:03:52 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

The question is why they were not counted and the reason is they voted
incorrectly.


No the question is were people who were eligible to vote unable to do
so. Remember, Michael, there is a right to vote in the Constitution.
You still do not seem to understand this.


duh-Jacob, THEY VOTED!


  #177   Report Post  
Clyde Slick
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
nk.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
ink.net...

"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:46:42 -0400, George M. Middius
wrote:



Clyde Slick said:

Your country hates freedom, that's why that is.

You are a CERTIFIED IDIOT.

I'm sure you'll admit, however grudgingly, that Americans' personal
freedom
has been eroded by government steadily over the (short) lifetime of the
country.

I've got to disagree there. Freedom has greatly increased in terms of
the abolition of slavery, the enfranchisement of women, and the end of
Jim Crow.

Yet everybody has lost rights, including the right to private property,
erosion of search and seizure restrictions, the inclusion of the concept
of probable cause. Income Tax, affirmative action, (reverse
discrimination),
the war on drugs, the list goes on and on.

Government has intruded more and more into things that are not the
business of government.


Like building roads...I remember your old arguments

And I remember yours, completely specious.



Contiguous and coherent rights of way cannot be acquired without the threat
of use of eminent domain. Invariably, there are enough reclacitrant
owners to prevent adequate right of way to construct the project.
soemtiemws, all it takes is one.


  #178   Report Post  
Clyde Slick
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Lionel" wrote in message
...

Art Sackborg is anxiously looking for his readmission to Middius' court.
...Sniffing Mididus' ass is his prefered role.



I'm too busy. Right now I am circling Uranus looking for Klingons.


  #179   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
nk.net...

"Clyde Slick" wrote in message
...

"Michael McKelvy" wrote in message
ink.net...

"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 09 Oct 2004 18:46:42 -0400, George M. Middius
wrote:



Clyde Slick said:

Your country hates freedom, that's why that is.

You are a CERTIFIED IDIOT.

I'm sure you'll admit, however grudgingly, that Americans' personal
freedom
has been eroded by government steadily over the (short) lifetime of
the
country.

I've got to disagree there. Freedom has greatly increased in terms of
the abolition of slavery, the enfranchisement of women, and the end of
Jim Crow.

Yet everybody has lost rights, including the right to private property,
erosion of search and seizure restrictions, the inclusion of the
concept of probable cause. Income Tax, affirmative action, (reverse
discrimination),
the war on drugs, the list goes on and on.

Government has intruded more and more into things that are not the
business of government.

Like building roads...I remember your old arguments

And I remember yours, completely specious.



Contiguous and coherent rights of way cannot be acquired without the
threat
of use of eminent domain. Invariably, there are enough reclacitrant
owners to prevent adequate right of way to construct the project.
soemtiemws, all it takes is one.



  #180   Report Post  
jak163
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 18:01:17 -0400, "Clyde Slick"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
.. .
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 06:06:54 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Tue, 12 Oct 2004 21:18:44 -0400, "Clyde Slick"
wrote:

How many of these didn't get to vote, and how many
of them voted with infcorrectly punched ballots?
I already told you, the ones that cast ballots got their votes
examined and rejected. And, as I told you, they were unoficially
recounted several times by news organizations, and
it DID NOT change the outcome.

You are thinking of the news reports about the punchcard ballots.
Read the executive summary of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
report. The disfranchisement was much broader than that. It doesn't
matter why it happened, the point is that many people who were
entitled to vote were unable to do so. That's a violation of the
Civil Rights Act and of the right to vote. The fact that
disfranchisement took place is not in dispute.

It matters why and how. Nobody went out and stopped anybody from casting
a
legal ballot. The votes not counted were invalid. Florida had problems
with their laws regarding counting ballots and have remedied that problem.
Unfortunately the new touch screen machines are vulnerable to tampering
and
that opens up a whole new batch of problems.


There doesn't have to be an intent or conspiracy to disfranchise in
order for there to have been disfranchisement. The fact that it
occurred is not in dispute.


They voted, so they were not disenfranchised. They voted, but
they incorrectly filled out the ballots.


To be more precise, the Commission's definition of disenfrachisement
is: "Disenfranchised voters are individuals who are entitled to vote,
want to vote, or attempt to vote, but who are deprived from either
voting or having their votes counted."

Keep in mind that Jim Crow did not function by explicit restrictions
against African Americans. It used a myriad of means to disfranchise
not only Blacks but also poor whites. Poll taxes and literacy tests
are the most well known, but even simple registration, the Australian
ballot, and confusing ballots were highly effective means of cutting
down the vote and preserving Democratic control. All of these were
violations of the 15th Amendment, but because of Plessy v Fergeson
they were not eradicated until the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s,
culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1965. The mere fact of the
Civil Rights Act on the books does not mean people can exercise the
substantive right to vote. Jim Crow made a reappearance in 2000, and
it will come back again if we don't keep due diligence.


Thanks for admitting that liberal Democratic local election
officials in South Florida practice Jim Crow. Another reason
black people should 'at least' give serious consideration to voting
for Republican candidates.


Well I should think Jim Crow would be wrong whether it was resurrected
by Democrats or Republicans. Do you disagree?


  #181   Report Post  
jak163
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 19:36:39 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

You also did not cite the minority opinion, which is much more reasoned and
objective.

Did you even read it?


No I didn't. I read only the letter of transmittal, introduction,
executive summary, and portions of chapter one and chapter eight. Now
I'll note that the minority consisted of only two out of eight
commissioners. But please go ahead and explain what aspects of the
official report it discredits in your view.
  #182   Report Post  
Clyde Slick
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
news

To be more precise, the Commission's definition of disenfrachisement
is: "Disenfranchised voters are individuals who are entitled to vote,
want to vote, or attempt to vote, but who are deprived from either
voting or having their votes counted."


To put it politely, I think that you are GROSSLY misconstruing
the term 'counted'. It is incredulous that one could believe that
the Commission has a problem with the rejection of incorrectly filled
out ballots, and that the Commission would consider such rejected ballots as
disenfranchisement. I believe that the applicable definition of uncounted
ballots are ballots that are completely ignored or otherwise not
examined by election officials.

It is an acceptable and long standing practice, and in fact REQUIRED BY LAW
that election officials examine each ballot to see that it is a correctly
cast ballot and that improperly cast ballots are rejected. You have it
all backwards. The acceptance of improperly cast ballots would constitute
election fraud.

I HAVE CAUGHT YOU RED-HANDED PURPOSEFULLY MISREPRESENTING THE DEFINITION OF
VOTER
DISENFRANCHISEMENT


  #183   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 19:36:39 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

You also did not cite the minority opinion, which is much more reasoned
and
objective.

Did you even read it?


No I didn't. I read only the letter of transmittal, introduction,
executive summary, and portions of chapter one and chapter eight. Now
I'll note that the minority consisted of only two out of eight
commissioners. But please go ahead and explain what aspects of the
official report it discredits in your view.


Read it first.


  #184   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"The Devil" wrote in message
news:6efrm0t9imip5lbv1c6jjkaodgfgi16f15@rdmzrnewst xt.nz...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 20:47:59 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

No--terrible to be accused of *that*. I do however accuse you of being
so dumb you couldn't organise a **** in a brothel, but there you go
...

Dad?


No, Mikey. If you search your mind carefully, you'll remember that you
don't even like me.

--

Stepfather?


  #185   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 19:36:39 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

You also did not cite the minority opinion, which is much more reasoned
and
objective.

Did you even read it?


No I didn't. I read only the letter of transmittal, introduction,
executive summary, and portions of chapter one and chapter eight. Now
I'll note that the minority consisted of only two out of eight
commissioners. But please go ahead and explain what aspects of the
official report it discredits in your view.


The short version is that Commission was made up of mostly Clinton yes men
who didn't use good science, didn't follow their own rules and didn't prove
their case. Their report is junk science, junk politics, and about as
honest as Clinton saying "I did not have sexual relations with that woman."

Put aside your bias and hatred long enough to use some objectivity and you
can't help but see the majority's report for the sham it is.




  #186   Report Post  
jak163
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 22:07:48 -0400, "Clyde Slick"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
news

To be more precise, the Commission's definition of disenfrachisement
is: "Disenfranchised voters are individuals who are entitled to vote,
want to vote, or attempt to vote, but who are deprived from either
voting or having their votes counted."


To put it politely, I think that you are GROSSLY misconstruing
the term 'counted'. It is incredulous that one could believe that
the Commission has a problem with the rejection of incorrectly filled
out ballots, and that the Commission would consider such rejected ballots as
disenfranchisement. I believe that the applicable definition of uncounted
ballots are ballots that are completely ignored or otherwise not
examined by election officials.


That is exactly what the commission meant and you can verify this for
yourself by reading the report. I would ask that you do so before
blustering about misrepresentation.

It is an acceptable and long standing practice, and in fact REQUIRED BY LAW
that election officials examine each ballot to see that it is a correctly
cast ballot and that improperly cast ballots are rejected. You have it
all backwards. The acceptance of improperly cast ballots would constitute
election fraud.

I HAVE CAUGHT YOU RED-HANDED PURPOSEFULLY MISREPRESENTING THE DEFINITION OF
VOTER
DISENFRANCHISEMENT

  #187   Report Post  
jak163
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Thu, 14 Oct 2004 03:44:03 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
.. .
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 19:36:39 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

You also did not cite the minority opinion, which is much more reasoned
and
objective.

Did you even read it?


No I didn't. I read only the letter of transmittal, introduction,
executive summary, and portions of chapter one and chapter eight. Now
I'll note that the minority consisted of only two out of eight
commissioners. But please go ahead and explain what aspects of the
official report it discredits in your view.


The short version is that Commission was made up of mostly Clinton yes men
who didn't use good science, didn't follow their own rules and didn't prove
their case. Their report is junk science, junk politics, and about as
honest as Clinton saying "I did not have sexual relations with that woman."

Put aside your bias and hatred long enough to use some objectivity and you
can't help but see the majority's report for the sham it is.


Michael:

This is a long way from an analysis of the findings of the commission.
If you have specific objections to the findings, then go ahead and
articulate them. These kinds of accusations don't have any substance
to them and don't really do anything to advance the discussion.
  #188   Report Post  
Lionel
 
Posts: n/a
Default

Clyde Slick wrote:


"Lionel" wrote in message
...

Art Sackborg is anxiously looking for his readmission to Middius' court.
...Sniffing Mididus' ass is his prefered role.



I'm too busy. Right now I am circling Uranus looking for Klingons.


Liar, you are *never* too busy when Middius asks for you. :-)
  #189   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Thu, 14 Oct 2004 03:44:03 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
. ..
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 19:36:39 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

You also did not cite the minority opinion, which is much more reasoned
and
objective.

Did you even read it?

No I didn't. I read only the letter of transmittal, introduction,
executive summary, and portions of chapter one and chapter eight. Now
I'll note that the minority consisted of only two out of eight
commissioners. But please go ahead and explain what aspects of the
official report it discredits in your view.


The short version is that Commission was made up of mostly Clinton yes men
who didn't use good science, didn't follow their own rules and didn't
prove
their case. Their report is junk science, junk politics, and about as
honest as Clinton saying "I did not have sexual relations with that
woman."

Put aside your bias and hatred long enough to use some objectivity and you
can't help but see the majority's report for the sham it is.


Michael:

This is a long way from an analysis of the findings of the commission.


Because tehy weren't there to anything other than screw the GOP.

If you have specific objections to the findings, then go ahead and
articulate them. These kinds of accusations don't have any substance
to them and don't really do anything to advance the discussion.


Read the minority opinion. It's in that big post I made 248KB. It lists
the findings of the majority and the minority.


  #190   Report Post  
Clyde Slick
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 13 Oct 2004 22:07:48 -0400, "Clyde Slick"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
news

To be more precise, the Commission's definition of disenfrachisement
is: "Disenfranchised voters are individuals who are entitled to vote,
want to vote, or attempt to vote, but who are deprived from either
voting or having their votes counted."


To put it politely, I think that you are GROSSLY misconstruing
the term 'counted'. It is incredulous that one could believe that
the Commission has a problem with the rejection of incorrectly filled
out ballots, and that the Commission would consider such rejected ballots
as
disenfranchisement. I believe that the applicable definition of uncounted
ballots are ballots that are completely ignored or otherwise not
examined by election officials.


That is exactly what the commission meant and you can verify this for
yourself by reading the report. I would ask that you do so before
blustering about misrepresentation.


Too be able to count a vote, one must be able
to clearly discern that a particular selection is made,
and that clearly there is one and only one selction made,
for each office.




  #191   Report Post  
jak163
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Thu, 14 Oct 2004 07:31:50 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

Being possible doesn't make it a bad hypothesis.


Being impossible to disprove makes it a bad hypothesis. Ask Arny, or
Norm, or Tom, or Stewart, or Gene, or any of the other people whom you
normally trust when it comes to formulating a hypothesis. If it can't
be proven to be false, it doesn't give any explanatory power.

This is why you will always be able to hang on to this theory. It is
impossible to disprove, and deserves no more credence than the theory
that the weapons were taken away by space aliens.
  #192   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Thu, 14 Oct 2004 07:31:50 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


Have you read the minority opinion from the Florida Civil rights
investigation yet?


  #193   Report Post  
jak163
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 02:56:25 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Thu, 14 Oct 2004 07:31:50 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


Have you read the minority opinion from the Florida Civil rights
investigation yet?


No I haven't, and I don't intend to, unless you can make some
compelling argument against the official report.

Have you read the report, or did you go straight to the minority
opinion and decide it was better because it didn't contradict your
preexisting views?
  #194   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 02:56:25 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Thu, 14 Oct 2004 07:31:50 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


Have you read the minority opinion from the Florida Civil rights
investigation yet?


No I haven't, and I don't intend to, unless you can make some
compelling argument against the official report.

Nice to know how fair minded you are.
I hope you never get jury duty.

If you read the minority report you will know why I put no stock in the
majority report, essentially the majority report is like a Michael Moore
movie, fiction, half truths, and bull****.

Have you read the report, or did you go straight to the minority
opinion and decide it was better because it didn't contradict your
preexisting views?


I read the majority report first. It was already known that private
investigations by major newspapers including the NY Times had failed to turn
up any evidence of the allegations made by the Gore people just gave more
credence to the minority report, plus I learned that the people who wrote
the minority report had no real interest in anything more than making Bush
look bad.

The bottom line is, nobody who voted properly was disenfranchised, if you
voted incorrectly, your vote was thrown out. It is very plain to see that
the spoiled votes, those that had to many punches or none at all were most
likely to turn up in areas where people were the least educated and had the
least amount of experience voting, irrespective of race.

"The only real problem was with the purges of convicted felons and the net
result was that more convicted felons got to vote. This had nothing to do
with a Dem vs. GOP issue, it had to do with a previous local election.

The Majority Report implies that this was no innocent mistake, but another
effort to suppress the black vote. The sole piece of supporting evidence it
cites a table with data on Miami-Dade County. Blacks were racially targeted,
according to the report, because they account for almost two thirds of the
names of the felon list but were less than one-seventh of Florida's
population.

This might seem a striking disparity. But it ignores the sad fact that
African Americans are greatly over-represented in the population of persons
committing felonies-in Florida and in the United States as a whole. The
Majority Report never bothers to ask what the proportion is. Without
demonstrating that less than two-thirds of the previously convicted felons
living in Miami-Dade County were African American, the racial disproportion
on the felon list is completely meaningless.

It is not only meaningless but irrelevant. The vast majority of the people
on the felons' list were properly listed. It was illegal for them to vote
according to Florida law. The Commission may not like that law, but it is
not its business to opine on the matter.

The only possible civil rights violation here is the allegation that
disproportionately large numbers of African Americans were put on the felon
list falsely. Had the Commission bothered to examine its own data supplied
in the report, it would have found that the truth was just the opposite of
what it claims."

It's a simple matter of fairness to find out the other side of the story,
and get an idea of who's telling the truth.


  #195   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 02:56:25 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


"jak163" wrote in message
news
On Thu, 14 Oct 2004 07:31:50 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:


Have you read the minority opinion from the Florida Civil rights
investigation yet?


No I haven't, and I don't intend to, unless you can make some
compelling argument against the official report.

Have you read the report, or did you go straight to the minority
opinion and decide it was better because it didn't contradict your
preexisting views?



The real ****er about the minority report is that if JUST ONE OF THE THINGS
THEY STATE IS THE UNVARNISHED TRUTH, THEN THE WHOLE MAJORITY REPORT IS
TRASH.




  #196   Report Post  
jak163
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 06:02:29 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

The Majority Report implies that this was no innocent mistake, but another
effort to suppress the black vote. The sole piece of supporting evidence it
cites a table with data on Miami-Dade County. Blacks were racially targeted,
according to the report, because they account for almost two thirds of the
names of the felon list but were less than one-seventh of Florida's
population.

This might seem a striking disparity. But it ignores the sad fact that
African Americans are greatly over-represented in the population of persons
committing felonies-in Florida and in the United States as a whole. The
Majority Report never bothers to ask what the proportion is.


I am familiar with this claim. Note that they don't explain whether
blacks indeed accounted for 2/3 of convicted felons in Florida. Why
don't you find out if that's true and let us know?

At any rate, this disparity is troublesome simply because it results
in such widespread disenfranchisement of African Americans. That it
is not of concern to Thernstrom and Redenbaugh is indeed telling.

I would also note that your characterization of the Commission as
partisan is faulty. It consists of eight commissioners with four
appointed by the President and four by Congress. No more than four
can be from the same political party.

Since you have read it, why dont you explain a little more about your
specific objections to the majority report?
  #197   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 06:02:29 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

The Majority Report implies that this was no innocent mistake, but another
effort to suppress the black vote. The sole piece of supporting evidence
it
cites a table with data on Miami-Dade County. Blacks were racially
targeted,
according to the report, because they account for almost two thirds of the
names of the felon list but were less than one-seventh of Florida's
population.

This might seem a striking disparity. But it ignores the sad fact that
African Americans are greatly over-represented in the population of
persons
committing felonies-in Florida and in the United States as a whole. The
Majority Report never bothers to ask what the proportion is.


I am familiar with this claim. Note that they don't explain whether
blacks indeed accounted for 2/3 of convicted felons in Florida.


Perhaps if you read it you will find out. Is it fear of being wrong or just
laziness?

Why
don't you find out if that's true and let us know?

At any rate, this disparity is troublesome simply because it results
in such widespread disenfranchisement of African Americans. That it
is not of concern to Thernstrom and Redenbaugh is indeed telling.

At the hearing in Miami, the Commission received testimony from
DBT/Choicepoint, Inc., the data-base company which provided the state with a
over-inclusive list of individuals who might be convicted felons, registered
in more than one county or even deceased. The compilation of the list was
part of an anti-fraud measure enacted by the Florida legislature in the wake
of Miami's 1997 mayoral election, in which at least one dead voter and a
number of felons cast ballots.

The Commission heard from DBT that approximately 3,000 to 4,000 non-felons
(out of approximately 174,000 names) were mistakenly listed on this
so-called "purge" list provided to the state. The list identified 74,900
potentially dead voters, 57,770 potential felons, and 40,472 potential
duplicate registrations. Under Florida law, the supervisors of elections
were required to verify the ineligible-voter list by contacting the
supposedly ineligible voters. Some supervisors who were concerned about the
unreliability of the list did not use it to remove a single voter. It is
regrettable that the authors of the majority report made no effort to
determine how many of the 67 supervisors of elections did or did use the
list. According to recent studies, the total number of wrongly-purged
alleged felons was 1, 104, including 996 convicted of crimes in other states
and 108 who were not felons. This number contradicts the Commission's claim
that "countless" voters were wrongly disenfranchised because of inaccuracies
in the list.

Most notably, the Commission did not hear from a single witness who was
prevented from voting as a result of being erroneously identified as a
felon. One witness did testify that he was erroneously removed from the
voter list because he had been mistaken for another individual on the felon
list whose name and birth date were practically identical to his. However,
he was able to convince precinct officials that there had been a clerical
error, and he was allowed to vote.

In pursuing its attack on the purge list, the Commission completely ignored
the bigger story: Approximately 5,600 felons voted illegally in Florida on
November 7, approximately 68 percent of whom were registered Democrats. On
June 8, General Counsel Hailes was asked why the report failed to address
the issue of ineligible voters who cast ballots on election day. His
response was: "That's not part of the scope of our report."

Based on extensive research, the Miami Herald discovered that, "among the
felons who cast presidential ballots, there were "62 robbers, 56 drug
dealers, 45 killers, 16 rapists, and 7 kidnappers. At least two who voted
were pictured on the state's on-line registry of sexual offenders."
According to the Herald, the biggest problem with the felon list was not
that it wrongly prevented eligible voters from voting, but rather that it
ended up allowing ineligible voters to cast a ballot:

Some... claim that many legitimate voters "of all ethnic and racial
groups, but particularly blacks" were illegally swept from the rolls through
the state's efforts to ban felons from voting. There is no evidence of that.
Instead, the evidence points to just the opposite, that election officials
were mostly permissive, not obstructionist, when unregistered voters
presented themselves. (Miami Herald Report, p. 105)

The Palm Beach Post conducted its own extensive research into the problems
with the flawed exceptions list. The Post's findings, which corroborate the
major conclusions of the Herald's investigation, include the following:

a.. Most of the people the state prevented from voting probably were
felons.

b.. Of the 19,398 voters removed from the rolls, more than 14,600 matched
a felon by name, birth date, race and gender.

c.. More than 6,500 were convicted in counties other than where they
voted, suggesting they would not have been found by local officials without
the DBT list.

d.. Many of these felons were convicted years ago, and they had no idea
that they did not have their civil rights [to vote].

e.. Many had been voting and unwittingly breaking the law for years.

(Palm Beach Post, "Felon Purge Sacrificed Innocent Voters," May 27, 2001)

The report's message is that nobody in authority did enough in terms of data
verification. But the Commission itself failed to verify key arguments made
in its report. The letter (submitted per the affected agency review) from
Michael R. Ramage, General Counsel for the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, provides a lengthy clarification of the FDLE's role in
verifying the felon status of voters whose names had been forwarded by the
local supervisor. (Note that, according to Mr. Ramage's letter to Mr.
Hailes, the FDLE was allowed to review only three pages of the 200-page
report, despite the prominence the report gives to this controversial
issue.) In his letter to General Counsel Hailes, dated June 6, 2001, Mr.
Ramage maintains that the Commission's findings are "wrong and based on
erroneous assumptions," and places undue emphasis on "anecdotal examples of
problems." His letter later goes on to detail FDLE's efforts regarding
verification of the "exceptions" list:

[i]t is important to note that during the pertinent time frame, FDLE
responded effectively to nearly 5,000 voters whose names matched those of
convicted felon's in Florida's criminal history records. (It is not unusual
for criminals when arrested to use a name, date of birth, address, social
security number, etc., other than their own.).... A number of those who
believed they had been wrongfully identified as not being able to vote were
ultimately found to be incorrect. They were, in fact, not eligible to vote.
Likewise, a number of those who raised a concern were ultimately found to be
eligible to vote. The process worked to resolve issues. Of those voters who
contacted FDLE to appeal the notice from a local supervisor of elections
that they were ineligible to vote, approximately 50 percent were confirmed
to be Florida convicted felons, and 50 percent were determined not to have a
conviction in Florida for a felony.

While the General Counsel on June 8 indicated that some revisions would be
made to acknowledge the "extraordinary efforts" by the FDLE, no revision has
been made in the conclusions, which are still wrong and based on erroneous
assumptions. Certainly, no eligible voter should be wrongly prevented from
doing so, but at the same time, election officials have a compelling
interest in preventing voter fraud by convicted felons. The Commission
majority has failed to look at all the facts regarding the felon list and,
instead of focusing on what it calls "the reality" of list maintenance, uses
anecdotes to call for an extensive and unwarranted investigation by the U.S.
Department of Justice.


I would also note that your characterization of the Commission as
partisan is faulty. It consists of eight commissioners with four
appointed by the President and four by Congress. No more than four
can be from the same political party.

Since you have read it, why dont you explain a little more about your
specific objections to the majority report?


It used anecdotes instead of facts.
It violated fundamental rules of due process.
They try to lay the blame on the Governor and not where it actually belongs,
with the counties.
It makes claims of unusually high turnout that aren't substantiated by fact.
The Commission could not find one single person who had been denied an
opportunity to vote as the result of being on the purge list.

"If the errors on the felons list were targeted so as to reduce the voting
strength of some group it was whites, not blacks, who were targeted. The
error rate for Hispanics was almost as high as that for whites-8.7 percent.
Since the data are from Miami-Dade, with its huge Hispanic population, one
might conclude that someone hoped to suppress both the both the non-Hispanic
white vote and the Hispanic vote."

There were extensive procedural errors, including ignoring the rules of
evidence.

"Republican and Independent Commissioners were never asked if they would
like
to call witnesses. Hearings were completely controlled by the Chair and the
General Counsel, and commissioners did not even know who the witnesses were
to be at one Miami hearing; thus they could not properly prepare questions."

"It is astonishing and
unprecedented that the commission would take the position that the views of
its minority members could not be circulated to the public until a rebuttal
of them was prepared. "

"The Commission reached its verdict long before it had even completed its
review of the evidence. On March 9, the Chair introduced a "preliminary
assessment" that was not shared with Commissioners beforehand and that did
not provide Florida officials with an opportunity to respond to the charges
against them. These procedures are sadly reminiscent of Alison in
Wonderland's
court of the Red Queen: "Verdict first, trial later!" "

The statistical analysis of Dr. Lichtman was flawed.

"Dr. Lichtman claimed (at the June 8 Commission meeting)
that he began his study of possible racial bias in the Florida election with
an open-even "skeptical"-mind, in fact, evidence suggests the contrary. As
early as January 11, at the very beginning of his investigation and prior to
conducting any detailed statistical analysis of his own, Dr. Lichtman stated
publicly that he was already convinced, on the basis of what he had read in
the New York Times, that in Florida "minorities perhaps can go to the polls
unimpeded, but their votes are less likely to count because of the disparate
technology than are the votes of whites." He concluded: "In my view, that is
a classic violation of the Voting Rights Act."[35] Long before he examined
any of the statistics, Dr. Lichtman had already concluded that Florida had
disenfranchised minority voters and violated the Voting Rights Act."

"Report, 21. Note that later in the report, on page 148, the majority
asserts that it was highly anomalous that 63 percent of spoiled ballots in
Palm Beach County were overvotes, and blames the alleged anomaly on the
infamous butterfly ballot. The pattern, according to the report, was "just
the opposite of what we normally observe, which is five percent or less of
the spoiled ballots." How could the author of this passage possibly think
that 5 percent or less was the norm for overvotes in Florida when the
Lichtman figures cited earlier in the report reveals that fully 59 percent
of all the spoiled ballots in the state were overvotes?"

Just admit you're biased and that the truth will burst the balloon you have
surrounded yourself with.
There is more than enough evidence to conclude that the majority report was
a hatchet job and that they had no real interest in finding the truth.

The list of improper procedures, faulty data, wrong conclusions, ignoring of
pertinent data and just general sloppiness is revolting to anyone who cares
about truth, but wait, I forgot, you're a Democrat and such things don't
matter. All you need is for someone to say what you believe is true, you
don't have to bother with pesky things like facts, they just get in the way.







  #198   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"The Devil" wrote in message
news:ddrvm0t7apr80ia9136ql4blghhq317hs7@rdmzrnewst xt.nz...
On Thu, 14 Oct 2004 03:27:30 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

Dad?


No, Mikey. If you search your mind carefully, you'll remember that you
don't even like me.


Stepfather?


sob

Until today, I've been quite lucky in that my hair has only gradually
been turning grey.

I am in no way related to you, Mikey. If you were my child (or
stepchild), I would be writing this from a prison cell, because I
would have long ago committed infanticide. My current occupation would
be writing thousand-page volumes exploring the reasons why some
animals eat their children.

--

Obviously you have no children of your own or you'd already have been eaten.

****, now I've probably given you fantasy material for a month. :-(


  #199   Report Post  
jak163
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 16:45:49 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

Just admit you're biased and that the truth will burst the balloon you have
surrounded yourself with.
There is more than enough evidence to conclude that the majority report was
a hatchet job and that they had no real interest in finding the truth.

The list of improper procedures, faulty data, wrong conclusions, ignoring of
pertinent data and just general sloppiness is revolting to anyone who cares
about truth, but wait, I forgot, you're a Democrat and such things don't
matter. All you need is for someone to say what you believe is true, you
don't have to bother with pesky things like facts, they just get in the way.


You seem to have some good arguments here, but the issues seem to be
very complicated, and I don't have the expertise to second-guess the
findings of the commission. I can't see any reason to trust the views
of two dissenters over a six-person majority. But you're certainly
welcome to do so if you wish.
  #200   Report Post  
Michael McKelvy
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"jak163" wrote in message
...
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 16:45:49 GMT, "Michael McKelvy"
wrote:

Just admit you're biased and that the truth will burst the balloon you
have
surrounded yourself with.
There is more than enough evidence to conclude that the majority report
was
a hatchet job and that they had no real interest in finding the truth.

The list of improper procedures, faulty data, wrong conclusions, ignoring
of
pertinent data and just general sloppiness is revolting to anyone who
cares
about truth, but wait, I forgot, you're a Democrat and such things don't
matter. All you need is for someone to say what you believe is true, you
don't have to bother with pesky things like facts, they just get in the
way.


You seem to have some good arguments here, but the issues seem to be
very complicated, and I don't have the expertise to second-guess the
findings of the commission. I can't see any reason to trust the views
of two dissenters over a six-person majority.


Bull****! You don't have the balls to read the report, which would give
more than enough information to know what a sham the majority report was.

It's not that complicated to understand, you just choose to remain ignorant.

But you're certainly
welcome to do so if you wish.


If their arguments didn't make sense, I would reject them. The problem is
they make sense and they are true.

The question of a Section 2 violation can only be settled in a federal
court. Plaintiffs who charge discrimination must prevail in a trial in which
the state has a full opportunity to challenge the evidence. To prevail,
plaintiffs must show that "racial politics dominate the electoral process,"
as the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee Report stated in explaining the newly
amended Section 2.

The majority's report implies that Section 2 aimed to correct all possible
inequalities in the electoral process. Had that been the goal, racially
disparate registration and turnout rates-found nearly everywhere in the
country-would constitute a Voting Rights Act violation. Less affluent, less
educated citizens tend to register and vote at lower rates, and, for the
same reasons, are likely to make more errors in casting ballots, especially
if they are first time voters. Neither the failure to register nor the
failure to cast a ballot properly-as regrettable as they are-are Section 2
violations.

Thus, despite the thousands of voting rights cases on the books, the
majority report cannot cite any case law that suggests punch card ballots,
for instance, are potentially discriminatory. Or that higher error rates
among black voters suggest disenfranchisement.

There is good reason why claims brought under section 2 must be settled in a
federal court. The provision requires the adjudication of competing claims
about equal electoral opportunity-an inquiry into the complex issue of
racial fairness. The Commission is not a court and cannot arrive at verdicts
that belong exclusively to the judiciary. Yet, while the majority report
does admit that the Commission cannot determine if violations of the Voting
Rights Act have actually occurred, in fact it unequivocally claims to have
found "disenfranchisement," under the terms of the statute.

It is absolutely correct, as the Commission report asserts, that violations
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act do not need to involve intentional
disenfranchisement. Section 2 of the act was amended in 1982 in an effort to
circumvent the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden v. City of Mobile, 1980.
Bolden, in insisting that plaintiffs in an equal protection suit demonstrate
discriminatory intent, had brought the statute in conformity with Fourteenth
Amendment standards in general. The amended provision allowed minority
voters nationwide to challenge methods of election on grounds of
discriminatory "result."

The concern at the time was that plaintiffs, in the wake of Bolden, would
have to find a smoking gun-unmistakable evidence that public officials
deliberately, knowingly set out to deprive minority voters of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment rights.

No witness, however, from the civil rights community argued that all voting
mechanisms or procedures with a disparate impact on black or Hispanic voters
would violate the law. Thus, the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, in
explaining the newly amended Section 2, defined a jurisdiction in violation
of the law as one in which "racial politics dominate[d] the electoral
process." At the 1982 Senate Hearings, a distinguished civil rights attorney
testified that claims of voter dilution would rest on "evidence that voters
of a racial minority are isolated within a political system...'shut out,'
i.e. denied access... [without] the opportunity to participate in the
electoral process."

Voter error is analogous to low registration rates; it is more likely to
occur among the less educated and the less affluent. And thus, despite the
thousands of voting rights cases on the books, the majority report cannot
cite any case law that suggests punch card ballots, for instance, are
potentially discriminatory. Or that higher error rates among black voters
suggest disenfranchisement.

The less-reliable machinery argument-which gained mythic proportions in the
press-has been widely disproven. It is simply not the case that poorer
counties with larger minority populations have substantially inferior voting
equipment that is significantly more prone to error. At most, this was a
minor factor in voter error rates.

In fact, as the Commission heard in Florida, the punch-card jurisdictions
did not have the highest "spoilage" rates. The "optical central" system had
the most problems-that is, the system using optical scanners with votes
counted at some central location rather than in the local precinct. (Thus,
the county with the highest spoilage rate, Gadsden County, used the optical
central tabulation system, not the infamous punch-card machines.) And the
"touchscreen" system has been found to have a spoilage rate as high as
punch-card systems.


The report also claims that "affected agencies were afforded an opportunity
to review applicable portions." The Commission's project management system
normally requires at least 30 days for affected agency review, yet the
governor and other officials were given only 10 days to review the report,
and the report was given to the press before affected parties could respond.
In an interview with the New York Times, the general counsel claimed that
anyone wishing to respond to the Florida report would have 20 days to do so.
Few of the affected agency comments have actually been factored into the
final report.

To compound the seriousness of these procedural improprieties, the
Commission handed out copies of the draft report at the June 8 meeting and
posted the draft on its web site, thereby widely disseminating a version of
the report that included none of the affected agency comments or any of the
corrections and amendments discussed at the June 8 meeting.

Affected agency review is an essential procedure to ensure fairness and
accuracy of Commission reports. Contrary to the Chair's statement on June 8,
it is not a mere "courtesy" that is granted or denied at the whim of the
Chair or the staff. In this case, the procedure was mooted by the leak to
the press and the public dissemination of a preliminary, uncorrected draft.


None of the above seems all that complicated, I'm sorry to have misjudged
you.

Perhaps you can find a bright high school student to explain it to you.


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