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#281
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wrote in message
... The only 'test' in the scientific sense that would have any value would be to have a subject wear something resembling the equipment used for lie detection. The subject's bodily functions would be monitored while he listens to two or more different cables, to a succession of musical selections repeated several times with each cable. The order of presentation would be randomized, so that he is not always listeing to a given cable first. If there is a difference in the 'excitement' provided by one cable over another, it may show up in the readings. Presumably, a more-excited subject's physiological responses (heart rate, breathing, galvanic skin response, etc.) would be elevated. If the product is indeed more 'exciting', it should cause measurable differences in the subject's responses. http://www.trans4mind.com/psychotechnics/gsr.html Or brain activity can be monitored directly. This is what Oohashi and his group did in order to correlate with subjective ratings of sound pleasure in the test they ran on inclusion of ultr-high frequencies in music (and they did find a correlation). |
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#282
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On 5 Aug 2005 00:11:54 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote:
The audio skeptic is asserting something of this general form. He observes that Karl cannot discriminate between SACD and CD versions of a song in an ABX test (any such test, quick-switch or otherwise). What he claims is, for all we know, the following could be the case: (1) there is some property x such that when Karl listens to the SACD version in its entirety he hears it as having property x but when he listens to the CD version in its entirety he does not hear it as having property x, and (2) there are properties of musical passages that are perceived only when the subject hears an entire piece or song, not short excerpts, but which fade in memory on consecutive time-distal presentations, preventing effective comparison, and (3) x is one such property. Please note that all of (1), (2), and (3) are included in the scope of "for all we know." The reason why (2) and (3) are included is because they may be relevant to explaining why the difference doesn't get picked up in the tests. The skeptic is not asserting that he knows that there is such a property x, or that he knows the nature of that property. He is simply saying that for all we know, there could be such a property. What we know doesn't entail that there isn't. Is the skeptic wrong? Do we know that there is no such property? If so, how do we know that? As ever, you post hundreds of lines but fail to get to the point. If x exists, then Karl will be able to listen both CD and SACD many times, and will reliably report the presence of x at the end of each performance via SACD. The important thing is that Karl must not *know* which medium is playing each time that he listens. If Karl is unable to do this, then ipso facto x does *not* exist in the physical soundfield, although it may certainly exist *in his mind* when he *knows* which medium is playing. -- Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering |
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#283
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On 5 Aug 2005 00:34:12 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote:
Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 2 Aug 2005 15:52:16 GMT, Mark DeBellis wrote: Various things are said to be known. "How do you know?" is not a reasonable question? Thousands of lines of agonising about it, without ever trying to find out for yourself, is indicative of ego over interest. Thanks for the diagnosis. apparently without ever considering that it's very simple just to go try it for yourself. Not sure I get you here. Try what? An ABX test? Not sure what a single result would establish. Nothing - that's why you should try 20 results. OK, so I take 20 ABX tests and I can't tell SACD and CD apart in those tests. We know what to infer from this without theory? We know that, to you in that system, they sound the same. No 'theory' is required, and certainly no deep philosophical agonising. Sometimes an egg is just an egg................ -- Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering |
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#284
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"Mark DeBellis" wrote in message
... On 31 Jul 2005 15:33:45 GMT, Keith Hughes wrote: Mark DeBellis wrote: snip, in order to focus on issue being responded to Give Karl a pencil and paper, replicate the ratings test within the same/different protocol, and all will be well. No recording is needed. *HE CAN DIFFERENTIATE THE TWO* - He already showed that. In one test, Karl rates his satisfaction. He can differentiate A and B in that test. In the other test, Karl is asked, "Do these sound the same or different to you?" He is asked to compare how A and B *sound*. These are different tasks and psychologically different situations. So when you say, "All Karl has to do is repeat *EXACTLY* what he did above," that is putting the procedure of one test into another. It is asking Karl to rate his satisfaction in response to each, to compare his answers, and to use *that* as the basis of the differentiation. There is no a priori assurance that if Karl completes the second test in the normal, straightforward way, the result will be the same as in the first test. Retain what you choose, but to snip the basis for a statement is rather poor form. Exactly the reason and even the methodology for the monadic control test I proposed. snip, irrelevant to above |
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#285
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I fail to see why this is more scientific then listening alone tests. Why
assume those responses "excitement", maybe they are repulsion or dred. If one wants to do this it is still required that which cable is in use is not known. In fact an intresting test would be to use this setup and have runs where it is known and others wher it is not, that would use the same test to confirm that perceptions or "bodily functions" are a product of knowing what the wire is just as it is when using listening. In any case, this is speculation and the state of the art at present and the nbenchmark for all others to compare are the results that hearing difference disappears when wire being used is not known.. That one can imagine alternatives is not the same as it being valid and doesn't replace the current benchmark. "The only 'test' in the scientific sense that would have any value would be to have a subject wear something resembling the equipment used for lie detection. The subject's bodily functions would be monitored while he listens to two or more different cables, to a succession of musical selections repeated several times with each cable. The order of presentation would be randomized, so that he is not always listeing to a given cable first. If there is a difference in the 'excitement' provided by one cable over another, it may show up in the readings. Presumably, a more-excited subject's physiological responses (heart rate, breathing, galvanic skin response, etc.) would be elevated. If the product is indeed more 'exciting', it should cause measurable differences in the subject's responses." |
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#286
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"Or brain activity can be monitored directly. This is what Oohashi and
his group did in order to correlate with subjective ratings of sound pleasure in the test they ran on inclusion of ultr-high frequencies in music (and they did find a correlation)." Quite different then suppporting wire makes a difference notions. Did they exclude bone conduction and resonances thereof? One of the "pleasures" of some is to have the music loud enough to "feel" it and brain scans would no doubt confirm it. |
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#288
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Keith Hughes wrote:
Mark DeBellis wrote: Keith Hughes wrote: Mark DeBellis wrote: On 2 Aug 2005 15:51:31 GMT, Keith Hughes wrote: Mark DeBellis wrote: He identified blue each time, but at no point was he able to judge *that* the colors were the same. The two perceptions didn't get combined in the right way to produce a judgment of identity or similarity. (You're denying that this can happen?) In this context, certainly I'm denying it. Karl has an internal reference for Blue. He identified A as Blue, and B as Blue. No he did not compare A and B directly, but so what? He identified them, separately, as "BLUE", and in doing so, defined the perceptions as same, or similar. That's what identifying them as Blue *means*. Identifying them *as the same* goes beyond categorizing each, separately, in the same way. Not in the context in which you couched the Karl scenario. You are trying to postulate that Karl, listening for 'satisfaction', uses a totally difference perceptual mechanism I'm not postulating that the mechanisms are totally different, only observing that the testing situations are psychologically different in significant respects. No, you are not "observing" that the situations are significantly different, you are hypothesizing, sans evidence, that there *could* be a difference. Not at all the same thing. First of all, I am observing that the two kinds of tests we are discussing (rating and same/different judgment) ask different questions of the subject, or request him/her to perform different tasks. They are different situations from a psychological standpoint. Second, for something to be presented as a hypothesis does not mean that it is asserted to be true, or that the person presenting it says he knows is true. A hypothesis is something "submitted for your consideration," a la Rod Serling. You have been arguing that I can't know that certain things are true. But I haven't been claiming to know that those things are true.(*) Rather, I am asking what evidence there is, if any, that they're false. (If we don't know that they're false, then, for all we know, they could be true.) Whether I have evidence for the hypothesis is relevant only if I am asserting it to be true. I do not have to already know it's true, or claim to know it's true, in order to ask what evidence there is for it, pro or con. I mean, really. I am saying, what if? What if such and such were true? Would it show up on the tests? If you want to tell me *why* such and such can't be true, or why it *would* show up on the tests, great. But you seem to be saying that you've resolved the matter when you say that I've put the idea forward without having sufficient evidence that it's true. It's a hypothetical question. (*) Even if I think, and have argued, that you're wrong to say that it's impossible to know that they are true. than when listening for 'difference', and further that there is *no* overlap in the acquired data (your problem with the misperception, IMO, that it's a "test within a test" to say that the ability to differentiate satisfaction will clearly result in an ability to differentiate the two systems). I'm not getting what you're saying in parentheses. And, about this "test within a test" issue, could you please explain your idea that "All Karl has to do is repeat *EXACTLY* what he did above. He say's to himself, 'Hmmmm, I like A better than B, logic dictates that they must be different'" (Date: 26 Jul 2005 18:10:52 GMT, Message-ID: ). It sounds to me like that is simply saying to enact the method of one test within another. If it isn't, then what do you mean? I'm unsure how you can be missing this point. Let's take it one step at a time: 1. Karl is presented with some form of probe signal, "A", followed by a second, "B". He's asked to rate them for enjoyment. 2. Karl enjoys A significantly more than he enjoys B. Karl *must* know, at that point, that A and B are *not* the same. This is simple logic; if AB = 1 (true), then A=B = 0 (false). This is the most basic form of a truth table. Possibly, Karl knows this only because he sees that he rated A a "7" and B a "6." He does not necessarily, at the end of B, make a direct mental comparison of the amounts of enjoyment. His knowledge that he enjoys one more than the other depends upon his coding his enjoyment as a rating, and comparing the ratings. 3. 1. Karl is presented with probe signal A, followed by B. He's asked to determine if they are the same, or different. Barring stipulation of intrusive test restrictions (re. listening times, manners, order of presentation, time dista presentations, etc. - which *NO ONE* has *ever* suggested here to my knowledge), Karl will evaluate the two, Using the procedure of "rating them for enjoyment" as described above, yes? and will, as he has already demonstrated to be the case, enjoy A more than B. Once again, the logic is irrefutable. If he enjoys one more than the other, he *knows* they are not the same. Yes, because the rating system enables him to know *that* he enjoys A more than he enjoys B. But what are the chances that someone will actually go about determining whether A and B are the same or different in this way? Not high; why would a person even think of doing it that way? It's more likely that they would compare the sounds and not think about, or encode and keep track of the levels of, their enjoyment. But unless Karl follows the procedure you outline, there is no assurance that he will reliably discriminate between A and B even if he rates them differently in the first test you describe. I am not saying that there isn't *some* way of conducting a same/different judgment test that would be equally sensitive as a ratings test (you have told us what it is); I'm suggesting that a normally enacted same/different judgment test might, for all we know, not be as sensitive, and so far I haven't seen why that's wrong. Patently, if you ask someone on consecutive mornings, what color tie is this, he could answer "blue" both times, but not be able to tell you, on the second day, that the ties were the same color (because on the second day he doesn't remember what color he saw on the first). Which is, again, irrelevant in the context you supposed. You showed the same tie each day, he recognized Blue each day, and from that (for this to be relevant to your Karl analogy), you presume could have "seen" using two different mechanisms I'm not assuming that two different mechanisms are involved. It could be two instances of the same mechanism. You absolutely are - in the context of the actual discussion. Otherwise you would not think that the situations are 'psychologically different'. Since the 'situation' cannot, in and of itself, be psychologically different ("it" has no psyche, after all), you must be saying that the situation elicits a different psychological response (i.e. different in a mechanistic sense) from the subject. I think we are getting mixed up between the two examples. "Psychologically different" applies to the two tests example, "could be two instances of the same mechanism" applies to the "blue--blue" example. on the *sole* basis that there's no evidence that he didn't. This is simply looking for a cause with no demonstrable effect in evidence. To call this skepticism is a misnomer. If your view predicts otherwise, then it is psychologically implausible. Your view then is that Karl recognizing A as Blue, and B as Blue *does not* mean that the perceptions were "the same, or similar"? No, that's not my view. The perceptions are "the same, or similar." But it doesn't follow from this that Karl can judge that A and B are the same. Again you ignore the context. Karl does not *necessarily* have to make the determination that A and B are the same, but within the context of the discussion, he *must*. He will be asked if they are the same or different, forcing the comparison, and he will evaluate A vs. B, with the result that A=blue, B=blue, therefore either A=B, or A~B. To refute this you must assert that either Karl has *no* internal construct containing the identification "Blue" against which Karl could associate A and B, or that Karl has multiple constructs associated with "Blue" (*not* shades of Blue, but Blue - that is the context) that he cannot discriminate between, and about which he is unaware. Both cases are implausible in the extreme. Well, it sounds to me like you have just proved on the basis of your theory that a person cannot fail to remember what they had for breakfast, and that's open to a rapid reductio. Isn't it obvious that, try as you like to "force the comparison," if he doesn't remember what he saw yesterday then he can't reliably compare the things? Then he can't judge them to be the same. I'll ask you once more, since you are clearly loath to respond: Cite *one* example, or *one* mechanism, whereby you can judge A to be more/less/greater than/less than/more enjoyable than/less enjoyable than, B without making a distinction, or differentiation between A and B. Of course there is no such example, Finally! because judging that there is a difference is a way of making a distinction. No kidding. Thus enjoying A more than B is identifying difference, and a distinction between A and B is established. However, responding to A one way and responding to B in a different way is not equivalent to judging that A and B are different. Of course it is. Well, no, it isn't. The two things should not be identified with one another. We may as well make this an aural example. You and I both have perfect pitch. On Tuesday morning you hear a pitch and say, "It's D." On Wednesday morning you hear a pitch and say, "It's E." You are asked, was it the same pitch both days? You say "No." On Tuesday morning I hear a pitch and say, "It's D." On Wednesday morning I hear a pitch and say, "It's E." I am asked, was it the same pitch both days? I say, "I don't know because I don't remember what I heard yesterday." There is a psychological difference between us, one that is reflected pretty clearly in our behavior. The main difference is that you can, and do, judge that the pitches on the two days were different, whereas I am unable to make such a judgment. However, it is true to say of each of us that we responded to A one way and responded to B in a different way. Therefore responding to A one way and responding to B in a different way is not equivalent to judging that A and B are different, since the former is something I do but the latter is not. And please forgo the "but if A was last year..." hyperbole. Within the context of a properly constructed, time proximate test, controlling for affective 'drift' in the subject, then a differential response to A versus B *must* be the result of differential perception. Other variables are controlled for. Appropriately constructed interrogatories are part of a well constructed test, and it would be relatively trivial to illicit a response of "different" from a subject who clearly had differential perceptions of A and B. Whether the subject *would* recognize the distinction, on his/her own, under 'normal' circumstances, is irrelevant. An integral part of any test (the basic context after all) is the requirement for comparison, forcing an evaluation of same/different. This is no different for blunt Same/Different evaluation as for relative enjoyment, as a "level 5" enjoyment of both A and B would elicit "same or similar", whereas a 'level 2' and a 'level 8' would elicit a response of "different". The fact that 2 and 8 were assigned requires this to be the case. OK. In general, how do you create a "properly constructed, time proximate test" that forces a reliable same/different evaluation, if what we are measuring, in the ratings test, is the subject's perception of a temporally extended property of the signal? Comparing longer excerpts will be prey to problems of memory. Suppose then we force comparison of corresponding short portions of the signal in a time-proximate way. How do we know that this will be sensitive to all differences to which the ratings test is sensitive? (In other words, there might be more than one sense in which a person can be said to "make a distinction.") Another irrelevancy. The key is to "make a distinction". Though there may indeed be myriad ways to make a distinction, distinction=perceived difference, as you just stated above. I don't mean to quibble, but if for certain purposes or in certain contexts the distinction between "differential response" and "judging to be different" is not "relevant," or if it ends up that you always have one where you have the other (in those restricted contexts), that's one thing, but there is still a fundamental difference between them. (And where there is a "perceived difference," things are judged to be different; again, it's one *way* of making a distinction, it's misleading to say "distinction=perceived difference" as you do above.) There is an important psychological difference between the person who is able to compare the contents of perceptions he enjoys at different times and one who can't (as in the perfect pitch example above). That difference is not "irrelevant" to psychology generally, even if it does not arise, as I think you are saying, in the context of "properly constructed tests." And if the discussion raises the question, "What are the scope and limits of such tests?" then we can't know a priori that such distinctions are irrelevant to the discussion. Responding to A one way and responding to B another way is *not* the same thing as judging that they are different; each of them is a certain *way* of making a distinction. The terms should not be used interchangeably, and it should not be assumed that they are the same thing. At best, they coincide in the context of tests that are constructed in a way that ensures that they do coincide (if I understand you right). A distinction between them would not arise in such contexts, just as "equilateral" and "equiangular" apply to the same things when the discussion is restricted to triangles; though the properties are distinct from one another, and do come apart when applied to other figures. The question of how the judgment of a similarity is related to individual perceptions is one of the central questions that Kant wrote about. The difference may tend not to arise in certain contexts because of the way those contexts are designed, but that doesn't mean they're the same thing. Once a difference is perceived, through whatever mechanism, or manner, one must be devoid of deductive skill to be unable to apply the simple truth table, and determine same=false, different=true. The assumption that the person can recognize the identity between what is contained in one perception and what is contained in another is a substantive psychological assumption. People don't remember everything they perceive, and they aren't logically omniscient. And not every context is one of "properly constructed" testing. There is a lot of idealization going on in your model of human abilities and behavior. Mark |
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#289
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Keith Hughes wrote:
Mark DeBellis wrote: Keith Hughes wrote: Mark DeBellis wrote: You will agree that in most cases in which a person hears a sound, the sound is perceived as having a certain loudness. That is, on that occasion, for that listener, there is a certain degree of loudness that the listener hears the sound as having. (Loudness in this sense can be measured by psychologists, on the phon scale for example. And by a degree of loudness I don't mean a point with infinite exactitude; a fuzzy interval would do fine. No measurement is exact.) Suppose our friend Karl hears sound A, then a long string of random noise, then sound B. There will be a degree of loudness he hears sound A as having, call it x, and a degree of loudness he hears B as having, call it y. ... Now in a situation like this, if A and B are separated enough, it is not unusual (yes?) for the subject not to be able to judge whether A sounded louder than B, or B than A, or that they were the same. Let's assume that that's the case with Karl. So his answer to the question "Which, if either, sounded louder to you?" will be "I don't know" ... How many times must I say the same thing for you to actually hear it (metaphorically of course)??? Flawed test methdology = flawed data = invalid test upon which no conclusion can be drawn. Got it? In an earlier post, in response to my claim that "There is a difference between something's being true (about Karl) and Karl's knowing it to be true," you said, "No, there is not, not when Karls perception is the subject at hand."[1] Here is an illustration of what I mean: Either x and y (see above) are the same or they are different. If they are the same, Karl doesn't know they are the same; hence, that they are the same will be a fact about his perception he does not know to be true. Well, it is *NOT* "a fact about his perception" at all. It is a fact (insofar as your stipulation of it is concerned) about an objectively verifiable physical property - NOT Karl's perception of that property. What we are talking about here is the degree of loudness Karl hears each sound as having. So if the degree of loudness Karl hears sound A as having is the same as the degree of loudness he hears B as having, that is a statement that relates his perceptions to one another in a certain way. It is a fact about his perception. Again, for this to have relevance, you would have had to say "Karl perceives them as the same, but doesn't know he perceives them the same, so there is a fact about his perception that he doesn't know". Sounds rather silly in the context of time-proximate presentations where Karl is being asked to determine either preference, or same/different, doesn't it? Karl doesn't perceive them as the same. Rather, in the case at hand, x is the same as y, where x and y are as defined above. Perhaps the distinction between those two statements doesn't arise in certain contexts, but there is no reason to generalize from such contexts to others and thus to obviate a distinction that clearly exists. If they are different, Karl doesn't know they are different; hence, that they are different will be a fact about his perception he does not know to be true. Either way, there will be some fact about his perception he does not know to be true. Same thing. You are assuming that Karl perceives all objective stimuli accurately, with infinite precision. Here, you conflate physical reality with perception. Where on earth do I make that assumption? The example adverts to perceived degrees of loudness from the very start. And about infinite precision, I take pains to say (see above) that we don't have to interpret degrees of loudness as points, but could regard them as intervals. Your statement "There is a difference between something's being true (about Karl) and Karl's knowing it to be true," is equally flawed, in that Karl can't have a perception without being aware of it. Since Karl's conscious perception *is* the subject of your analogy, i.e. he is participating in a *test* where *his perception* is the only variable of interest, there is no "truth about Karl" that is relevant. The only "something's being true" that is relevant, is what are Karl's conscious perceptions relative to the test signals. Relevant to what? If you don't accept the assumption that A has a perceived loudness and that B has a perceived loudness, that's one thing. But once you do, then it's just a fact of logic that they are either the same or not the same. Whichever it is -- that they are the same, or that they are not the same -- that will be a fact about Karl's perception that he doesn't know to be true. Mark |
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#290
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Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
On 5 Aug 2005 00:34:12 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 2 Aug 2005 15:52:16 GMT, Mark DeBellis wrote: Various things are said to be known. "How do you know?" is not a reasonable question? Thousands of lines of agonising about it, without ever trying to find out for yourself, is indicative of ego over interest. Thanks for the diagnosis. apparently without ever considering that it's very simple just to go try it for yourself. Not sure I get you here. Try what? An ABX test? Not sure what a single result would establish. Nothing - that's why you should try 20 results. OK, so I take 20 ABX tests and I can't tell SACD and CD apart in those tests. We know what to infer from this without theory? We know that, to you in that system, they sound the same. If you are saying that a failure to distinguish in an ABX test implies that in the context of normal listening there is no difference in the perceptual information derived from the two sources, we do need theory in order to know that to be true, and I'd be interested to know exactly how we know that to be true. No 'theory' is required Theory is always required. Data without a theory to interpret it is meaningless. Otherwise why not just say, listen sighted and go with what it tells you? It's theory that, rightly, backs you up when you explain why sighted testing is unreliable. Mark |
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#291
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Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
On 5 Aug 2005 00:11:54 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: The audio skeptic is asserting something of this general form. He observes that Karl cannot discriminate between SACD and CD versions of a song in an ABX test (any such test, quick-switch or otherwise). What he claims is, for all we know, the following could be the case: (1) there is some property x such that when Karl listens to the SACD version in its entirety he hears it as having property x but when he listens to the CD version in its entirety he does not hear it as having property x, and (2) there are properties of musical passages that are perceived only when the subject hears an entire piece or song, not short excerpts, but which fade in memory on consecutive time-distal presentations, preventing effective comparison, and (3) x is one such property. Please note that all of (1), (2), and (3) are included in the scope of "for all we know." The reason why (2) and (3) are included is because they may be relevant to explaining why the difference doesn't get picked up in the tests. The skeptic is not asserting that he knows that there is such a property x, or that he knows the nature of that property. He is simply saying that for all we know, there could be such a property. What we know doesn't entail that there isn't. Is the skeptic wrong? Do we know that there is no such property? If so, how do we know that? As ever, you post hundreds of lines but fail to get to the point. At least it's down to hundreds now. In an earlier post you had me at thousands. If x exists, then Karl will be able to listen both CD and SACD many times, and will reliably report the presence of x at the end of each performance via SACD. Perhaps, if we know what question to ask, and if Karl is conscious of x. Suppose he does reliably report the presence of x in that way. Do we know that if we conduct a different test, a quick-switch test where Karl has to say if the two sources sound the same or different to him, that he will reliably diferentiate them? If so, how do we know that? The important thing is that Karl must not *know* which medium is playing each time that he listens. Yes, I agree that that's crucially important. If Karl is unable to do this, then ipso facto x does *not* exist in the physical soundfield, Why should we think that? How do we know that if Karl perceives a certain property of the signal, then he will be able to report that he perceives that property? Does psychology assume that people are always able to reliably report what they perceive? Wouldn't psychophysics be a lot easier if that were true? Mark |
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#292
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Keith Hughes wrote:
Mark DeBellis wrote: ... about this "test within a test" issue, could you please explain your idea that "All Karl has to do is repeat *EXACTLY* what he did above. He say's to himself, 'Hmmmm, I like A better than B, logic dictates that they must be different'" (Date: 26 Jul 2005 18:10:52 GMT, Message-ID: ). It sounds to me like that is simply saying to enact the method of one test within another. If it isn't, then what do you mean? I'm unsure how you can be missing this point. Let's take it one step at a time: 1. Karl is presented with some form of probe signal, "A", followed by a second, "B". He's asked to rate them for enjoyment. 2. Karl enjoys A significantly more than he enjoys B. Karl *must* know, at that point, that A and B are *not* the same. This is simple logic; if AB = 1 (true), then A=B = 0 (false). This is the most basic form of a truth table. 3. 1. Karl is presented with probe signal A, followed by B. He's asked to determine if they are the same, or different. Barring stipulation of intrusive test restrictions (re. listening times, manners, order of presentation, time dista presentations, etc. - which *NO ONE* has *ever* suggested here to my knowledge), Karl will evaluate the two, and will, as he has already demonstrated to be the case, enjoy A more than B. Once again, the logic is irrefutable. If he enjoys one more than the other, he *knows* they are not the same. p.s. Let me try putting the question the other way round. If we were seeking to determine whether Karl derives greater pleasure, blind, from the SACD version of the song heard in its entirety than the CD version heard in its entirety, and in particular to gain evidence that he doesn't, what sort of test would be relevant? Clearly, you have given an example of such a test, but would any sort of "same/different judgment" test be adequate for this purpose if it *doesn't* incorporate your suggestion that Karl "repeat *EXACTLY* what he did" in the rating-of-enjoyment test? Mark |
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#293
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wrote in message ...
I fail to see why this is more scientific then listening alone tests. Why assume those responses "excitement", maybe they are repulsion or dred. If one wants to do this it is still required that which cable is in use is not known. In fact an intresting test would be to use this setup and have runs where it is known and others wher it is not, that would use the same test to confirm that perceptions or "bodily functions" are a product of knowing what the wire is just as it is when using listening. In any case, this is speculation and the state of the art at present and the nbenchmark for all others to compare are the results that hearing difference disappears when wire being used is not known.. That one can imagine alternatives is not the same as it being valid and doesn't replace the current benchmark. "The only 'test' in the scientific sense that would have any value would be to have a subject wear something resembling the equipment used for lie detection. The subject's bodily functions would be monitored while he listens to two or more different cables, to a succession of musical selections repeated several times with each cable. The order of presentation would be randomized, so that he is not always listeing to a given cable first. If there is a difference in the 'excitement' provided by one cable over another, it may show up in the readings. Presumably, a more-excited subject's physiological responses (heart rate, breathing, galvanic skin response, etc.) would be elevated. If the product is indeed more 'exciting', it should cause measurable differences in the subject's responses." Exciting is only one response, and probably not the proper one in many situations. Music elicits many emotional responses...joy, sorrow, melancholy, wistfulness, etc. Excitement per se is just one of them. That's why if one is going to take measurements, it makes more sense to monitor directly what is happening to the areas of the brain known to be associated with emotions. |
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On 6 Aug 2005 15:20:28 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote:
Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 5 Aug 2005 00:11:54 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: The audio skeptic is asserting something of this general form. He observes that Karl cannot discriminate between SACD and CD versions of a song in an ABX test (any such test, quick-switch or otherwise). What he claims is, for all we know, the following could be the case: (1) there is some property x such that when Karl listens to the SACD version in its entirety he hears it as having property x but when he listens to the CD version in its entirety he does not hear it as having property x, and (2) there are properties of musical passages that are perceived only when the subject hears an entire piece or song, not short excerpts, but which fade in memory on consecutive time-distal presentations, preventing effective comparison, and (3) x is one such property. Please note that all of (1), (2), and (3) are included in the scope of "for all we know." The reason why (2) and (3) are included is because they may be relevant to explaining why the difference doesn't get picked up in the tests. The skeptic is not asserting that he knows that there is such a property x, or that he knows the nature of that property. He is simply saying that for all we know, there could be such a property. What we know doesn't entail that there isn't. Is the skeptic wrong? Do we know that there is no such property? If so, how do we know that? As ever, you post hundreds of lines but fail to get to the point. At least it's down to hundreds now. In an earlier post you had me at thousands. That was then, this is now. Perhaps you are improving.......... If x exists, then Karl will be able to listen both CD and SACD many times, and will reliably report the presence of x at the end of each performance via SACD. Perhaps, if we know what question to ask, and if Karl is conscious of x. Irrelevant. It's *your* postulation that Karl senses 'x', otherwise he could not say that it is present. Suppose he does reliably report the presence of x in that way. Do we know that if we conduct a different test, a quick-switch test where Karl has to say if the two sources sound the same or different to him, that he will reliably diferentiate them? If so, how do we know that? How do we know? We *test* him, of course, using the alternative protocol. Have you forgotten that this is the entire premise of the thread? The important thing is that Karl must not *know* which medium is playing each time that he listens. Yes, I agree that that's crucially important. Well, that's a start, I suppose. If Karl is unable to do this, then ipso facto x does *not* exist in the physical soundfield, Why should we think that? Because it is the logical conclusion. How do we know that if Karl perceives a certain property of the signal, then he will be able to report that he perceives that property? Because if he could not report it, he did not perceive it. I believe a 'duuh' should be inserted around here somewhere. Does psychology assume that people are always able to reliably report what they perceive? Wouldn't psychophysics be a lot easier if that were true? Psychology, if properly done, like any science, *assumes* nothing. OTOH, psy is a notoriously 'soft' science, where nothing seems to be truly certain, and certainly lacks significant evidence. It's a bit like educational theories - they are as prolific as ani. And what the heck is 'psychophysics'? -- Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering |
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On 6 Aug 2005 15:19:45 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote:
Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 5 Aug 2005 00:34:12 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 2 Aug 2005 15:52:16 GMT, Mark DeBellis wrote: Various things are said to be known. "How do you know?" is not a reasonable question? Thousands of lines of agonising about it, without ever trying to find out for yourself, is indicative of ego over interest. Thanks for the diagnosis. apparently without ever considering that it's very simple just to go try it for yourself. Not sure I get you here. Try what? An ABX test? Not sure what a single result would establish. Nothing - that's why you should try 20 results. OK, so I take 20 ABX tests and I can't tell SACD and CD apart in those tests. We know what to infer from this without theory? We know that, to you in that system, they sound the same. If you are saying that a failure to distinguish in an ABX test implies that in the context of normal listening there is no difference in the perceptual information derived from the two sources, we do need theory in order to know that to be true, and I'd be interested to know exactly how we know that to be true. No, we don't need theory. What we need is results from testing of alternate methods. We have *lots* of those, and ABChr seems to be the ultimate winner, but time-proximate ABX is a close second. Long-term execises such as are often recommended by the 'subjectivists' don;t seem to work in practice, while any kind of sighted test is immediately thrown out due to massive expectation bias effects. No 'theory' is required Theory is always required. No, *facts* are required, *observations* are required, and experimental *evidence* is required. Once you have those, you can then hypothesise, and *test* your hypothesis against the experimental results. Data without a theory to interpret it is meaningless. Otherwise why not just say, listen sighted and go with what it tells you? It's theory that, rightly, backs you up when you explain why sighted testing is unreliable. No, it's the results of practical experiments which back you up. -- Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering |
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"Stewart Pinkerton" wrote in message
... ....snip... And what the heck is 'psychophysics'? ?!? http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/psychophysics  |
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Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
On 6 Aug 2005 15:20:28 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 5 Aug 2005 00:11:54 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: The audio skeptic is asserting something of this general form. He observes that Karl cannot discriminate between SACD and CD versions of a song in an ABX test (any such test, quick-switch or otherwise). What he claims is, for all we know, the following could be the case: (1) there is some property x such that when Karl listens to the SACD version in its entirety he hears it as having property x but when he listens to the CD version in its entirety he does not hear it as having property x, and (2) there are properties of musical passages that are perceived only when the subject hears an entire piece or song, not short excerpts, but which fade in memory on consecutive time-distal presentations, preventing effective comparison, and (3) x is one such property. Please note that all of (1), (2), and (3) are included in the scope of "for all we know." The reason why (2) and (3) are included is because they may be relevant to explaining why the difference doesn't get picked up in the tests. The skeptic is not asserting that he knows that there is such a property x, or that he knows the nature of that property. He is simply saying that for all we know, there could be such a property. What we know doesn't entail that there isn't. Is the skeptic wrong? Do we know that there is no such property? If so, how do we know that? As ever, you post hundreds of lines but fail to get to the point. At least it's down to hundreds now. In an earlier post you had me at thousands. That was then, this is now. Perhaps you are improving.......... You are entirely too modest. If x exists, then Karl will be able to listen both CD and SACD many times, and will reliably report the presence of x at the end of each performance via SACD. Perhaps, if we know what question to ask, and if Karl is conscious of x. Irrelevant. It's *your* postulation that Karl senses 'x', otherwise he could not say that it is present. Yes, if he doesn't perceive x then he won't be able to report it. But that's not equivalent to what you said previously, which is the inverse: if he does perceive x then he will be able to report it. And why should that be the case? (See below.) Suppose he does reliably report the presence of x in that way. Do we know that if we conduct a different test, a quick-switch test where Karl has to say if the two sources sound the same or different to him, that he will reliably diferentiate them? If so, how do we know that? How do we know? We *test* him, of course, using the alternative protocol. Have you forgotten that this is the entire premise of the thread? OK, I am asking whether we have some theory that predicts that if Karl reports a difference then the quick-switch test will also show a difference. If Karl is unable to do this, then ipso facto x does *not* exist in the physical soundfield, Why should we think that? Because it is the logical conclusion. What are the premises from which it follows as a matter of logic? I mean deductively. How do we know that if Karl perceives a certain property of the signal, then he will be able to report that he perceives that property? Because if he could not report it, he did not perceive it. I believe a 'duuh' should be inserted around here somewhere. What would you say about cognitive psychologists' theories of pitch height and chroma (say), which they say listeners perceive; very few people, if any, could *report* what they perceive in these terms. The psychologists' route to knowing about them is far more circuitous than through reliance on direct report. Does psychology assume that people are always able to reliably report what they perceive? Wouldn't psychophysics be a lot easier if that were true? Psychology, if properly done, like any science, *assumes* nothing. Not sure what you mean by that. OTOH, psy is a notoriously 'soft' science, where nothing seems to be truly certain, and certainly lacks significant evidence. That's unfortunate, because any claim about what audio tests tell us about what people hear is basically a claim about, and relies on our background knowledge of, human psychology. It's a bit like educational theories - they are as prolific as ani. And what the heck is 'psychophysics'? It's (part of) what's covered in the journal Perception and Psychophysics. Mark |
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Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
On 6 Aug 2005 15:19:45 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Theory is always required. No, *facts* are required, *observations* are required, and experimental *evidence* is required. Once you have those, you can then hypothesise, and *test* your hypothesis against the experimental results. OK. Clearly you take a different view from that of many writers in the philosophy of science, who argue that there is no such thing as "theory-neutral" observation, e.g., N. R. Hanson and W. V. O. Quine. I myself find that view pretty persuasive. Mark |
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"Stewart Pinkerton" wrote in message
... On 6 Aug 2005 15:19:45 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 5 Aug 2005 00:34:12 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: snip, jump to relevant section to my comment If you are saying that a failure to distinguish in an ABX test implies that in the context of normal listening there is no difference in the perceptual information derived from the two sources, we do need theory in order to know that to be true, and I'd be interested to know exactly how we know that to be true. No, we don't need theory. What we need is results from testing of alternate methods. We have *lots* of those, and ABChr seems to be the ultimate winner, but time-proximate ABX is a close second. Long-term execises such as are often recommended by the 'subjectivists' don;t seem to work in practice, while any kind of sighted test is immediately thrown out due to massive expectation bias effects. No 'theory' is required Theory is always required. No, *facts* are required, *observations* are required, and experimental *evidence* is required. Once you have those, you can then hypothesise, and *test* your hypothesis against the experimental results. Data without a theory to interpret it is meaningless. Otherwise why not just say, listen sighted and go with what it tells you? It's theory that, rightly, backs you up when you explain why sighted testing is unreliable. No, it's the results of practical experiments which back you up. Why does that mathematician's comment at the HE2005 "debate" spring to mind.....his comment that in his classes at MIT the engineers were always separating themselves from the mathematicians and physicists by "jumping to the end point" and failing to examine the underlying premises"? |
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Mark DeBellis wrote:
Keith Hughes wrote: I'm not postulating that the mechanisms are totally different, only observing that the testing situations are psychologically different in significant respects. No, you are not "observing" that the situations are significantly different, you are hypothesizing, sans evidence, that there *could* be a difference. Not at all the same thing. First of all, I am observing that the two kinds of tests we are discussing (rating and same/different judgment) ask different questions of the subject, or request him/her to perform different tasks. They are different situations from a psychological standpoint. I understand that you are *asserting* that to be the case. To be true, one has to accept that a subject can be able to enjoy A more than B without being able to make a conclusion about same/difference. I believe that I have describe, in detail, why I find this totally implausible. Second, for something to be presented as a hypothesis does not mean that it is asserted to be true, or that the person presenting it says he knows is true. A hypothesis is something "submitted for your consideration," a la Rod Serling. An hypothesis is typically an explanation of observed phenomena, or a set of assumptions to be tested by observation. An hypothesis must also, to have any rigor, be falsifiable. Your 'hypothesis' is found wanting against these criteria. You have been arguing that I can't know that certain things are true. But I haven't been claiming to know that those things are true.(*) No, you have been postulating non-verifiable, non-falsifiable, and non-observable mechanisms to generate doubt about all existing test methodologies. Rather, I am asking what evidence there is, if any, that they're false. (If we don't know that they're false, then, for all we know, they could be true.) Good lord man, is this really your position? That anything is possible as long as we can't *prove* that it isn't? Whether I have evidence for the hypothesis is relevant only if I am asserting it to be true. I do not have to already know it's true, or claim to know it's true, in order to ask what evidence there is for it, pro or con. If the hypothesis is not falsifiable, by its very construction, it is a "position", or "belief", not an hypothesis. I mean, really. I am saying, what if? What if such and such were true? Would it show up on the tests? Come, now...you were not saying "what if", you were using an analogy to support what is obviously your opinion that the "typical" audio test methods are deficient. If you want to tell me *why* such and such can't be true, or why it *would* show up on the tests, great. But you seem to be saying that you've resolved the matter when you say that I've put the idea forward without having sufficient evidence that it's true. It's a hypothetical question. Again, I have been trying to explain why, IMO, your *analogy* is not relevant, for the myriad reasons discussed, in the context of supporting your position. That is the only matter I'm saying is resolved (to my mind obviously). snip I'm unsure how you can be missing this point. Let's take it one step at a time: 1. Karl is presented with some form of probe signal, "A", followed by a second, "B". He's asked to rate them for enjoyment. 2. Karl enjoys A significantly more than he enjoys B. Karl *must* know, at that point, that A and B are *not* the same. This is simple logic; if AB = 1 (true), then A=B = 0 (false). This is the most basic form of a truth table. Possibly, Karl knows this only because he sees that he rated A a "7" and B a "6." He doesn't *see* it, he *does* it. That's what the test is. I notice you also use "6" and "7" presumably to imply small, subtle differences. Another defect in this type of test - resolution. You need a very large sample size, under controlled conditions, from each subject, to estimate the precision of the test. He does not necessarily, at the end of B, make a direct mental comparison of the amounts of enjoyment. His knowledge that he enjoys one more than the other depends upon his coding his enjoyment as a rating, and comparing the ratings. Well, you never tire of trying this contextual obfuscation do you? The test *requires* him to make these comparisons, yet you keep wanting to talk about what "might" be if it weren't a test, and extrapolate that to support the idea that the same mechanism exists within the context of the test. There *is* no "what if he doesn't compare" within the context of a test for which comparison is the basis. 3. 1. Karl is presented with probe signal A, followed by B. He's asked to determine if they are the same, or different. Barring stipulation of intrusive test restrictions (re. listening times, manners, order of presentation, time dista presentations, etc. - which *NO ONE* has *ever* suggested here to my knowledge), Karl will evaluate the two, Using the procedure of "rating them for enjoyment" as described above, yes? Yes, as a matter of course. and will, as he has already demonstrated to be the case, enjoy A more than B. Once again, the logic is irrefutable. If he enjoys one more than the other, he *knows* they are not the same. Yes, because the rating system enables him to know *that* he enjoys A more than he enjoys B. But what are the chances that someone will actually go about determining whether A and B are the same or different in this way? Not high; They don't need to "go about" comparing that way, its part of everyday perception. Do you only enjoy something if you're being asked to rate it? Do you need a pencil and paper to remember what you like better? why would a person even think of doing it that way? They would have to think about *not* doing it that way, to some extent, to not let their enjoyment or satisfaction become part of their perception. You think my view mechanistic, yet you seem to think perception is defined by a series of subroutines that are exclusive, and do not execute concurrently. It's more likely that they would compare the sounds and not think about, or encode and keep track of the levels of, their enjoyment. But unless Karl follows the procedure you outline, It is not a *procedure*, it is a recognition of normal perception. It is your proposition that enjoyment can *ONLY* be a factor in a ratings test, which is patently ridiculous. there is no assurance that he will reliably discriminate between A and B even if he rates them differently in the first test you describe. There is every assurance that statistically valid discrimination in the first test will result in the ability to discriminate in a same/difference test. You are trying hard to find ways to compartmentalize perception such that there can be no overlap in the perceptual mechanisms involved in various forms of audio presentation. Where's the evidence that such is the case? I am not saying that there isn't *some* way of conducting a same/different judgment test that would be equally sensitive as a ratings test (you have told us what it is); I'm suggesting that a normally enacted same/different judgment test might, for all we know, not be as sensitive, and so far I haven't seen why that's wrong. The same argument is just as valid for assuming that we're descended from space aliens. Just a matter of degree. Hence the falsifiability requirement for a true hypothesis. Patently, if you ask someone on consecutive mornings, what color tie is this, he could answer "blue" both times, but not be able to tell you, on the second day, that the ties were the same color (because on the second day he doesn't remember what color he saw on the first). Which is, again, irrelevant in the context you supposed. You showed the same tie each day, he recognized Blue each day, and from that (for this to be relevant to your Karl analogy), you presume could have "seen" using two different mechanisms I'm not assuming that two different mechanisms are involved. It could be two instances of the same mechanism. You absolutely are - in the context of the actual discussion. Otherwise you would not think that the situations are 'psychologically different'. Since the 'situation' cannot, in and of itself, be psychologically different ("it" has no psyche, after all), you must be saying that the situation elicits a different psychological response (i.e. different in a mechanistic sense) from the subject. I think we are getting mixed up between the two examples. "Psychologically different" applies to the two tests example, "could be two instances of the same mechanism" applies to the "blue--blue" example. ... No confusion on my part...I'm saying that for the two test examples to be psychologically different *within the context of the test parameters* would require that the perceptual mechanisms employed must be different. Well, it sounds to me like you have just proved on the basis of your theory that a person cannot fail to remember what they had for breakfast, and that's open to a rapid reductio. Isn't it obvious that, try as you like to "force the comparison," if he doesn't remember what he saw yesterday then he can't reliably compare the things? Then he can't judge them to be the same. Clearly you ignored the "Again you ignore the context" admonition, because again we have the "but what if he forgot" hyperbole. An example where Karl cannot judge same/difference between what he heard 50 years ago and what he heard today has *zero* relevance to the discussion. snip However, responding to A one way and responding to B in a different way is not equivalent to judging that A and B are different. Of course it is. Well, no, it isn't. The two things should not be identified with one another. We may as well make this an aural example. You and I both have perfect pitch. On Tuesday morning you hear a pitch and say, "It's D." On Wednesday morning you hear a pitch and say, "It's E." You are asked, was it the same pitch both days? You say "No." On Tuesday morning I hear a pitch and say, "It's D." On Wednesday morning I hear a pitch and say, "It's E." I am asked, was it the same pitch both days? I say, "I don't know because I don't remember what I heard yesterday." Again, and analogy based on a supposition that has no place in any well designed test. As we've discussed at length. There is a psychological difference between us, one that is reflected pretty clearly in our behavior. The main difference is that you can, and do, judge that the pitches on the two days were different, whereas I am unable to make such a judgment. You clearly do not understand what a test is, and concomitant data analysis methodology. "I don't know, I can't remember yesterday" is a non-response. It is a clear indication of either a flawed methodolgy, or an unsuitable subject. Whereas the inability to discriminate a difference in a time-proximate test presentation, *is* indicative of actual perceptual performance. However, it is true to say of each of us that we responded to A one way and responded to B in a different way. And, of course, reminding you that yesterday you identified the sound as "D" would clearly allow you to make a determination of "different". Hence the analogy (the original Blue analogy) fails, since there is an internal construct against which you've already made an identification, and you *MUST* forget for you not to be able to make a distinction. Do you fail to see how contrived this is? Therefore responding to A one way and responding to B in a different way is not equivalent to judging that A and B are different, since the former is something I do but the latter is not. If you ignore context, and impose an implausible range of constraints. snip OK. In general, how do you create a "properly constructed, time proximate test" that forces a reliable same/different evaluation, if what we are measuring, in the ratings test, is the subject's perception of a temporally extended property of the signal? You presuppose that such exists. As I've stated to Mr. Lavo on occasion, you need only do a level matched, blind, test. Do it *any* way you want, subject to the listed constraints, and do a sufficient number of trials to get a statistically valid result. If you cannot differentiate, you have no observation on which to form an hypothesis. To say "well, all my listening says they sound the same, and analysis of the engineering behind the articles/recordings/etc. indicate that relative to the established thresholds of human hearing, they should sound the same, but maybe they don't...I better speculate on what could be causing these results", hardly even rises to the level of speculation. Comparing longer excerpts will be prey to problems of memory. Yes, that's why it isn't done by serious people. Suppose then we force comparison of corresponding short portions of the signal in a time-proximate way. How do we know that this will be sensitive to all differences to which the ratings test is sensitive? How do we know it is sensitive to all the difference that we imagine might be there? That we have never observed? That there's absolutely no basis for supposing? The germane question is "why would we care?". Only in the presence of contravening data would the question have merit. (In other words, there might be more than one sense in which a person can be said to "make a distinction.") Another irrelevancy. The key is to "make a distinction". Though there may indeed be myriad ways to make a distinction, distinction=perceived difference, as you just stated above. I don't mean to quibble, but if for certain purposes or in certain contexts the distinction between "differential response" and "judging to be different" is not "relevant," or if it ends up that you always have one where you have the other (in those restricted contexts), that's one thing, but there is still a fundamental difference between them. (And where there is a "perceived difference," things are judged to be different; again, it's one *way* of making a distinction, it's misleading to say "distinction=perceived difference" as you do above.) Only out of the context of the test. Why must you always equivocate with "for certain purposes" or "certain contexts"? We're only talking about one context. There is an important psychological difference between the person who is able to compare the contents of perceptions he enjoys at different times and one who can't (as in the perfect pitch example above). Which is irrelevant, as discussed above. That difference is not "irrelevant" to psychology generally, Which we are not adressing or discussing. even if it does not arise, as I think you are saying, in the context of "properly constructed tests." And if the discussion raises the question, "What are the scope and limits of such tests?" then we can't know a priori that such distinctions are irrelevant to the discussion. Clearly we can. That's what occurs in test construction. That is what controlling for extraneous variables is all about. If relying on long term memory is not efficacious, for example, then we exclude that from the test method. Responding to A one way and responding to B another way is *not* the same thing as judging that they are different; each of them is a certain *way* of making a distinction. The terms should not be used interchangeably, and it should not be assumed that they are the same thing. At best, they coincide in the context of tests that are constructed in a way that ensures that they do coincide (if I understand you right). A distinction between them would not arise in such contexts, just as "equilateral" and "equiangular" apply to the same things when the discussion is restricted to triangles; though the properties are distinct from one another, and do come apart when applied to other figures. The question of how the judgment of a similarity is related to individual perceptions is one of the central questions that Kant wrote about. The difference may tend not to arise in certain contexts because of the way those contexts are designed, but that doesn't mean they're the same thing. The responses are the same if the context is controlled, and the boundaries constrained...the situation under discussion. Whether an abstraction can be imagined in which the difference is intrusive is irrelevant. Once a difference is perceived, through whatever mechanism, or manner, one must be devoid of deductive skill to be unable to apply the simple truth table, and determine same=false, different=true. The assumption that the person can recognize the identity between what is contained in one perception and what is contained in another is a substantive psychological assumption. People don't remember everything they perceive, and they aren't logically omniscient. And not every context is one of "properly constructed" testing. There is a lot of idealization going on in your model of human abilities and behavior. No, my "model" is based on objectively verifiable phenomena, and behavior. Your "model" is based on the assumption that if we are not omniscient, we know nothing for certain. That if we do not fully and completely understand every nuance of how a perception is generated, that applying statistical interpretations of the objective results of perception are of no use, because they cannot *prove* that there are, and can be, no other interpretations. Fine for philosophical ponderings, inimical to observational science. Sorry, but I fail to see any value to either of us in continuing this discussion. And, as I have too many protocols to write, and reams of data to analyze, I'll bid you adieu with this post. Keith Hughes |
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Harry Lavo wrote:
Why does that mathematician's comment at the HE2005 "debate" spring to mind.....his comment that in his classes at MIT the engineers were always separating themselves from the mathematicians and physicists by "jumping to the end point" and failing to examine the underlying premises"? Using the word "always" in this context is hyperbole. Is he "always" correct just because he is a mathematician? |
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Harry Lavo wrote:
"Stewart Pinkerton" wrote in message snip Data without a theory to interpret it is meaningless. Otherwise why not just say, listen sighted and go with what it tells you? It's theory that, rightly, backs you up when you explain why sighted testing is unreliable. No, it's the results of practical experiments which back you up. Why does that mathematician's comment at the HE2005 "debate" spring to mind.....his comment that in his classes at MIT the engineers were always separating themselves from the mathematicians and physicists by "jumping to the end point" and failing to examine the underlying premises"? Because that statement is about the difference between theory and practice. Very similar to the difference between Newtonian and Quantum mechanics. Newtonian physics are *facts*, and reflect the results observable in the macro world. Properly applied Newtonian physics will allow you to predict exactly what will happen in the macro world. It is not *relavent* to the macro world that the underpinnings of the physics and mathematics employed may comprise many mechanistic or probablistic component effects that are not completely delineated. Certainly, that is not to say that investigation into the micro-level effects is not interesting, or illuminating. Neither you nor I understand gravity at the most fundamental level, but clearly we can measure the acceleration due to gravity, and we can can calculate, with 100% certainty, what the effects of that acceleration will be (given that we understand the other macro effects in the specific case of interest). Keith Hughes |
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On 6 Aug 2005 20:34:31 GMT, "_Dejan_" wrote:
"Stewart Pinkerton" wrote in message ... ...snip... And what the heck is 'psychophysics'? ?!? http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/psychophysics Ah, OK, I know the subject, but wasn't familiar with the term. Certainly, when I studied Psy at Aberdeen Uni back in the '60s, it wasn't a term in common use. Agreed that it's relevant to audio. -- Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering |
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On 6 Aug 2005 20:35:21 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote:
Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 6 Aug 2005 15:20:28 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Suppose he does reliably report the presence of x in that way. Do we know that if we conduct a different test, a quick-switch test where Karl has to say if the two sources sound the same or different to him, that he will reliably diferentiate them? If so, how do we know that? How do we know? We *test* him, of course, using the alternative protocol. Have you forgotten that this is the entire premise of the thread? OK, I am asking whether we have some theory that predicts that if Karl reports a difference then the quick-switch test will also show a difference. We don't have 'a theory', we have hundreds of DBTs performed every day by major audio manufacturers. Over many decades of research by psychoacousticians, quick-switched short-term tests have *proven* to be the most sensitive for the differentiation of small, but *real*, acoustic differences. To be precise, ABChr is currently considered to be the ultimate DBT, and is the basic model used by those developing advanced lossy compression codecs such as AAC and MP3. If Karl is unable to do this, then ipso facto x does *not* exist in the physical soundfield, Why should we think that? Because it is the logical conclusion. What are the premises from which it follows as a matter of logic? I mean deductively. If he does not sense it, it is *by definition* not audible, and he canbnot report it. That he might not *report* a difference that he did sense, would be perverse. In case there was some ambiguity in my earlier statement, there are of course many *measurable* differences in the physical soundfield which are below audibility. How do we know that if Karl perceives a certain property of the signal, then he will be able to report that he perceives that property? Because if he could not report it, he did not perceive it. I believe a 'duuh' should be inserted around here somewhere. What would you say about cognitive psychologists' theories of pitch height and chroma (say), which they say listeners perceive; very few people, if any, could *report* what they perceive in these terms. The psychologists' route to knowing about them is far more circuitous than through reliance on direct report. What psycholigists say people perceive, tends to drift with time..... Does psychology assume that people are always able to reliably report what they perceive? Wouldn't psychophysics be a lot easier if that were true? Psychology, if properly done, like any science, *assumes* nothing. Not sure what you mean by that. Read it again. Science does not assume - but is psychology a true science? OTOH, psy is a notoriously 'soft' science, where nothing seems to be truly certain, and certainly lacks significant evidence. That's unfortunate, because any claim about what audio tests tell us about what people hear is basically a claim about, and relies on our background knowledge of, human psychology. OTOH, it's easy to *demonstrate* that sighted listening is useless for differentiating amall acoustic differences, withoiut calling upon any psychological theories. It's a bit like educational theories - they are as prolific as ani. And what the heck is 'psychophysics'? It's (part of) what's covered in the journal Perception and Psychophysics. Indeed so. I was not previously familiar with the term, but it is of course relevant to audio. -- Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering |
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On 6 Aug 2005 20:35:44 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote:
Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 6 Aug 2005 15:19:45 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Theory is always required. No, *facts* are required, *observations* are required, and experimental *evidence* is required. Once you have those, you can then hypothesise, and *test* your hypothesis against the experimental results. OK. Clearly you take a different view from that of many writers in the philosophy of science, who argue that there is no such thing as "theory-neutral" observation, e.g., N. R. Hanson and W. V. O. Quine. I myself find that view pretty persuasive. I have no overt interest in the philosophy of Science, only in its practical implementation. -- Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering |
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On 7 Aug 2005 01:37:04 GMT, "Harry Lavo" wrote:
"Stewart Pinkerton" wrote in message ... On 6 Aug 2005 15:19:45 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Data without a theory to interpret it is meaningless. Otherwise why not just say, listen sighted and go with what it tells you? It's theory that, rightly, backs you up when you explain why sighted testing is unreliable. No, it's the results of practical experiments which back you up. Why does that mathematician's comment at the HE2005 "debate" spring to mind.....his comment that in his classes at MIT the engineers were always separating themselves from the mathematicians and physicists by "jumping to the end point" and failing to examine the underlying premises"? Indeed - that's why engineers get things done, while the mathematicians are still worrying about the origin of that strange fourth-order term. The engineer simply shrugs and adds another 3% safety margin. -- Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering |
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Harry Lavo wrote:
Exciting is only one response, and probably not the proper one in many situations. Music elicits many emotional responses...joy, sorrow, melancholy, wistfulness, etc. Excitement per se is just one of them. That's why if one is going to take measurements, it makes more sense to monitor directly what is happening to the areas of the brain known to be associated with emotions. Yes, certainly, the hell with listening. Who needs it? ;-( |
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Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
Why does that mathematician's comment at the HE2005 "debate" spring to mind.....his comment that in his classes at MIT the engineers were always separating themselves from the mathematicians and physicists by "jumping to the end point" and failing to examine the underlying premises"? Indeed - that's why engineers get things done, while the mathematicians are still worrying about the origin of that strange fourth-order term. The engineer simply shrugs and adds another 3% safety margin. It's also why they build things from time to time that break or don't work. Demands of the practical world force compromise on folks with deadlines and budgets. I just don't understand the blanket denial of this slop built into real world applications of theoretical ideals. Scott Wheeler |
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Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
On 6 Aug 2005 20:35:44 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 6 Aug 2005 15:19:45 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Theory is always required. No, *facts* are required, *observations* are required, and experimental *evidence* is required. Once you have those, you can then hypothesise, and *test* your hypothesis against the experimental results. OK. Clearly you take a different view from that of many writers in the philosophy of science, who argue that there is no such thing as "theory-neutral" observation, e.g., N. R. Hanson and W. V. O. Quine. I myself find that view pretty persuasive. I have no overt interest in the philosophy of Science, only in its practical implementation. The two ton gorilla in the room that any philosopehr who asserts that facts are merely social constructs is that stuff based on scientific reasoning *works*. It can't be mere chance that the technology developed by science and engineering actually does what it's intended to do. DBTs *work*. And they don't always give the answer that's *desired*. Certainly scientists' pet theories don't always turn out to be true, either. So what would it matter to the endless self-correcting nature of science , if observations weren't ever 'theory neutral'? The ones that are *wrong* will find themselves at odds with the rest of the data eventually. That hasn't happened with DBTs. -- -S "You know what love really is? It's like you've swallowed a great big secret. A warm wonderful secret that nobody else knows about." - 'Blame it on Rio' |
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Steven Sullivan wrote:
The two ton gorilla in the room that any philosopehr who asserts that facts are merely social constructs is that stuff based on scientific reasoning *works*. It can't be mere chance that the technology developed by science and engineering actually does what it's intended to do. It obviously isn't mere chance but it obviously is an on going proccess. DBTs *work*. No,all else being equal they work better. They don't *always* work though. And they don't always give the answer that's *desired*. I agree. Interesting that some objectivists tend to reject such tests out of hand while not applying any standards of rigor to reported tests that give desired answers. It's not real science when that happens. Certainly scientists' pet theories don't always turn out to be true, either. So what would it matter to the endless self-correcting nature of science , if observations weren't ever 'theory neutral'? The ones that are *wrong* will find themselves at odds with the rest of the data eventually. That hasn't happened with DBTs. Really? Every dbt in the history of science has yielded correct data? I think not. Scott Wheeler |
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Keith Hughes wrote:
Mark DeBellis wrote: Comparing longer excerpts will be prey to problems of memory. Yes, that's why it isn't done by serious people. p.s. It's avoided precisely *because* the judgment of similarity/difference does not track similarity/difference of perception in such a case, yes? This is why we should not run the two concepts together. We have to make the distinction in order to understand why the methodological constraint is adopted in the first place. Mark |
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Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
On 6 Aug 2005 20:35:44 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 6 Aug 2005 15:19:45 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Theory is always required. No, *facts* are required, *observations* are required, and experimental *evidence* is required. Once you have those, you can then hypothesise, and *test* your hypothesis against the experimental results. OK. Clearly you take a different view from that of many writers in the philosophy of science, who argue that there is no such thing as "theory-neutral" observation, e.g., N. R. Hanson and W. V. O. Quine. I myself find that view pretty persuasive. I have no overt interest in the philosophy of Science, only in its practical implementation. Fair enough, but the question of how theory and observation are related is, after all, a central issue in the philosophy of science. Mark |
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Steven Sullivan wrote:
Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 6 Aug 2005 20:35:44 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 6 Aug 2005 15:19:45 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Theory is always required. No, *facts* are required, *observations* are required, and experimental *evidence* is required. Once you have those, you can then hypothesise, and *test* your hypothesis against the experimental results. OK. Clearly you take a different view from that of many writers in the philosophy of science, who argue that there is no such thing as "theory-neutral" observation, e.g., N. R. Hanson and W. V. O. Quine. I myself find that view pretty persuasive. I have no overt interest in the philosophy of Science, only in its practical implementation. The two ton gorilla in the room that any philosopehr who asserts that facts are merely social constructs is that stuff based on scientific reasoning *works*. It can't be mere chance that the technology developed by science and engineering actually does what it's intended to do. DBTs *work*. OK, so if we want to measure the perception of signals that occupy a span of time, like a musical passage, i.e., temporally extended sounds or sequences of sounds, you are saying DBTs work. In particular, quick-switch same/different judgment tests work. And they are better the shorter the snippets are that are compared, yes? What does "work" mean here? How do we know that they work? Why do they work? Suppose I think that "DBTs work" means this: for any property x, if I perceive passage A as having property x, but do not perceive passage B as having property x, then I will be able to differentiate A and B in the quick-switch same/different judgment test. Is there some scientific explanation of why DBTs work (assuming it is true)? Or is it just a brute fact that they work, not something that can be explained? I mean, I think it's kind of remarkable that they work, if they do. Things could have been otherwise. It could have been that continuous exposure to an ultrasonic signal for 10 seconds would give a person a headache. Suppose I were to compare that with silence in a quick-switch test, and only compared short snippets. Then I wouldn't hear a difference in the test. But the perceptual effect of listening to the 10-second ultrasonic passage would be different from that of listening to 10 seconds of silence. (A failure of supervenience; the example substitutes sensation for perception but it's the same basic idea.) Of course, I have no idea whether there is a type of ultrasonic sound with the property I am describing. But if there isn't, then it just seems like it's a matter of good fortune that things turned out the way they did. DBTs work, but it's entirely contingent that they do. Seems we should expect more than that. In other words, I don't see why they *should* work. Maybe that's the kind of explanation I'm asking for. About the idea that "facts are merely social constructs," I don't think that philosophers who say that observations are "theory-laden" are necessarily saying that. Most philosophers are pretty sensible. Mark |
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Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
On 6 Aug 2005 20:35:21 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 6 Aug 2005 15:20:28 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Suppose he does reliably report the presence of x in that way. Do we know that if we conduct a different test, a quick-switch test where Karl has to say if the two sources sound the same or different to him, that he will reliably diferentiate them? If so, how do we know that? How do we know? We *test* him, of course, using the alternative protocol. Have you forgotten that this is the entire premise of the thread? OK, I am asking whether we have some theory that predicts that if Karl reports a difference then the quick-switch test will also show a difference. We don't have 'a theory', we have hundreds of DBTs performed every day by major audio manufacturers. Over many decades of research by psychoacousticians, quick-switched short-term tests have *proven* to be the most sensitive for the differentiation of small, but *real*, acoustic differences. OK, good point, thanks. To be precise, ABChr is currently considered to be the ultimate DBT, and is the basic model used by those developing advanced lossy compression codecs such as AAC and MP3. If Karl is unable to do this, then ipso facto x does *not* exist in the physical soundfield, Why should we think that? Because it is the logical conclusion. What are the premises from which it follows as a matter of logic? I mean deductively. If he does not sense it, it is *by definition* not audible, and he canbnot report it. That he might not *report* a difference that he did sense, would be perverse. In the above, x is a property, not a difference. The question is whether if he perceives the property x he would be able to report the presence of x, not whether if he perceives a difference he would be able to report a difference. (The perception of a difference is not the same as a difference between perceptions.) In case there was some ambiguity in my earlier statement, there are of course many *measurable* differences in the physical soundfield which are below audibility. How do we know that if Karl perceives a certain property of the signal, then he will be able to report that he perceives that property? Because if he could not report it, he did not perceive it. I believe a 'duuh' should be inserted around here somewhere. What would you say about cognitive psychologists' theories of pitch height and chroma (say), which they say listeners perceive; very few people, if any, could *report* what they perceive in these terms. The psychologists' route to knowing about them is far more circuitous than through reliance on direct report. What psycholigists say people perceive, tends to drift with time..... Well, if what they say implies that people are not always able to report what they perceive, and you say people are always able to report what they perceive, I'm going to believe the psychologists. Mark |
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Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
On 6 Aug 2005 20:35:21 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Stewart Pinkerton wrote: On 6 Aug 2005 15:20:28 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" wrote: Suppose he does reliably report the presence of x in that way. Do we know that if we conduct a different test, a quick-switch test where Karl has to say if the two sources sound the same or different to him, that he will reliably diferentiate them? If so, how do we know that? How do we know? We *test* him, of course, using the alternative protocol. Have you forgotten that this is the entire premise of the thread? OK, I am asking whether we have some theory that predicts that if Karl reports a difference then the quick-switch test will also show a difference. We don't have 'a theory', we have hundreds of DBTs performed every day by major audio manufacturers. Over many decades of research by psychoacousticians, quick-switched short-term tests have *proven* to be the most sensitive for the differentiation of small, but *real*, acoustic differences. To be precise, ABChr is currently considered to be the ultimate DBT, and is the basic model used by those developing advanced lossy compression codecs such as AAC and MP3. p.s. What are those DBTs compared *with*, in order to show that they are more sensitive? Is the comparison systematic or anecdotal? If there is a large body of research on this, then if you or anyone could point me to a survey article, or a representative study say, I'd appreciate it. I can find it pretty plausible that what's been observed indicates that if Karl has a word in his language for property x and can reliably report it on the instances where he detects it, then he'll also discriminate it in a DBT. It's not so evident to me, though, how we know that if there's a subtler, statistical difference on a ratings test then it'll show up on the DBT. Hence my request to point me to the relevant research, thanks. About theory again ... whenever we start talking about interpretation or evaluating the significance of data, that's theory. So whenever we take past data as having some implication for what we will see in the future, that's theory (cf. Hume). It's theory that tells us what aspects of observed situations should be projected to other times or places (Goodman). When you say something has been "proven" to be the "most sensitive," you're not just reporting raw data, or even simply comparing data, but interpreting it and (implicitly) making predictions about the future, yes? That's theory. Mark |
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Keith Hughes wrote:
Mark DeBellis wrote: Rather, I am asking what evidence there is, if any, that they're false. (If we don't know that they're false, then, for all we know, they could be true.) Good lord man, is this really your position? That anything is possible as long as we can't *prove* that it isn't? p.s. Since you asked, "possible" can mean (1) it isn't excluded by what we know, i.e., for all we know, it could be true; call this "epistemically" possible; (2) physically or scientifically possible, i.e., consistent with the laws or principles of physics or other science (including laws we haven't yet discovered). No, I don't think that (1) implies (2). Mark |
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Steven Sullivan wrote:
The two ton gorilla in the room that any philosopehr who asserts that facts are merely social constructs is that stuff based on scientific reasoning *works*. It can't be mere chance that the technology developed by science and engineering actually does what it's intended to do. DBTs *work*. p.s. If DBTs work, then the fact that they work depends on certain things in psychology being true, and it is interesting to think what they must be. For instance, a short-comparison test will work, or be most sensitive, only if a masking effect does not fade over the course of a long, constant signal. If it did, then the perceptual effect of longer signals would not be predicted by the comparison of short snippets. Yes? Mark |
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wrote in message ...
Harry Lavo wrote: Why does that mathematician's comment at the HE2005 "debate" spring to mind.....his comment that in his classes at MIT the engineers were always separating themselves from the mathematicians and physicists by "jumping to the end point" and failing to examine the underlying premises"? Using the word "always" in this context is hyperbole. Is he "always" correct just because he is a mathematician? That was pretty much what he said. I'm just reporting it. |
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