Mark DeBellis wrote:
wrote:
Mark DeBellis wrote:
p.s. Again, what you say here blurs the distinction between (a) whether
the perceptual effects of two 5-minute stretches are the same, and (b)
whether the listener can reliably judge, after hearing the two
stretches in succession, that they are the same (or different).
That's because there is no distinction. And THAT'S because there is no
such thing as a "perceptual effect."
If you
want to *define* the term "audible difference" along the lines of (b),
then nothing stops you, but it's still possible for there to be a
relevant difference in perceptual effects, along the lines of (a),
without the *perception of a difference*. No "definition" will make
those things the same.
Again, there is no such thing as a perceptual effect, independent of
perception. The only possible evidence that two things are perceivably
different is that they are perceived differently.
One way to put the issue is, are two perceptions different in respect
of what properties we perceive the things in question to have? (I.e.,
we perceive A as having property P, and do not perceive B as having
property P.) I think you too quickly paraphrase this in terms of
whether things are "perceivably different," meaning that we perceive a
difference; I think that's begging the question.
If you are saying: the only possible evidence that perceptions differ
in respect of properties perceived is that the things are actually
discriminated from one another, then why should we think that?
Psychoacoustics can and does furnish a theoretical basis on which there
can be evidence of a less direct sort. For instance, we could have
reason to think that a subject hears sound A as having a certain
loudness x, and later hears sound B as having a certain loudness y.
Suppose the subject never actually compares them; still, there will be
a fact of the matter about whether x and y are the same or different.
In a case where our theory predicts, for example, that x and y will be
different, we'd have evidence that the perceptions are different (in
respect of what properties we perceive the sounds to have), even though
the subject doesn't actually discriminate the sounds.
I think that an objectivist might ask, what if conscious perception
depends on many factors other than the attributes of the sound? For
example the perception of the loudness of A depends on what kind of
mood you're in, what you ate for dinner, and what other sounds you just
heard before it. Same with B.
Perhaps this is why the emphasis of the objectivist on comparing A to B
under controlled conditions: because no reliable or predictable
subjective effect exists for a single sound taken in isolation, in
their view.
Mike
You are merely playing at semantics here.
No. It's a point about perception that's relevant to everything on
this thread, and to many of the claims people make on the group.
Mark